Developing Local Capacity for Management of Natural Resource Conflicts in Africa A Review of Key Issues, Approaches, and Outcomes

Achieving the good governance necessary to fulfill the NWP vision of environmental and economic sustainability requires substantial reforms such as strengthening procedural rights for ru

Developing Local Capacity for Management of Natural Resource Conflicts in Africa:

A Review of Key Issues, Approaches, and Outcomes

A Peter Castro Chair & Associate Professor Department of Anthropology Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs

Syracuse University Syracuse, New York, 13244

Paper prepared for SANREM-CRSP

Final Draft April 2005

resources are so close to livelihoods and identities in Africa, conflicts over their access and use demand special attention for anyone concerned with its development.

There are four parts to this paper The introductory section contains a brief assessment about the NWP framework, including some of its assumptions about conflict management and the broader agenda of African development The framework offers a positive program for action but can be strengthened by contextualizing more clearly the conditions and trends it tries to address What are the sources of the issues and problems associated with nature/resources, wealth/economics, and power/governance highlighted in NWP? What contributes to their perpetuation? Such information is vital for proper planning, including overcoming obstacles and pitfalls arising frominaccurate or incorrect assumptions The next two sections of my paper try to address this need

by examining the social and historical dimensions of African land and natural resource conflicts The analysis identifies the intractable nature of many of these conflicts, which originate in inequalities embedded in the national policy frameworks set up for administering land during thecolonial era It also describes efforts in recent decades by independent African governments to reform their national policies through a range of interventions, including many recent

participatory endeavors At the same time, the paper reveals how political, economic,

demographic, and other socioeconomic factors are altering people’s relationship to land and to each other, triggering more conflicts Unfortunately, it is not possible to present detailed case materials in this paper, though hopefully readers will consult the references for further

information

Given this setting, the last part of the paper examines current practices in natural resource

conflict management It opens with a discussion of some current patterns, especially how people make use of a range of legal orders and of conflict management processes in trying to resolve conflicts The paper next looks at strengths and weaknesses of three major modes of conflict management processes: Alternative Dispute Resolution, which is popular with international donors; national legal systems; and informal conflict management, which the NWP framework identifies as highly significant All three modes offer enormous potential, yet they all possess limitations, including all sharing problems of accessibility for women, the poor, and other

socially marginalized groups It is also noted that evaluative studies of Alternative Dispute Resolution’s effectiveness and impacts are required to see if its apparent popularity and its negative imagine among critics are warranted Deciding which mode of conflict management to apply in a particular situation is something that needs to be decided on a situation-specific basis –there is no easy guide Overall, it is crucial for the NWP framework to maintain its focus on

1 I am grateful to Carlos Perez, Carla Roncoli, and David Brokensha for their comments on previous drafts

governance and power issues Good governance is a prerequisite for truly effective natural resource conflict management, which itself is an essential component for securing and improvinglivelihoods As Gay (2004: 80) observes, however, the meaning of “good governance” ought to

be defined by people out of their national and local experiences and needs, rather than based on asupposed superior external model

The Nature, Wealth, and Power Framework

Nature, Wealth, and Power is a 35-page document offering a guide for future rural development

investment in Africa At first glance its appealing design of text interspersed by wide margins, colorful information boxes, and figures make it appear to be light reading Yet there are many profound and compelling passages contained within it The NWP framework’s principles and action recommendations derive from a synthesis of the experience of natural resource-based interventions during the past two decades The core concept is that policies and programs must integrate environmental management (nature), livelihood/economic concerns (wealth), and good governance (power) The tone of NWP is not only positive but also upbeat, furnishing a forceful counterpoint to the chronic pessimism and gloom about Africa’s future The framework

emphasizes the role of knowledge, social learning, capacity building, and incentives, as well as markets and other institutional settings where people can make choices about natural resources intheir own self-interest NWP acknowledges the need to address political dimensions of resource access, particularly the pressing issues of exclusion and tenure insecurity, which can prevent people from exercising such choice Achieving the good governance necessary to fulfill the NWP vision of environmental and economic sustainability requires substantial reforms such as strengthening procedural rights for rural people, increasing their participation in decision-

making, and establishing institutional forums or platforms, especially at the local level, where ongoing and inclusive communication about natural resource issues is possible It also requires making officials more accountable, reallocating authority to institutions best positioned to exercise them, and fostering pluralistic approaches to problem solving

The principles and recommendations of the NWP framework have significant implications for managing natural resource conflicts, creating the potential for new rights regimes and policy frameworks that are more sensitive to the needs of most rural dwellers Importantly, NWP portrays conflicts in natural resource management as “learning opportunities.” But there is also the need to “facilitate conflict management,” including use of “nonformal” processes and

mechanisms The NWP framework also warns of relying on consensual approaches to natural resource (and presumably conflict) management:

Consensus is positive when freely given and adequately informed, but this is

rarely the case In addition, consensus, even if reached, can impede creativity and

productive effort Other approaches are needed that respect diversity, recognize

restrained dissonance or bounded conflict, and respect the autonomy of others

(NWP 2002: 31)

The choice of words is somewhat ambiguous, since the phrase “facilitate conflict management”

is often used to refer to alternative dispute resolution approaches, which rely on consensus Still, the framework is clear that “major obstacles” exist to the use of consensual approaches to naturalresource management

There is much to commend in the NWP framework, particularly its thoughtful attention to powerand governance dimensions Recognition of procedural rights, participatory decision-making, accountability for authorities, the need for conflict management, and avoidance of simplistic consensual models are vital issues for strengthening livelihoods and promoting sustainable resource management In spite of its carefully crafted design, the NWP framework has troubling omissions that render it vulnerable into becoming yet another “blind rush into the unknown”

(Bayart et al 1999a: 1) Surprisingly little information is given about current circumstances

regarding nature, wealth, and power in Africa For example, the NWP framework states that despite the continent’s rich natural resource endowment, “many rural Africans remain mired in poverty, resources are often mismanaged, and rural people largely disenfranchised” (NWP 2002: 3) Ineffective and inequitable natural resource management is also portrayed as contributing to conflicts at the regional to local levels (NWP 2002: 31) How this appalling situation originated and is perpetuated is not revealed Indicative of this ahistorical approach is the absence of the word ‘colonial’ in the text.2 The text points out that a significant “transition” is occurring in Africa today, with rising “stakes for resource access and control… as evidenced in struggles overresource tenure throughout Africa In socioeconomic terms, there are both winners and losers” (NWP 2002: 15) This passage suggests that tensions and conflicts are increasing regarding land and natural resources, a perception that is widely shared but by no means fully supported by

available data (for example, see Hussein et al 1999) Unfortunately, the NWP framework does

not touch further upon this question The document does attempt to illustrate its overall points bypresenting four cases (from Namibia, Mali, Botswana, and Madagascar), plus a concise “Current Outlook” information box in each section, but it is unclear whether these are typical or atypical success stories

No one expects a lengthy historical analysis in a succinct development investment guide Yet, acknowledgment of the origins and complexity of present circumstances is needed, even if done briefly, such as a small textbox with references for follow-up by readers History conditions contemporary social action, and failure to take it into account results in disappointing policies,

programs, and projects (see Uphoff 1991; Chambers 1997; Castro 1998; Bayart et al 1999b; Bryceson et al 2000; Nolan 2002) Indeed, it is impossible to divorce the analysis of resources,

wealth, and power from their historical and social contexts, especially regarding conflict and conflict management processes As Berry (2002: 640) notes, appreciating the link between past and present is especially important in African land conflicts since competing claims are often based on “debates over historical precedents and their relevance to relations of property and power in the present.”

