Russia: History and Political Culture

Russia History and Political Culture Pisarev, Alexander Tamkang University, Taiwan Abstract Russi.

Pisarev, Alexander

Tamkang University, Taiwan

Abstract Russia: History and Political Culture

Pisarev, Alexander

One of the most typical features of Russia’s traditional and contemporary culture is the issue of unresolved identity in recent times In this sense Russia is not unique, but what is quite peculiar is the way this issue is articulated in Russian cultural tradition The entire Russian history, including the history of culture, can be presented as a cyclical movement between the two extremes of the human universe – West and East If the initial stage of the formation of the Russian state (Kiev Rus), without a doubt, was the result of the impact of the European civilization during the forthcoming periods of Russian history, as the country was under numerous influences which were the result of the “wind from the East.” The two sources of “orientalization” of Russian culture, and political culture in particular, were the incorporation into the Mongol Empire in the 13th century and inheritance of the Byzantine tradition in the 15th century

The first attempt to resolve the contradiction between Western and Eastern sources of Russian cultural tradition was the concept of Moscow as the “Third Rome,” which was destined to unify the fragmented universe on the foundation

of the values of the Orthodoxy Hence, the sprouts of the Russian “messianic idea” came into being The efforts to “Westernize” Russia during the two

centuries of existence of the Russian Empire, and seven decades of the Soviet Empire, failed to resolve the issue of identity, but strengthened the collision between Western-oriented culture and Eastern-type political culture After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the issue of identity resurfaced again and nowadays constitutes one of the most debatable problems, both among the political elites, and the common folk

Keywords: Political Culture, Cultural Identity, Messianism, “Westernizers,”

“Russian Idea”

주제어: 정치 문화, 문화적 정체성, 메시아니즘, 서구주의자, 러시아 사상

Ⅰ Political Culture Approach and Russian Political Culture

The roots of the “political culture” (политическая культура) approach in

political science can be traced back to the middle of the 20th century when the school of the “culture and personality” emerged The new approach was the outcome of merging the concepts that were typical to psychoanalysis and anthropological studies The purpose of several prominent Western scholars who had implied it (Harold Lasswell, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Erich Fromm and others) was to find a scientifically based explanation of such social phenomena as aggression, warfare, authoritarian rule, fascism ect They argued that these phenomena were the outcome of different practices of children’s socialization This school was especially influential during the Second World War when the studies of different types of “national characters” became popular At that time there were published studies on “national characters” of the major powers participating in the war The main hypothesis the scholars relied on was the link between the dominant political culture and patterns of traditional childrearing in a village community in any given country

In the aftermath of the Second World War as a reaction to the anthropological and psychological reductionism, in America, political science

flourished in “rational choice” and “public choice” studies of different patterns of political culture They were focused on research of the voting behavior and based

on such quantitative and scientific methods as interview schedules and content analysis of Mass Media and other materials Although they were challenged in the 1960s and early 1970s by the “New Marxist” approach, which stated that political culture of the West was merely the continuation of the “false consciousness” of the bourgeoisie ideology, they still remained the mainstream in political culture based studies One of the most important contributions of this period of time to the problematic political culture was the formulation of the definition of this approach In the classic research of Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba was given the definition which, though it was challenged on numerous occasions, still remains influential: “internalized cognitions, feelings and evaluations” by the political society actors of the political system(Almond and Verba, 1965, pp 13-14)

This further step was an attempt to put the political culture approach into a broader cultural-historical context and to extend it to studies of different political-cultural traditions The basis for this new definition of culture and its continuation - political culture, was associated with the research of Clifford Geertz, who tried to observe different cultural traditions from the historical-comparative perspective(Geertz, 1973) Thusly, the definition of culture and its integral part – the political culture – was becoming more sophisticated and included such phenomenon as symbolic, expressive, behavioral aspects that had been observed in language, rituals and systems of classification(Cruz, 2005,

p 28) Generally speaking, this shift signified the retreat from “behavioral” interpretation of the political process to its “interpretevist” explanations(Molchanov,