I Conflict: Definitions and Dimensions

The language of conflict management is notoriously imprecise, with the meanings of key terms such as ‘conflict’ and ‘dispute’ varying widely in the literature (Burton 1996; Warner 2001) For present purposes, ‘conflict’ is defined broadly here as “a state of opposition or hostilities… a

fight or struggle [or]… the clashing of opposed principles” (Oxford Encyclopaedic English

Dictionary quoted in Oucho 2002: 10) What is crucial is that two or more parties perceive some

2 Other words curiously missing from the Nature, Wealth, and Power framework include pastoralist, herder, and

cattle.

fundamental and underlying incompatibility of interest relative to an issue, thing, or situation related to the environment (Ochieng Odhiambo 2000: 8) This recognition of a fundamental incompatibility of interests sets apart a conflictive situation from a disagreement In a conflict one or more parties “are not prepared to accept the status quo (should that any longer be a possibility) or to accede to the demand or denial of demand by the other” (Gulliver 1979: 75) Natural resource conflicts revolve around access to, and control and use of, land, water, forests, pasture, and related environmental features Such conflicts can occur at all societal levels, from the intra-household to the global Thus, conflicts can differ in their social pervasiveness (the number and types of people involved), and in their geographical scale (ranging from highly

localized events to ones on a national or even international scale) (Hussein et al 1999).

It must be noted that having a ‘conflict of interest’ in a natural resource is not the same as being

in a conflict over it Hussein et al (1999: 399-400) provide a clear statement on the pervasive

nature of conflicting interests among natural resource users:

Conflict of interest refer to the fundamental relationship between actors who

permanently or temporarily co-habit an area, have different objectives and

interests, and use similar local resources such as land, vegetation and water

Conflicts of interest over the ownership and use of resources therefore may exist

between any resource users (farmers and farmers, herders and herders, herders

and farmers), and may be intra-household, inter-personal, intra-group, inter-group

or in some cases between local users and outside interests such as corporations

and the state… conflicts of interest [are] … part of the fundamental relationship

between local resource users because they set the stage for competition among

them, which in some cases ends in violent conflict

Hussein et al (1999) point out that increasing competitive demand for resources can intensify

apparent conflicts of interest, though conflict and violence are not inevitable Looking

specifically at herder-farmer competition for resources, they observe the existence of “an array ofpossible outcomes”: people may rely on local natural resource institutions to clarify and enforce their resource rights; or they may engage in avoidance strategies, including retreating,

diversifying livelihoods, or seeking new alliances Even if people acknowledge explicitly that a conflict exists, violence is not inevitable, as they may pursue their interests in litigation: “A complex patchwork of forums for pursuing litigation in semi-arid Africa comprises customary institutions (traditional rulers), state administrators and the formal courts, including supreme

courts and courts of appeals which have adjudicated in natural resource disputes…” (Hussein et

al 1999: 400-401)

Analysts also differ in their definition of dispute.3 For present purposes, I will follow Putnam andWondolleck’s (2003: 37) definition (also see Gulliver 1979) that a dispute refers to an episode where the fundamental and underlying incompatibilities of a conflict “becomes actualized in specific issues and events,” such as a fight, protest, appeal to authorities, or a lawsuit Thus, all disputes are conflicts, but not all conflicts may manifest themselves as disputes It is also useful

to distinguish the term insecurity, which refers to situations where personal and collective security, including one’s livelihood, is undermined by conflict, whether manifested by endemic violence, disputes, or chronic tension (Ochieng Odhiambo 2000)

3 Ramirez (2002), for example, essentially reverses the definitions of conflict and dispute used in this paper.

Latent Conflicts

This broad definition of conflict draws attention to the issue of fundamental and underlying incompatibility of interests, rather than on purported manifestations of conflictive situations In part this reflects growing awareness of the importance of latent or structural conflicts in natural resource management Warner and Jones (1998: 2) describes these as:

… structural inequalities inherent in legal definitions of land ownership and

resource use; regional economic and political elites supporting commercial

interests over-and-above those of local groups; and longstanding ethnic and

cultural differences These latent conflicts often lie dormant until ‘re-awakened’

by a particular set of developmental pressures

Therefore, the apparent lack of outward manifestations of discord or antagonism does not mean that relationships marked by conflict are not present As will be seen below, Africa is beset by latent conflicts concerning land and natural resources that generate tensions, disputes, and, in some places, insecurity These latent conflicts are deeply rooted in Africa’s historical political economy and its cultural institutions, and they are not easily or effectively addressed through local-level interventions such as conflict management training or peace committees Instead, their management or resolution calls for policy or legal reforms, as well as education and wealth-creation programs at the national or regional levels (Warner and Jones 1998)

Manifestation and Emergence of Conflict

Conflicts manifest themselves in many different ways Some are readily identifiable through open hostility and violence Power’s (2004: 63) account of “the decimated landscaped… the blackened and emptied villages” of Darfur, Sudan, for example, graphically illustrates the impacts of the region’s recent warfare As already mentioned, not all conflicts are so apparent People are not always open in revealing themselves In some cultures conflict is rarely discussed openly (Brenneis 1988) Conflicts are also allowed to smolder quietly because of fear, distrust, peer pressure, financial constraint, or for strategic reasons “Agrarian peace” may be, as Scott (1985: 40) states, “the peace of repression (remembered and/or anticipated) rather than the peace

of consent or complicity.” In such situations underlying conflicts may be manifested in reflected

in “the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on” (Scott 1985: xv-xvi) Powerful groups may not “frame” (interpret) such actions as being related to a conflict, but instead portray it as criminal or deviant behavior Framing – “the process of constructing andrepresenting the world around us” – is a crucial element of conflicts (Gray 2003: 12) It furnishesself-reports of the existence (or non-existence) of conflicts, and furnishes crucial insights into each party’s perspective, motivations, and possible strategies regarding conflict management

At what point grievances or disagreement turn into conflicts is not always easily determined Notall grievances become conflicts, and not all conflicts erupt into disputes But what shifts a

grievance into a conflict? First, it is important to recognize that the factors that affect people’s capacity to deal with conflicts are largely the same ones that affect their capacity to cooperate in local resource management institutions, including: perceived benefit of cooperating (over

alternatives), size and makeup of the user group, the degree of heterogeneity of interests among both the user group members and their local leadership or elite, expectations and time horizons

of resource users, the degree of communication among them, the degree of trust, the willingness

to engage in cooperation, the contents of social norms, the skills and legitimacy of leadership, thestability of the group, catalysts to initiate or end cooperation, and cultural practices such as rituals that reinforce social solidarity (Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995 cited in Arnold 1998;

also see Ostrom 1990; Hussein et al 1999; Vedeld 2000; Agrawal 2003) Shifts in these social

and related variables alter the incentives or disincentives for cooperating or clashing The choice

of individuals and of groups to engage in, or react to, the self-seeking of others, is in many ways analogous At both levels choice-making regarding conflicts, including structural ones, involves:

Many considerations are involved in the question of timing, of when and where

and against whom to turn a quiescent competitive positive into active into active

hostile competition The most fundamental of these presumably have to do with

the degree of underlying pressure on power and resources, and the degree of

encroachment of one’s competitors and the opportunities for bettering one’s own

position Between counterpoised groups these basic pressures and positions tend

to be long-term and the consequence of a cumulative series of events The issues

involved may be so fundamental that they are much more far-reaching than any

particular event in the series Yet active confrontation, if it is to occur, must

happen at a particular time, place, and occasion (Moore 1972: 76)

Ironically, it is this very specificity of time, place, and circumstance that may make a conflict appear to be a discreet, unique event, disguising their structural roots Moore (1972: 77) states:

“The legal wrong, moreover, makes it possible to have a show-down without necessarily

acknowledging the deeper long-term motives or objectives which may accompany such action.” Such shifts in power and resources, in degrees of encroachment, and in perceived opportunities for bettering one’s own position need to be understood in relationship to external or internal conditions that may shape the emergence and character of a conflict As Vedeld (2000: 126), drawing on Douglas (1986), observes regarding people’s shifts in willingness to engage in common property resource regimes, the issue “must be contextualised, made conditional, and studied as a dynamic process related to changes in social relationships.” Ramirez (2002: 10-11) suggests that two layers of conditioning factors may trigger such shifts in land conflicts:

(1) An “accumulation of sources of tensions” that erode or breakdown in the institutional relations governing access to, or use of, land and other natural resources These sources include endogenous population increases, immigration, shifts in social consensus,

alterations in land prices or productive potential, confusion over the sources of rules governing resource access or administration, and disagreement over arbitration

procedures

(2) In response to multiple grievances, a group may seek to “flip” or overturn a formerly balanced conflictive situation by trying to force its own agenda or aims Catalysts to flips include “external interventions, changes in weather, challenges to leadership structures, weak administrative systems or changes in rules or laws.”

Another approach focuses on identifying perverse incentives within resource-use and other institutions that foster free riding, corruption, rent seeking, and other sources of conflict (Ostrom 1990) For example, Gibson (1999) argues that perverse incentives created by politically driven wildlife policies in Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe produce poor conservation outcomes and generate numerous conflicts, including between rural communities and officials These types of analyses suggest that certain general thresholds – opportunities, capacities, and perceived costs,

and incentives – need to be surpassed for conflicts or disputes to emerge The variables and relationships involved are still unclear, though, and context-specific analysis offers the best routefor understanding (Ramirez 2002)

Other analysts emphasize that land and resource conflicts are driven by increased competition, which itself is the outcome of demographic, economic, political, social, ecological, and other variables that need to be understood in historical perspective For example, Berry (2002: 639) states:

In most countries, the causes of increasing competition and contestation over land

have been similar Rapid population growth, environmental degradation, and slow

rates of economic development that leave many people dependent on small-scale

farming, livestock raising and foraging have transformed Africa from a continent

of land abundance in the first half of the twentieth century to one of increasing

land scarcity by its end

In this view, land conflicts are seen as increasing through time at all socioeconomic levels Meanwhile, Africa’s recent economic, political, environmental, and epidemiological crises have rendered livelihoods more vulnerable, reinforcing the value of land, as people seek it for

security Legal pluralism, institutional proliferation, and leadership contests since the colonial eraadd to growing confusion over land rights, but they also created a socio-political space where multiple claims can be dealt with through negotiations (Berry 2002) Peters (2004: 279) also seesland conflicts arising from Africa’s historical political economy, with increased competition

“deriving from multiple sources… focusing on land relations.” Her analysis assigns greater emphasis to processes of exclusion arising from commodity production, livelihood

diversification, growing social divisions, conservation programs, reserve appropriation elites,

and macro economic policies In contrast, Hussein et al (1999), as well as Kratli and Swift

(1999), urge caution in generalizing on conflict trends, particularly the claim that natural

resource conflicts are increasing in number and intensity For example, Hussein et al (1999)

argue that the lack of rigorous time-series data on herder-farmer conflicts prevents any such conclusion

Yet another approach looks at the societal forces that propel widespread rural conflicts and violence concerning land and other resources Paige’s (1975) classic study on social movements and export agriculture examined the pivotal roles of class relations, particularly each group’s relative dependence on land versus either capital or wages for livelihood, in determining the direction and intensity of rural conflicts Buijtenhuijs (2000: 115) points out that by the 1980s “a new phenomenon of ‘predatory war’ emerged in Africa… insurgent movements [who seek]… to secure by force of arms the economic resources in those areas which combatants control.” Some studies attribute these conflicts to widespread poverty, failed governance, and high dependence

on natural resources, with countries possessing oil and valuable minerals particularly vulnerable (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Addison et al 2003) Others identify ideology, ethnicity, and regional politics as significant contributory factors (Herbst 2000; Oucho 2002; Draman 2003) Many of these analysts emphasize the drive for pecuniary gain as a main motive, with conflict and violence creating opportunities for economic gain not available in

peacetime Taking a different track, Bayart et al (1999) argues that widespread African conflicts

both reflect and derive from a “recomposition of identities” and a reformation of the state, which

is increasingly characterized by the privatization and criminalization of power In contrast,

Buijtenhuijs (2000: 119) reasserts the importance of “the age-old peasant concern with land,” and with livelihood, as factors driving Africa’s increasing rural violence.

The Social Complexity of Conflicts

Many rural areas give the impression – at least to outsiders – of pastoral innocence How can conflicts occur in such a seemingly peaceful situation? Yet, André and Plateau (1998: 37) suggest that simmering tensions may not be far below the surface:

Rural communities are far from being the havens of peace and the models of

altruistic behavior which they are depicted to be in popular accounts inspired by a

romantic view of indigenous life Of concealed behind the veil of multiple

reciprocal exchange arrangements, there are often at work pervasive tensions and

rivalries that must be carefully held in check to avoid disruptions of social order

When disputes erupt, as they did in Rwanda, where André and Plateau (1998) conducted a detailed study of land conflicts, it often reflects multiple and deep sociocultural, economic, and political fissures Competition and conflict can follow “myriad social fault lines, pitting national and local elites against ordinary citizens, neighbor against neighbor, kinsmen again kinsmen, andhusbands against wives ” (Berry 2002: 639) By the late 1980s in Rwanda, land scarcity and rising landlessness – due to population density, increasing inequalities in landholding driven by market and socioeconomic factors, and changes in inheritance and related customs – contributed

to tensions and conflicts which reached not only deep inside communities but within the “very heart of family life” as children clashed with parents and siblings with each other (André and Plateau 1998) Land and resource disputes run the danger of generating more and deeper

divisions, undermining the foundations of society, and reducing its ability to deal with scale political and social conflicts in a peaceful manner

larger-Africans natural resource and land disputes are clearly economic and, increasingly, class-based conflicts Yet, they are not solely reducible to these dimensions alone These conflicts occur within a sociocultural context, shaping and being shaped by it For example, Suliman (1999) argues that violent conflicts in rural Sudan mainly arise from resource scarcity, either from practices that exclude people’s access to them, or from environmental degradation Yet Suliman (1999: 219) notes:

However, with the passage of time, ethnic, cultural, and religious affiliations seem

to undergo transformation from abstract ideological categories into concrete

social forces In a wider sense, they themselves become contestable material

social resources and, hence, possible objects of group strife and violent conflict

Although usually by-products of fresh conflicts, ethnic, cultural, and spiritual

dichotomies can invert, with the progress of a conflict, to become intrinsic causes

and, in the process, increase its complexity thereby reduce the possibility of

managing, resolving, and ultimately transforming it

The diverse Nuba people were forged by resource-based conflicts into a quasi-homogenous ethnic group, who largely perceived their troubles as rooted in ethnic, rather than economic, competition

Intractable Conflicts

The form and intensity of conflicts vary widely by place, and they also vary through time The phrase ‘intractable conflict’ is used to denote complex conflicts of considerable intensity that persist over long periods (Lewicki et al 2003) Putnam and Wondolleck (2003: 41) observe that:

Complexity is linked to the number and interwoven nature of issues and parties in

the conflict, the levels or layers of social systems in which dispute reside, and the

difficulties of locating arenas in which to address a conflict In highly intractable

situations the number and interconnectedness of issues escalates

Intensity refers to the high level of emotionality and commitment felt by participants, with such conflicts becoming pervasive, permeating cultural, political, and institutions Not surprisingly, intractability is also marked by divisiveness – such conflicts can divide and polarize people The durability of intractable conflicts does not mean that it cannot be solved by legal, political, or consensus-based solutions, though these may be difficult to implement given its complexity Instead, it can reflect that for some parties the perceived costs of resolving the conflict are too high and outweigh the perceived costs of continuing with it (Putnam and Wondolleck 2003: 39) Importantly, many natural resource conflicts in Africa possess an intractable character, enduring decades through colonial and independent governments The next part of the paper focuses on the nature of these intractable conflicts

Part II: Africa’s Policy Frameworks, Social Settings, and Conflicts

Colonial Roots

Many of the roots of Africa’s contemporary natural resource conflicts are in the colonial era Although the European powers varied somewhat in their approach, they shared and operated with, as Davidson (1983: 5) reminds us, “the same assumptions for the same purpose Each of them was racist and exploitative.” Legal, policy, and administrative arrangements were set up that served first and foremost diverse colonial interests The Europeans established colonies in a neo-mercantilist pattern in which “micro-level state economic controls and incentives were the norm not the exception” (Green 1977: 53) Colonial governments used legal mechanisms such asreception clauses (“received” law) to formalize their jurisdiction The implications for

indigenous land rights were enormous: “All existing customary land laws were subordinated to the received law and so all existing rights in land were at the mercy of the incoming power” (McAuslan 2000: 80)

European racial and cultural chauvinism fostered misperceptions and misunderstandings of African landholding and resource-use practices, many of which widely persist to the present Officials generally viewed indigenous land tenure as a pre-modern cultural relic, unsuitable to the demands of a modern economy In addition, colonial authorities often believed many

indigenous resource-use practices, including pastoralism and swidden cultivation, to be

environmentally damaging, underestimating or ignoring the substantial local and time-tested ecological expertise that provided the basis for such resource-use strategies The lack of legal recognition for indigenous land rights African resource-use systems as highly vulnerable to official intrusion Insecurity over land issues has been one of the most important sources of land conflicts in Africa Even as the racial dimensions faded with independence, the imbalances between the statutory and customary tenure systems still persist as a controversial aspect of African land issues, generating conflict (Bruce 1998)

Europeans took direct control of land in some places Enclaves of private ownership were

created in urban centers, as well as in European settler zones in East and southern Africa

Governments claimed large areas as forest reserves, national parks, or other state lands, usually managed by centralized command-and-control protectionist bureaucracies with law-enforcement powers The state also granted concessions to mining, timber, farming, and other commercial interests Rangelands, woodlands, and wetlands used by mobile herders, farmers, and foragers were sometimes declared “unoccupied” or “untitled” lands and thus designated as state property

In many cases state title was exercised only on paper, as the Africans retained, ironically,

effective occupation Colonial seizures of land provoked covert and open resistance, including protests, revolt, litigation, and appeals to authorities (for example, see Paige 1975; Mackenzie 1998) Many of today’s state-local conflicts concerning land and other resources originated during colonial times (for example, see Little and Horowitz 1987; Nafziger 1988; Richards and Tucker 1988; Martin 1991; Berry 1993, 2002; Castro 1995; Fairhead and Leach 1996; Maddox

et al.1997; Penny 1998; Bruce 1998; Peters 2004).

Land still held by Africans was nominally governed by local custom The nature and practice of customary tenure, however, was closely connected to the political economy of, and cultural changes associated with, colonial rule Colonial governments usually relied on administrative law and bureaucracies for the management of land, particularly in African areas (Okoth-Ogendo 2000) State agents dealing with agriculture, livestock, or forestry sometimes tried to exercise some control over land use through compulsory (and unpopular) conservation campaigns (Castro1996; Maack 1997) Importantly, both customary law and land issues were combined under the jurisdiction of the “native affairs” administration, instead of the national legal system Provincial officials exercised executive powers over the African population and also selected or approved chiefs, tribunal elders, council members, and others who served as local agents of the state These local authorities usually received, or had enhanced, power to intervene in land matters, including allocation or adjudication, which they often used for the interest of their clients and themselves They also served as adjudicators or mediators in land disputes Mamdani (2000: 102) argues that this institutional arrangement thwarted the benefits of the rule of law, since

“customary justice was administratively driven.” With some modification, these conditions still largely prevail regarding land and conflict administration at the local level

The alteration of so-called customary tenure and law during colonial rule is another controversiallegacy, contributing to present-day conflicts The existence of recognized rules and problem-solving processes indicates that competing and conflicting interests occurred in the past These practices were dynamic, fluid, and open-ended Traditional African societies often appeared to have social mechanisms such as dispute resolution forums and peer pressure to keep conflict from escalating (Gluckman 1956) Yet, these social mechanisms were not necessarily guided by values of harmony or equality (Colson 1995), and power bargaining and coercion were part of customary conflict management repertoires (Moore 1969) Colonialism introduced or intensified

a number of socioeconomic and cultural processes with implications for both customary tenure and law: commercialization, religious conversion, Western schooling, and so on The attempts byauthorities to impose some standardization onto customary tenure and law through codification

or other means added to the mix (for example, see Colson 1974) As conflicts over land emerged among the Africans, the various actors involved sought to shape or bend institutional rules and

practices in their favor, or they forged social networks that bestowed access to resources (Berry

1993, 2002) Adjudication of disputes seemed to do little to clarify for colonial officials the confusion of customary tenure; if anything, it confirmed for them the need to institute tenure reforms With only a few exceptions, such as the consolidation and privatization of landholdings

in central Kenya as part of the Mau Mau counterinsurgency of the late 1950s, radical changes didnot occur before the winds of independence swept through Africa