Western countries Nonetheless, though there were significant differences between different “interpretivists,” basically they agreed that the Russian political culture, contrary to the West, was based on absolutism, despotism, collectivism and servility Such scholars as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Edward Keenan, Henry Kissinger, Richard Pipes and Stephen White emphasized the continuity of Russian history, associated the roots of authoritarian tradition with the epoch of Mongol domination and saw its continuation during periods of Muscovy, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union(Pipes, 2001; Tucker, 1990; Billington, 1970)

On the other hand, in Western studies of Russian political culture one can find a different approach, the partisans of which draw attention to a liberal stream in Russian political tradition On the contrary, Stephen Cohen criticized the theory of “unbroken continuity” between different stages in Russian history and blamed this approach for its concept of “predestination” and teleological motives(Cohen, 1985, p 51) During the time of Gorbachev’s reforms, some Western scholars had the chance to conduct field research in Russia and as a result of their “behavioral” studies, they came to the conclusion that democratic orientations and the values of freedom were not alien to the broad Russian public(Hahn, 1993, p 318) For them, as for some other scholars, the trajectory

of the development of the Russian “political culture” was more associated with

such political institutions, as the Novgorod veche (Новгордское вече), Zemskii

Sobor(Земский собор) and zemstvo (земство) They even argued that the Russian

case was not much different from the Eastern European countries and that Russia was simply lagging one step of historical development behind its European neighbors(Malia, 1994)

The studies of the Russian political culture in the Soviet Union started in the 1970s-1980s The definition of “political culture”, which was generally accepted

by Soviet scholars, was quite close to the classic formula suggested by their Western colleagues: internalized cognitions, feelings and evaluations, patterns of behavior of social strata and individuals in their relationship with the system of political power(Orlov, 2008, p 52) Soviet political scientists largely utilized this technique as being typical of their Western colleagues, who had accepted the

“behaviorist” approach to the studies of political culture They managed to arrive

at some important results, though they were undermined to a large extent by the ideological constraints of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology After the fall of communism in Russia, and liberation of the political sciences from their ideological control, the study of Russian history and contemporary Russian society from the point of view of the political culture approach became more common Among the themes that were largely discussed, both by political scientists and politicians were the issues of Russian historical-cultural identity, the problematic relations of the state-society, and the continuity and discontinuity of Russian political tradition(Pivovarov, 2006; Orlov, 2008; Malinova, 2009; Glebova, 2006; Surkov, 2007)

The main purpose of this paper has not been a study of the Russian style

political culture per se, but a reflection of this problem in traditional and

contemporary political discourse and its influence on political ideologies and party politics In this respect two major themes have emerged: the issue of cultural identity and the impact of the state in the process of modernization of the country The former topic was articulated in Russian traditional and contemporary

political thought as the “Russian idea” (Русская идея) concept, while the latter was represented by the concept of “Russian power” (Русская власть) These

two theories, in the authors’ opinion, belong to the domain of the political culture approach and were intimately interrelated with the political process in Russia in the modern world

Ⅱ “Russian Idea” and “Russian Power”

Both advocates and opponents of the ideological trend dominant in Russia today characterize it mainly in vocabulary drawn from the West-European experience of the “clash of ideologies,” principally conservatism, liberalism and socialism (Marxism) However, this formulation may be of value in understanding global politics, as it is less helpful in comprehending the salient features of Russian culture and their continuation – modern politics In the author’s view, three main principle themes had emerged in the debate on Russian political culture Firstly, the unresolved question of cultural-historical self-identification Secondly, messianism as an ideological response to this unresolved problem, which was defined by Russia’s 19th century thinkers as the “Russian idea” concept.1) Thirdly, it was authoritarianism of the state which was instrumental in shaping Russian identity and the powerful Russian nation, which some contemporary Russian scholars categorized as the system of “Russian power”(Mararenko, 1998, p 171) Though this listing may seem common place, the author would argue that these factors were essential to understanding contemporary Russian politics