Continuity and Change in the Independence Era

Most leaders of independent Africa shared with their predecessors a lowly opinion of customary tenure’s potential as an institutional framework for development (Bruce 1998: 144) Following the lead of all modern states (see Scott 1998), these policy makers pursued the task of extending centralized control by trying to create uniform national tenure systems based on standardized measurement, codes, and administration Most African countries nationalized land rights, vestingpower ultimately in the state or its representatives The intention was to establish the state as guarantor of land rights, reducing or removing the authority of customary tenure It also sought

to control the authority of traditional royalty, chiefs, courts, and elders over land (Quan 2000) Furthermore, nationalization confirmed the ability of the state to seize land for use in

development activities such as irrigation schemes, group ranches for settling pastoralists,

national parks, and so on Independent African governments also retained centralized and-control protectionist over forest reserves, national parks, and other state lands Foreign aid augmented the ability of the governments to act, and their actions often mirrored the priorities of their international donors

command-Governments showed considerable variation in the vigor with which they pursued their tenure and protectionist missions Armed with modernist visions and the coercive power of the state, some national leaders engaged in large-scale social engineering Socialist governments in Tanzania, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, promoted egalitarian collectivism and greatly expanded state authority as replacements for local land management regimes These unpopular policies fueled conflicts and undermined rural productivity, ending in resounding failure In these land reforms resistance did not “necessarily come from a class of well-endowed landholders but from multiple and intractable systems of family-related land rights

uniform-among smallholders” (Hyden et al 1993: 419) Most countries went in the opposite direction,

seeking to convert customary tenure into individualized freehold rights through registration and titling Western donors encouraged the policies, believing that population and commercial pressures were already propelling a move towards individualized holdings (Platteau 2000) Kenya extended its program, with other nations such as Nigeria and Cameroon, introducing such measures on a less ambitious scale With the rise of structural adjustment in the 1980s and the retreat of socialistic policies, the eventual privatization of land was often assumed to be the natural course of events

Promotion of privatized or individualized land rights has emerged as a highly unpopular among many rural Africans due to “its high economic and social costs, and negative consequences for the poor” (Toulmin and Quan 2000: 2) It has been the source of many land conflicts (Berry 2002; Peters 2004) Equity issues raised by privatization of land rights included:

o Many local groups risked losing recognition of their subsidiary or derived rights to lands – “This is especially true of women, pastoralists, hunter-gatherers, low caste people, former slaves and serfs, and people belonging to minority tribes” (Platteau 2000: 66)

o Powerful individuals and groups manipulated registration schemes to assign themselves land rights

o Poor smallholder often activate land markets, driven by distress to sell land to prosperoushouseholds – “As a result of market imperfections, titling has more economic value for privileged farmers owning comparatively large amounts of land and having other forms

Mutual Incomprehension

The lack of institutional articulation – or “harmony” – between customary and statutory tenure systems has continued to contribute to natural resource conflicts The vast majority of Africans still obtain their rights to land through customary means, yet local tenure regimes frequently occupy an uncertain position within national policy frameworks The Land Tenure Center’s profile of West African land tenure in the 1990s, for example, found that 11 of 22 countries either ignored or had formally abolished customary rights in their national policy frameworks Yet even where customary land rights are acknowledged to varying extents, they nevertheless often hold an ambiguous position The Land Tenure Center analysts identified a “mutual

incomprehension” between the national and customary tenure systems Interaction occurs only in

“an unplanned and haphazard fashion, since institutionalized means of communication between them hardly exist” (Bruce 1998: 18) A report from a recent workshop spelled out clearly the implications of this situation:

In West Africa, the gap between what the law says and how land rights are

managed in practice is still a major feature of the tenure issue In general,

governments pay little or no heed to the local rules governing land tenure

practices The vast majority of people lack access to legal procedures, which are

too cumbersome and costly or fundamentally inappropriate As a consequence

their rights are insecure in legal terms and sometimes in real terms, leading to

conflict and loss of land (Lavigne Delville et al 2002: iii).

Although there is some variation, the above pattern also largely holds for countries in East and southern Africa (Bruce 1998)

Several analysts argue that legal pluralism – the coexistence of different and overlapping legal orders regarding land – is not solely the problem Rather, it is the uncoordinated multiplicity of

land and dispute-resolution authorities that generates uncertainty and conflict (Moore et al 1999;

Lavigne Delville et al 2002; Berry 2002) Different actors possess the authority to allocate and arbitrate land rights, and drawing on different rules, they can decide in contradictory ways The

growing competition for land compels people to be highly opportunistic in selecting conflict resolution forums, seeking to find a setting compatible to their interests Conflicts not only center

on who has rights to the land, but also on the issue of authority: who has the ability to decide, and on what basis (Berry 2002: 656) Lavigne Delville (2000: 103) illustrates a typical situation

in West Africa:

There are unclear links between authorities such as customary chiefs, imams,

préfets who do not stay long in one post, project technicians, interfering

politicians and so on (Lund 1995) This leads to considerable uncertainty over

who may deliver rulings, such that no arbitration can ever be accepted as final,

because another may overrule a decision by one authority As a result, outcomes

cannot be predicted and all forms of arbitration may be challenged, so conflicts

escalate and lasting solutions are hard to achieve

The flexibility and indeterminacy implied in this multiplicity of authorities can offer chances for people to engage in strategic maneuvering in negotiating their rights to resources (Berry 2002) Some analysts see the struggle for livelihoods in Africa as the outcome of contests “in a variety

of social arenas, from the household to the nation” (Berry 1993: 200) To cope, people invest in networks to maintain or to enhance their access to resources by fostering multiple claims

Overall, these disputes over land are interpreted as part of an open-ended process of agrarian change (Berry 1993; Shipton 1994) For example, Lavigne Delville et al 2002: 10) state:

“[Actors in situations of land insecurity] attempt, more or less successfully, to make use of networks and alliances, witnesses, recourse to authorities and written documents in order to make their rights more secure, playing on both the local and government.” Other analysis argue that negotiability has its limits, since not all people have equal access to all dispute-resolution options: class, gender, age, and other factors can restrict which avenues are open to certain individuals and groups (Castro and Ettenger 1997) Structural adjustment policies, development projects, commercial expansion, and other processes are seen as deepening Africa’s social divisions, reducing the strategic actions of the poor, women, and other marginalized groups (Horowitz 1989; Palmer 2000; Peter 2004)

A New Pluralistic and Participatory Paradigm?

The state’s generally poor performance in administering land and in managing natural resources has raised questions about its competence to handle such matters (Okoth-Ogendo 2000) Public disillusionment with inefficiencies, inequities, and injustices in official policies and practices hasintensified long-standing calls for reforms Instead of reform being synonymous with individual titles or collectivization, however, the possibility of working within the framework of existing land rights is gaining popularity – “a paradigm of adaptation” (Bruce 1992 quoted in Lavigne

Delville et al 2002: 4) This paradigm proposes giving existing land rights greater security by

providing them with legal recognition Similarly, a movement has been underway in the field of natural resource management to work towards the recognition or establishment of community-based management systems, thereby often restoring access to areas alienated by the state (Bojang2000) Overall, Toulmin and Quan (2000: 5) envision a new paradigm based on pluralism and popular participation Governments at all levels, social groups ranging from villages to tribes, and civil society organizations will engage in negotiations to determine their own solutions to issues regarding land rights It needs to be emphasized that these new paradigms are emerging within a highly contested setting Their ability to prevail is by no means certain

Nonetheless, several national-level initiatives have taken place to try to address the long-term duality in Africa’s system of land tenure as means of promoting poverty alleviation, economic development, community empowerment, and sustainable natural resource management Major approaches include (see Bruce 1998; Brown 1999; FAO 2000; Toulmin and Quan 2000; Arnold 2001; Lavigne Delville 2002):

o Significant revision of policies and laws dealing with land issues have occurred in a dozen countries, in some cases with high degrees of public consultation in formulation or implementation (as in Uganda, Mozambique, and South Africa)

o Decentralization of responsibility for land administration to new institutions, either with broad mandates for local governance (as in Senegal, where elected rural councils since