The issue of cultural-historical identification, as it was well known, was the result of Russia’s complicated history and geography To be precise, it had been Russia’s location between the great civilizations of East and West that determined the historical development of the country Viewed from this angle, the course of Russian history appeared to be constantly shifting between East and West.2) In the initial stage of the history of the Russian state Western influences predominated, while following this Russia was reconstructed on the basis of Eastern political culture during the two centuries of Mongol Empire domination The long-term effect of this “wind from the East” was clearly identifiable during the subsequent period of Muscovite rule in Russia(Yurganov, 1998, pp 197-198)

The two centuries of the Russian Empire, despite Peter the Great’s (Петр Велик

ий) efforts did not see the issue of cultural ambiguity resolved, as one of the

most important outcomes of the reforms was strengthening of samoderzhavie (сам

одержавие), based on the paradigm of “enslavement” of the society by the state,

or system of holopstvo (холопство) (Harhordin, 2011, p 38) They also added a

further contradiction, which was of the sharp confrontation of the Western-oriented culture of Russian nobility and the traditional political culture of

Russian despotism(Faizova, 1999, p 85).

The Russian Empire constituted the historical stage when the Russian state, or the system of “Russian power”, acquired its fullest development The supreme property rights of the state merged with religious and juridical institutions which were intended primarily to protect the state from society and at the same time the state positioned itself as the beneficent patron of its subjects This mode of relations between state and society was obviously quite different from the pre-modern and especially modern European pattern

One response to uncertainty of cultural identity – whether Russia belonged to the West, or constituted the forefront of the East in Europe, was Russian messianism, which saw Russia’s mission as that of the unifier of East and West,

primarily through the medium of the Russian Orthodox Church (Православная Ц

ерковь) These ideas of Russia’s historical role had been apparent, at least since

the 15th century, when the “Second Rome” – the Byzantium Empire, fell to the Turks leaving Russia as the only legitimate successor to the Byzantine civilization which had for so long bridged the East and West At this historical point the

messianic concept of Russia as the “Third Rome” (Третий Рим) came fully into

being.3)

In the middle of the 19th century the theory of the messianic role of Russia

as unifier of the East and West was revived during the debate between

“Slavophiles” (Славянофилы) and “Westernizers” (Западники) The former

advocated the unique contribution of Russia to world history – “Russian idea,” while the latter insisted that their country had no other historical option, but to

accept the basic values of the Western civilization, or “Western way” (Западный

путь)) An important component of this debate was the impact of state

institutions in determining the future development of the country For the supporters of the “Russian idea” concept, the messianic role of Russia as unifier

of the East and West was unachievable without a patron state that was powerful enough to drive society in the right direction For “Slavophiles,” state institutions

as well were closely associated with the role of the traditional rural commune (o

бщина, мир) which underpinned the entire system of social relations They saw

the Russian type of rural community as a unique formation which was basically incompatible with such modern Western institutions as private property and individualism For them the community was the source of the unique spiritual unity of Russian people

Thinkers, writers and politicians who belonged to the “Westernizers” camp –

Pavel Annenkov (Павел Анненков), Timofei Granovskii (Тимофей Грановский), Konstantin Kavelin(Константин Кавелин) strongly believed that Russia had to

accept the model of historical development demonstrated by the Western

civilization On the other hand, their opponents – Ivan Kirievskii (Иван Кириевск

ий), Alexei Homyakov (Алексей Хомяков), Aksakov brothers (братья Аксаковы),

later – Fedor Dostoyevsky (Федор Достоевский), Vladimir Soloviev (Владимир

Соловьев) and others, emphasized the uniqueness of Russian civilization and its

messianic nature Whereas for the “Westernizers” there were no theoretical difficulties in defining their approach (which later laid the groundwork for Russian liberalism), the supporters of the “Slavophile’s” concept had to specify the features of the “unique Russian culture,” the essence of Russian messianism and the main principles of the “Russian idea.”4)

Theoretically, the starting point of this discussion looked different from the theories developed centuries ago Beforehand, Russia was considered to be, in fact, the representative of the “true West,” by the middle of the 19th century, when partisans of the “Russian idea” reformulated the problem This new approach was based on the conception of initial separation between the East and West and Russia, which in turn placed both historically and culturally between these two extremes In other words, this theory stressed the issue of cultural-historical identity, as Russia had to identify itself with the West, the East,

or neither An influential Russian thinker and philosopher in the middle of the

19th century Petr Chaadaev (Петр Чаадаев) was the first who presented the

problem in this light He wrote: “And yet placed between the two great divisions

of the world, between East and West, resting one elbow on China and the other

on Germany, we ought to combine in ourselves the two great principles of human intelligence, imagination and reason, and fuse in one civilization the history of all parts of the globe”(Chaadaev, 2004, p 36) Probably, it was Dostoyevsky who suggested the clearest response to the theoretical challenge, whether Russia belongs to the East or to the West His argument was: Russia belongs both to the Western and Eastern worlds, hence to the mankind as a whole, and in this sense is capable to demonstrate something critically valuable for both parts of the divided universe Specifically, argued Dostoyevsky, certain moral values, which did not exist as part of the Oriental cultural tradition and could not be found any longer in contemporary Western societies.5)

The adoption, by Russian intelligentsia in the second part of the 19th century,

of a revolutionary strategy of reconstruction of semi-traditional society did not signify an end to the feud between the proponents of “Western way” and

“Russian idea.” The Russian populists-narodniks (народники) were inspired by the

messianic ideal of establishment of a socialist society not only in Russia, but all over the world, on the foundation of communitarian institutions close to the Russian type.6) The example of another faction of Russian revolutionary movement looked quite different, as Russian social-democrats initially declared

that the “Western way” was the only historical option for Russian society (встат

ь на дорожку Запада – Ленин) On the eve of the 1917 October revolution (О

ктябрьская революция), however, the familiar messianic impulse became more

and more obvious For Bolsheviks (большевики), the center of the world-wide

revolution shifted from Western Europe to Russia and this important break with the central point of the Marxist teaching can be considered as an adoption of the

basic principles of “Russian idea.” In this sense, the Soviet Russia (Советская Р

оссия) represented more continuity than the break with the previous cultural

tradition Both “Russian idea,” reinterpreted by Russia’s leadership of the world communist revolution and the system of “Russian power,” represented by the almighty communist state, reached their most developed forms.7)

And even more: the Soviet Union (Советский Союз) portrayed itself as a

unifier and leader of the East in its struggle against the capitalist West(Malinova,

2009, p 38) In the USSR, as in the traditional Russian Empire, a simultaneously paternal and oppressive state merged with property and law which was designed

to protect its interests and specific ideology-religion or the system of

“quasi-religious congregations,” as some scholars put it, in the form of Marxism-Leninism(Harhordin, 2011, p 95; E Pain, 2012, p 44) Last but not least, collectivism gained victory over the concept of individualism the roots of

which became evident after the Great Reform (Великая реформа) of the second half of the 19th century and especially during Prime Minister Petr Stolypin’s (Пе

тр Столыпин) agrarian reforms at the dawn of the 20th century It must be

admitted that the system of communism in Russia bore some features that were commonly associated with Western modernity – in particular, rationality as the solution to social and political problems But this rationality was negated by its subjugation to the irrational goal, of constructing a paradise on Earth in the shape of the communist society.8)

It is not surprising that after the Bolsheviks’ takeover, theoretically, the most comprehensive alternative to the Russian communist’s conception of Russia’s role

in world history was also based on a modification of Russian messianic dreams

It was represented by the “Eurasian” (евразийцы) school, which was founded in

immigration and included some of the most prominent Russian thinkers of the time, all of whom were forced to leave the country after the communist’s take over Among them one can find such figures as the specialist in comparative

cultures Eugenii Trubetskoi (Евгений Трубетской); historians Petr Savitskii (Петр