1972 have managed a territory called a terroir), or to specialized boards (as in Botswana)

or commissions (as in Niger) that handle land matters separately from local government bodies

o Decentralization of responsibility for land administration to existing local authorities in conjunction with local government structures (as in Ghana, where chiefs maintain their role in land issues)

o Collaborative-based natural resource management systems involving, at least nominally, some form of partnership between the state and local communities, with examples

including limited transfer of ownership of non-reserved forest areas to communities (as inTanzania and the Gambia), establishment of village management committees or

organizations (as in Malawi, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger), use of contracts to bind communities and public agencies (as in Benin), management contracts (as in Madagascar, where specially trained mediators help draw up agreements between community, local council, and the state), and various project formats (as in many

countries)

o Codifying customary tenure and resource management regimes and integrating them into national legislation and policies (as in Niger, where detailed studies provided informationfor the Rural Code)

o Registration of local rights with the intent of giving them legal status, including both collective or village rights (as in South Africa and Mozambique) and individual and household rights (as in Côte d’Ivoire and Benin with their “Rural Land Tenure Plans”)

o The emergence of written contracts to record the details of land transfers with the aim of them more secure (as in Guinea, where it has been on a limited scale, though the use of

“informal” documents is spreading elsewhere in Africa)

All these measures may be interpreted as reactive and proactive responses to Africa’s intractable land conflicts, and they all contain possibly significant implications for conflict management processes

It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the impacts of these measures In many cases their

outcomes are unclear, or yet to be determined (Lavigne Delville et al 2002) However, it is

worthwhile considering common problems or constraints reported to date in many based forestry interventions in Africa, which have been underway in different formats since at least the early 1980s (FAO 1985, 2000; Brown 1999; Ribot 1999; Arnold 1998, 2001; Kerkhof 2000;):

collaborative-o Ccollaborative-onflicting interests within ccollaborative-ommunities collaborative-or acrcollaborative-oss user-grcollaborative-oups are underestimated, making it harder to organize or maintain collaborative arrangements.

o Women lack opportunities to participate or share fully in benefits

o Pastoralists are often under-represented or entirely neglected

o Power structures in local institutions are often hierarchical rather than democratic, making it difficult to represent the range of local interests

o Local elites disproportionately receive the benefits from activities

o Effective mechanisms for managing conflicts are not available

o Intrusive state rules and requirements make local empowerment difficult, while

reinforcing central control

o National policy frameworks are not in place to allow collaborative or participatory activities to move beyond the pilot stage

Given these problems, many collaborative forestry efforts have been infused with conflicts, either between local forest users and officials/project staff, or among forest users from the same

or different communities Bojang (2000: 11) frankly states: “While the prospect exists for combined natural resource management, the current lack of political will and the resistance to change (by those standing to lose) pose serious constraints.” These experiences are not isolated Palmer (2000: 275) observes: “Implementation of new land laws and policies has proved

problematic, which is not unexpected, given the contentious and highly political nature of land, and current financial constraints of governments.” The road ahead clearly moves in an uphill direction, with conflict a concern

Demographic and Socioeconomic Dimensions

The role of population in generating or contributing to African conflicts has itself served as a source of contention Malthusian-influenced analysts have long expected rising populations to cause environmental degradation, deepening poverty, and resulting in acts such as migration or encroachment that stimulate conflicts A noteworthy analysis along this lines is Attwell and Cotterill’s (2000) critique of community-based management for conservation in Africa, which they see as a largely flawed approach based on wooly postmodernism, romantic rather scientific views of traditional resource use, and a hard-headed unwillingness to confront the real and pervasive issue: population growth They contend that frank discussion of population’s impact

on the environment has become a “taboo” within the development industry

Attwell and Cotterill missed in their literature search a substantial body of literature debating issues about family-based agriculturalists, population growth, commercialization, intensification,

occupational diversification, and stratification (for example, see Netting 1993; Turner et al 1993; Bryceson et al 2000) This literature indicates that population growth, commercialization,

and other processes of socioeconomic change matter in rural lives, but in complex ways

Analysis usually seeks to examine the articulation between macro and micro levels through time and space The complexities are often best understood through case studies For example,

Campbell (1999: 379) points out that externally and internally driven forces of change (with population growth fitting into either category, depending if it is through migration or natural increase) is always mediated through “local processes embedded in a community’s interaction with the natural resource base.” In a case study of herding and farming communities in Kajiado, Kenya, between 1977 and 1996, Campbell (1999) shows that state policies, population growth

due to migration and natural increase, new economic opportunities, agricultural intensification, and the expansion of wildlife-based tourism altered the spatial pattern of land use Farming expanded into former grazing grounds, while herders also experienced the closure of water and pasture sites to game parks Many of the Maasai (who used to be the predominant group

numerically in the area) had taken up farming, but now they had to compete with a large number

of people from other parts of Kenya Among the major changes has been a rise in conflict Campbell (1999: 391) reports: “In 1977, latent conflict was discernible over access to land wheresufficient water was available to meet the needs of various land users: herders, farmers, wildlife, and tourists Such conflict over water is now overt The issue, however, is not merely one of access but also of quantity and quality.” Water pollution has increased, with other environmental changes including declining deforestation, declining soil fertility, and decreased wildlife

Overall, the ability to cope is differentiated by age, gender, and socioeconomic status, though a moral economy of mutual assistance still exists within communities

André and Plateau’s (1998) detailed case study of Rwandan land conflicts returns to themes raised by Malthus, but they do so in a manner considerably more sophisticated than that of Attwell and Cotterill They carefully documented in the years before the Rwandan civil war of

1994 how acute competition for land was sparked by rising population density (the most

crowded levels in Africa), increased individualization and marketization of land tenure, and growing inequality in landholding (which reflected unequal access to off-farm income) What developed was a ‘Malthusian trap’ producing “bitter tensions within families, intra-community hatreds and violence, and serious questioning of the evolving regime of market-allocated,

individualized property rights These adverse effects which corrode the very core of community life are shown to have been at work in the course of events that led to the truly horrifying

bloodshed that took place in Rwanda during 1994” (André and Plateau’s 1998: 2) It must be added that André and Plateau’s (1998: 38) adamantly deny that extreme resource scarcity

directly caused the civil war and genocide; instead, they attribute it to “macro-political forces cynically playing upon ethnic divisions in order to maintain themselves in power.” They

contend, however, that the social tensions brought on by resource scarcity and conflicts helps explain “why violence spread so quickly and so devastatingly throughout the countryside” (André and Plateau’s 1998: 38; also see Buijtenhuijs 2000, on the role of population pressure andland conflict in Rwanda) Their overall argument also counters the optimistic arguments of those who believe that rising population pressures inevitably results in positive resource use

Women’s rights to land are sometimes undermined through competition for farmland due to rising population pressures, commercialization, commodification, intensification, and related

processes (Hyden et al (1993: 418) In Northwest Province of Cameroon, for example, women’s

access to land was squeezed by the adoption of coffee cultivation by males, and the presence of Fulani herders, who had been invited into the region by chiefs and local leaders eager for tribute and taxes As coffee took up prime land, women were compelled to move their food crops onto pasture lands, which were already crowded by greatly increased numbers of herders and

livestock Violent conflicts eventually arose between the women and herders Attempts to arbitrate the conflict locally failed, and the situation deteriorated further for the women when Fulani were able to gain individual control to their cultivable lands through a registration schemeestablished by the 1974 Land Ordinance (Bruce 1998)