Савитский) and Alexei Shahmatov (Алексей Шахматов) A group of widely

known philosophers–Nikolai Berdyaev (Николай Бердяев), Georgii Florovskii (Гер

гий Флоровский), Lev Karsavin (Лев Карсавин), Fedor Stepun (Федор Степун)

and Boris Shiryaev (Борис Ширяев) had also to leave the country A famous scholar and an outstanding specialist in comparative law Nikolai Alekseev (Никол

ай Алексеев) and others were forced to go into exile as well

It is quite natural that there were different positions advocated by the

representatives of the “Eurasian” movement, as all of them were profound and independent thinkers Still, there was also a common ground, which permitted them to define this intellectual trend as based on a common understanding of Russia’s past and quite close estimation of the perspectives of the future development of the country In accordance with the views of their predecessors –

“Slavophiles,” the supporters of the “Eurasian” paradigm emphasized their

“anti-Westernism,” whilst on the other hand, concentrated on the specific historical role of Russia From their perspective, due to its geographical position, historical and cultural inheritance, Russia received the calling to create a constructive symbiosis of both Western and Oriental cultures, and on this foundation built an alternative to the “declining” Western civilization Somehow, the “Eurasian” school adepts obviously emphasized that spiritually Russian culture was much closer to the great civilizations of the East, than to the Western-European culture(Malinova, 2009, p 81) It was worthy of note, that

“Eurasianists,” unlike their predecessors, were much less inclined to discuss the problem of the salvation of the West and concentrated more on the alternatives

to the world order created by the Western powers(Orlova, 1998, pp 104-105)

An observation of the theories presented by the participants of this intellectual movement would certainly take the author too far and away from the main subject of this paper, though with no doubt it deserves special consideration One can discover a lot of creative conceptions formulated by the adherents of this movement, each of which needs special attention and critique.9) Probably, it was Nikolai Alekseev who made one of the most important contributions to the theory

of Russia as a center of the emerging “Eurasian” civilization and who viewed this problem from the perspective of the specific features of the Russian type of statehood As it was argued before, his intellectual predecessors and contemporaries paid serious attention to the problem of the interrelation between Russia’s unique historical mission and the role of the Russian state Somehow, in the author’s opinion, Alekseev was the first among “Eurasianists” who presented the most sophisticated theory of the impact of state in the “Eurasian civilization” and clearly established the logical link between the problematic of “Russian idea”

and the peculiar pattern of statehood instrumental to its realization

In Alexeev’s view, from the very beginning of Russian history, the Russian

state was founded on the Oriental conception of statehood that was essentially

different from the Western principles of state building The Western theory of

state, in his opinion, was based on the concept of “contract” between individuals

and supreme political authority which accepted the necessity of guarantee of

individual rights The Oriental perception of the problem was based on the

motive of “service” (служение), both of the supreme political authority and its

subjects In this context, from Alexeev’s point of view, it was not the problem

of individual rights, but the question of whether the state represented the

“right-doing” (правда) was critically important for Russian people In other words,

the state institutions and the supreme political leader were personally responsible

for the formulation of the right direction of the development of society and were

in charge of maintenance of harmony, based on the equilibrium of different

interests(Alekseev, 1998, p 90) From this perspective, Russian people who were,

as a matter of fact, indifferent to the problematic of personal rights and

freedoms, were more readily to accept even dictatorship, if it was based, in their

perception, on the “right-doing” of the government The alternative to the

“right-doing” dictatorship or authoritarian regime, as Alexeev believed, was only

an “uncontrolled liberty” (вольница) that could bring the society to a state of

complete disintegration(Alekseev, 1998, p 114) Thus, the “Russian idea” and the

theory of the specific kind of statehood became inseparable parts of the

“Eurasianist’s” concept of the past and future of the Russian civilization It was a

challenge to Russian “Westernizers” in emigration, who stressed the necessity of

the perception of the basic Western values, including liberal tradition based on

the guarantee of personal rights as a starting point of state building, and its

continuation – the free market economy It is worth noting that advocating

diametrically opposite positions in terms of Russia’s future development, both the

adepts of “Western way” and of Russia’s uniqueness, were close to each other in

their observation of the main categories of Russian political culture They would

agree that it was characterized by the unresolved cultural-historical identity contradiction (West-East opposition), concept of Russia’s unique historical mission, collectivism and, last but not least, the impact of the hugely oppressive, and at the same time parental state, which was represented by a strong charismatic leader While for Russian liberals these features constituted the main obstacle in the way of modernization of the country and had to be removed, for traditional and modern partisans of “Russian idea,” on the contrary, they were and still are the sole foundation for building Russia’ glorious future This pattern of political culture, the author would argue, managed to survive not only Imperial, but also

Communist Russia and was quite typical of contemporary Russian society(Obrazi

Rossiiskoy Vlasti ot El’tsina do, 2009, pp 34-35).

Ⅲ Russian Cultural Tradition and Contemporary Politics

For the intellectual elite and the mass of Russian people, the end of communism signified the end of the “Russian idea” Very soon however, it became obvious that the fundamental cultural divide was still there Among political parties, movements and groups, active in the Russian political arena in

early 1990s during Michael Gorbachev (Михаил Горбачев) reforms (перестройка)

were two major groupings that could be readily seen: those who advocated the

“Western way” and those who spoke for a modified “Russian idea.” Russian

“democrats-reformers” (демократы) identified themselves with basic principles of

the West European civilization, while their opponents from the camp of

“leftist-traditionalists- nationalists” (красно-коричневые) insisted on Russia’s

specificity and incompatibility with the values of the “declining” West(Magaril,

2012) Still, during the period of Boris Yeltsin’s (Борис Ельцин) rule, despite

strong opposition from the modified supporters of “Russian idea,” the nature and direction of the political and economic reforms reflected mainly the views of the supporters of the “Western way” scenario of Russia’s reconstruction Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in early 1990s, “Westernizers” enjoyed

broad public support, but by the middle of the last decade of the 20th century it became apparent that they were losing their momentum, as the “Russian idea” political forces became more influential.10) On the eve of the second Parliamentary elections after the fall of the USSR, which were held in 1995, it was quite clear that there was not only an uncompromising ideological split in the country, but the whole system of government was divided in to two conflicting parts The executive branch of power headed by the Russian President Yeltsin, was eager to fulfill the agenda of reforms suggested by the

“Westernizers,” while the “patriots-nationalists” dominated in the Russian parliament

The reasons for the fast decline of the influence of “democrats-reformers” were numerous and represented a combination of internal and external factors The general direction of Yeltsin’s initiated reforms was the transformation of Russia into a “normal” European country, which was hardly achievable without the acceptance of the European values, and in fact, meant distancing from the main essence of the “Russian idea.” In terms of the system of the “Russian power” the “democrats” proclaimed a broad program of economic and political reforms aimed at its total deconstruction They foresaw the dissociation between state and property (privatization), state and ideology (establishment of multi-ideology and multi-party system) and between state and law on the basis of separation of powers The newly adopted Russian Constitution of 1993 was founded on the concept of strict separation between the executive power represented by the Russian President, and the Russian Parliament, in which the

key role belonged to the lower chamber – the State Duma (Государственная Ду

ма) The judicial branch of power was proclaimed to be independent from both

the executive and legislative powers, as well as the Mass Media which was given

a guarantee from interference on behalf of the state In terms of the new political system, it was a decisive break with previous political tradition, as for the first time in Russian history, if not democracy, but democratic-type structures and institutions were being built.11)

The most controversial part of the initiated changes was the economic reform,