Ethnicity and Other Communal Relations

Bruce and colleagues’ (1998) analysis of the land situation in East Africa highlights “the

frequent connection between communal and ethnic conflict and competition over natural

resources.” Besides the already mentioned cases of Rwanda, Burundi, and Kenya, they observe:

In Somali, one key factor leading to the collapse of national coherence was anger

over unfairness in resource distribution, with pastoralists marginalized and the

valuable urban and irrigated land moving into the hands of clans associated with

the government In Uganda, policy reform discussions have seen persistent

questions of which ethnic groups are winners under the different scenarios In

Tanzania and Sudan, expansion of mechanized cereal cultivation is undermining

the viability of pastoralist peoples and has become an international human rights

issue… Ethiopia has decentralized tenure policy to ethnically based regions,

raising fears of discrimination against those coming from other regions (Bruce

1998: 142-143)

Similar situations can be found elsewhere in Africa as well Bruce (1998) argues that issues tenure security and equitable access are likely at the center of these ethnic and other communal conflicts over land Horowitz (1989: 1) presents a similar analysis but draws attention to linkageswith global capitalism, development interventions, and national policy:

At the root of much of today’s violent conflicts is intensive competition among

groups, many of them ethnically defined, for control over resources made newly

valuable by their incorporation into the world’s commoditized political economy

Among the consequences of government and donor policies that enhance

privileged access to strategic resources on the part of the already affluent and

powerful is the violence used by this elite to dispossess those poorer and weaker

Both perspectives emphasize that natural resource conflicts are not the outcome of primordial tribal rivalries Instead, ethnicity, along with other social identities, is a way of mediating and mobilizing access to resources

Ethnic and other communal conflicts call attention to the imbalances of power inherent in Africa’s existing national policy frameworks for land and natural resources National and local differences in power set in motion or magnified by official policies and market pressures affect the ability of all social groups – ethnic or religious groups; people along the wealth gradient of prosperous to poor; men and women; herders, farmers, and foragers; urban and rural business interests; national and multinational business interests – to compete for land and other resources Conflicts originate in, or continue to be shaped by, issues of inequitable access to resources and

of tenure insecurity To address these issues will require political solutions dealing not only with natural resources, but also the nature of governance and civil society itself There is also a need for more effective means of resolving and managing land-based conflicts Bruce (1998: 143) states: “While formal, judicial approaches to dispute resolution remain critical, it appears there is

a need to think through how these can best be supplemented and properly integrated with more informal approaches to the resolution of disputes, approaches with strong roots in African cultures.”

Tenure Niches, Development Activities, and Conflicts Involving Farmers, Herders, and Others

The concept of tenure niches is helpful for analyzing the nature of overlapping claims to

resources African cultural landscapes are separated into tenure niches – discreet areas of

different usage governed by their own common set of rules Although customary African tenure systems have been portrayed as either inherently communalistic or individualistic, elements of both styles normally co-exist within the patchwork of tenure networks occurring within a

territory Some customary tenure niches, for example, are based on individual or household rights, but other niches within the same community can involve group-held rights Bruce (2001: 24) underscores the complexity and dynamism of tenure niches:

The space they cover may vary seasonally, as when household fields after harvest

become a commons where all community livestock can graze crop residues…

Tenure niches may overlap when there are distinct tenure regimes for two

resources that physically overlap, as when tenure in trees is defined independently

from that in land When two communities with different tenure systems share (or

compete for) a resource, each community may project tenure over the resource,

and the overlapping niches may have different rules

Sites where niches overlap, therefore, have served as perennial arenas of competition and

conflict Population pressures, commercialization, commodification, urbanization, and

development interventions have intensified competition for key tenure niches in many places, generating increased conflicts Peters (2004: 293) describes the situation regarding rivers: “Sincerivers are important for fisheries as well as for riverine gardens, and riverbeds are also a source for the gravel and sand used in the increased construction associated with growth in urban and peri-urban areas, competition also develops among quite different uses and differently placed users.” Urban expansion onto grazing grounds, farmland, and forest is a widespread and

increasing phenomenon throughout Africa (see Pankhurst 2003; Kazoora 2003), and conflicts about it are likely to intensify as urban areas seek to control rural areas for watershed

management

Cooperation and conflicts between farming communities and transhumant herders concerning overlapping tenure niches in Africa’s agropastoral zones of the Sahel, East Africa, and southern

Africa have attracted considerable attention (Shipton 1994; Kratli and Swift 1999; Moore et al

1999) Each group, in pursuing its own livelihood, potentially threatens the livelihood of the other Farmers can deny herders access to dry season pasture, watering sources, salt licks, and other vitally needed resources Livestock belonging to herders can destroy crops Herders may also control pastures suitable for farmers to engage in wet season cultivation To deal with the situation, many groups customarily arranged for timely herd movements and controlled grazing

Farmers allow for travel corridors and permit livestock to graze on post-harvest plots The fallowing fields benefit from added manure Herders may allow cultivators access to certain pastures for wet season cultivation Such agreements can involve negotiations and coordination

involving multiple parties over wide areas The pastoral code (dina) developed in the Niger Delta

of north-central Mali under Cheikou Ahmadou in the 1800s, for example, established regulationsfor livestock movements and land use to permit Fulani herders, Bozo fisherfolk, and Bambara

rice farmers to use the same resources during different times of year The dina has proved

enduring, with aspects of it continuing to the present (Bruce 1998) Economic and social ties, such as the reciprocal exchange of products and share-herding arrangements, reinforced these arrangements

Serious breakdowns in complementary agreements and other arrangements for sharing tenure niches have occurred, sometimes with explosive consequences Escalation of conflict is

fundamentally propelled by the vulnerability of their respective livelihoods, though conflicts mayalso be expressed in ethnic, religious, national, or other terms Because some pastoralists

regularly cross national boundaries, these tenure-niche conflicts can assume international

proportions A dramatic example occurred in the 1980s, when dam construction in the Senegal River Valley altered the uses and value of land, with elites on both sides of the Senegal and Mauritania border intensely competing for the newly irrigated lands The tenure rights of long-time resource users – Senegalese farmers and Mauritanian herders – grew more insecure With the* breakdown of complementary arrangements, clashes between the different groups sparked ethnic riots in Dakar and Nouakchott, forcing repatriation of nearly 200,000 people between the two nations (Horowitz 1989)

Several considerations are behind the widespread trend towards greater conflict (Shipton 1994) Increasing demand for land due to cash-cropping, agricultural intensification, the expansion of settlements, rising land values, and government policies requiring demonstration of effective

land occupation (mise en valeur) can cause farmers to close areas to herders Continuous

cropping through the use of irrigation or chemical fertilizer, for example, can eliminate the need for fallowing Farmers who take up livestock rearing may want to keep pasture or dry season water sources for their own animals Herders may take up cultivation, cutting off other farmers from wet-season pasture Droughts, civil conflicts, increased rangeland competition, or shifting rainfall patterns increasingly drive herders farther afield in search of pasture, expanding the area

of potential conflict with farming communities (Kratli and Swift 1999) Development

interventions, including irrigation, rangeland closures, forest protection, and so on, can greatly alter existing tenure niche relationships among groups In Senegal, for example, forestry sector reforms set up local forestry protection committees Empowered to levy fines, the Forest Service let the committee keep one-tenth of the amount as an incentive for enforcement Herders who had secondary rights to trees soon faced fines for their actions Moreover, farmers who had allowed them access to land in the past increasingly refused to do so, fearful that they would be fined for allowing tree cutting (Bruce 1998) Overall, situational factors and incentives favor the pursuit of individual or group interests at the expensive of other claimants to resources

Women’s Rights to Land and Resources

Competition over access to land not only occurs at the societal or community level, but also within domestic groups, including families Women land rights, while subject to negotiability, have been subordinate in customary tenure to those of their families as a whole (Berry 1993) In Islamic societies, religious rules and traditions also viewed the land rights of women as being less than men’s Throughout Africa customary decision-making about land, including handling

of disputes, was handled in settings characterized as a male space Women were allowed

different degrees of involvement, but they usually were not involved in public decision-making Political, socioeconomic, and cultural changes have often altered in significant ways the access

of women to natural resources Migot-Adholla and John (1994: 14) give a broad and succinct summary:

Yet, as a result of agricultural intensification and commercialization, compounded

by major social and economic transformations since the beginning of the

twentieth century, women’s position in society has become increasingly weaker

Of particular concern is the reinterpretation of cultural rules legitimizing access,

use, and control of agricultural land by male-dominated African societies and

state institutions to the disadvantage of women The general result is that while

women do the bulk of agricultural work, their rights to land are tenuous at best

Of course the dimensions of gender inequality vary among households and cultural groups, sincethese entities and their wider communities are not homogeneous units The issue of women’s land rights has received increased attention in recent years, and several countries have

implemented legislation establishing gender equality with respect to access to natural resources and land, including Uganda, South Africa, Niger, Mali, Mozambique, and Tanzania Related reforms in marriage and inheritance laws have been slower to implement, however, and overall gains appear limited (Hilhorst 2000) As will be seen, women’s involvement in conflict

management processes has increased, though it has yet to be accorded equality with that of men’s

Summary

Natural resource conflict management must go beyond efforts to try to address apparently

conflicting interests among opposing parties It requires taking into account the historical and contemporary political economy, as well as cultural dimensions, that shape the nature of

competition over natural resource use and management The following points especially bear remembering when examining modes of natural resource conflict management:

o Although conflicts over land and natural resources in Africa are often said to be

increasing in scope, magnitude, and intensity, there is a lack of rigorous time-series data

in many places to confirm this trend; nonetheless, natural resource and land conflicts pose

a significant challenge for governance, livelihoods, and sustainable development in Africa

o Many conflicts over natural resources are rooted in inequities and inefficiencies in the dual systems of statutory and customary tenure established in colonial times and

perpetuated since independence

o Customary land tenure’s legally ambiguous or threatened position in national policy framework has made rural communities vulnerable and generated conflicts

o Colonial and post-colonial land seizures for private and state use generated intractable conflicts that often still continue to the present-day.

o Colonial and independence governments generally relied on their administrative

infrastructure for governance of land, which often proved to be inefficient and even predatory regarding locally based land rights

o Colonial and independence governments have relied on centralized command-and-controlprotectionist bureaucracies for the management of forests and other vast tracts of land claimed by the state

o Customary law has been shaped by indigenous, colonial, and recent influences as it continuously adapts

o Some analysts emphasize the negotiability of customary land rights, which allow for multiple claims through fluid social networks, but others now argue that class divisions and social exclusion are widening inequalities and increasing vulnerability among the poor and marginalized groups

o Government efforts to impose collectivization and privatization on rural communities were highly problematic, and there now are numerous initiatives seeking to build on customary tenure rather than simply abolish it

o The experience with land privatization especially highlighted the vulnerability of the poor, women, pastoralists, and other groups with subsidiary or derived rights to land, as well as the substantial capacity of powerful individuals and groups to lay claim to large areas

o The experience with collaborative-based resource management also reveals the difficulty

of dealing with conflicting interests over resources, power differentials, and the

persistence of state involvement through rules and administrative structures

o Population growth, commercialization, intensification, and other processes help shape theincidence and nature of African natural resource conflicts

o Issues of tenure insecurity and inequitable access to land rooted in national policy

structures are at the center of communal or ethnic conflicts over natural resources

o Overlapping tenure niches have been the source of cooperation as well as conflict among different resource users, including herders, farmers, fisherfolk, and foragers

o Policies, development interventions, politics, processes of agrarian change, urbanization, and class formation are intensifying conflicts over tenure niches

o Despite some efforts at fostering gender equality in national policy frameworks, women still generally hold disadvantaged positions in accessing and using natural resources

Part III: Approaches to Natural Resource Conflict Management in Africa

All nations and communities possess ways of dealing with natural resource conflicts They may seek to resolve a conflict, reaching a decision that removes the source of the disagreement or dispute However, sometimes the goal of resolving a conflict may prove challenging The source

of a conflict may seem too complex, too politically charged, or too deeply rooted in local culture

or history for a final settlement to be attainable Instead, people may seek to manage a conflict, finding ways to address it and its sources in both the short and long terms (Castro and Nielsen 2003b) These mechanisms for conflict management may be formal or informal, violent or

peaceful, equitable or not (Castro and Ettenger 1997) While the specific mechanisms vary, people rely on the same fundamental procedural modes to handle conflicts: avoidance, coercion, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication (Nader and Todd 1978).

o Avoidance: not openly acknowledging or acting on a conflictive situation

o Coercion: trying to impose one’s will through the threat or use of force, including peer pressure, violence, protests, exertion of economic dominance, and political processes

o Negotiation: a process of joint problem solving in which parties reach agreement through consensus or through power bargaining

o Mediation: facilitated negotiation involving a neutral third party

o Arbitration: decision-making by a third party, which can be binding or non-binding

o Adjudication: relying on a judge or administrator to make a binding decision

In seeking to resolve or manage conflicts, people will use other techniques and tools to further the processes of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication:

o Coalition building: the collaboration of several individual, groups or associations throughalliances or networking

o Conciliation: a third party meets individually with the conflict parties, attempting to help them focus on addressing conflict through negotiation

o Facilitation: a third party assists in organizing or moderating meeting, or in making other logistical arrangements

o Fact-Finding or research: the parties, or appointed neutrals, gather information pertaining

to the conflict, its background and possible agreements

As mentioned previously, such mechanisms occur within a context of legal pluralism in which different legal orders co-exist and overlap within the same socio-political space Although it is a feature of all societies (Merry 1992), Africa’s legal pluralism derives from indigenous, colonial, and post-colonials social and political processes (Kuper and Kuper 1965; Harrington and Manji 2003) These legal orders, with their own norms and procedures, derive from the nation-state, officially recognized customary law, religion, social group (ethnic, caste, community), or the informal living law of local custom Some analysts see human rights as rooted not only in

international agreements or national constitutions, but also in universal human obligation and responsibility (Moser and Norton 2001) The various legal orders can be complementary or competitive, in harmony or contradictory Nation-states attempt to exercise exclusive control over the definition of legal, extra-legal, and illegal orders People, however, hold their own views

of legitimate and illegitimate authority

The approaches that people take to address conflict, including choice of legal orders and conflict management processes, depends on a number of consideration: their knowledge of available options, their assessment of possible support from allies and strategic contacts, their evaluation

of risks and costs, and their relationship with the opponent Even when people prefer to keep the handling of a conflict within a community, they may appeal to a number of legal orders (living law, customary law, religion, or local agents of the state) and use several conflict management processes (avoidance, coercion, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or adjudication), sometimes