Concern for self image and social image in the management of moral failure rethinking shame

Concern for a damaged social image is represented in an other‐condemnation → rejection combination, whereas concern for a damaged self‐image is represented in a global self‐defect → infe

Research article

Concern for self‐image and social image in the management of moral failure:

NICOLAY GAUSEL1* AND COLIN WAYNE LEACH2

1

Østfold University College, Fredrikstad, Norway;2

University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA

Abstract

Moral failure is thought to damage self‐image when people appraise it as indicating a global self‐defect This appraisal is thought to be associated with the feeling of shame and thus self‐defensive motivation However, a damaged social image better explains self‐defensive motivation to hide from and avoid others Based on an integrative review of theory and research, we offer a conceptual model of how concern for self‐image and social image guides the experience of moral failure The model distinguishes the appraisals (of self‐defect and other‐condemnation) and feelings (of rejection, inferiority, and shame) embedded in the shame concept Concern for a damaged social image is represented in an other‐condemnation → rejection combination, whereas concern for a damaged self‐image is represented in a (global) self‐defect → inferiority combination As these appraisal–feeling combinations are concerned with damage done to one’s image, they should be linked to self‐defensive motivation As the (specific) self‐defect → shame combination is concerned with a repairable defect in self‐image, it should be linked with self‐improvement motivation Thus, our model explains why “shame” is sometimes tied to self‐defensive motivation and sometimes tied to self‐improvement motivation after moral failure Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Despite our best intentions, we sometimes fail to be honest,

trustworthy, or fair Such moral failures are central to our

social image because they sour others’ evaluations of us (see

Braithwaite, 1989; de Waal, 1996; Wojciszke, 2005) Our

moral failures also sour the social image that we imagine

others have of us (see Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959) Given

their interest in social relationships and society, social sciences

like anthropology, economics, and sociology have paid great

attention to peoples’ concern for their social image in

instances of moral failure (for reviews, see de Waal, 1996;

Scheff, 2000) The concept of shame has been central to much

of this work For instance, the symbolic interaction tradition in

sociology has long examined shame as the experience of a

social image damaged by moral failure (e.g., Cooley, 1902;

for a review, see Scheff, 2000) Generally, avoidance of others

and withdrawal from the social scene are thought to follow

from shame about a badly damaged social image This is

because people are thought to be motivated to defend their

social image from further damage by limiting others’

opportunities to further condemn them for their moral failure

(Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff, 2000)

One’s morality is also of the utmost importance to one’s

evaluation of oneself (e.g., Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007;

Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002; for a review,

see Wojciszke, 2005) Thus, moral failure is also central to self‐

image In psychology, it is concern for one’s self‐image that is

emphasized in most work on the experience of moral failure

Thus, psychology tends to view shame as the emotional

experience of a badly damaged self‐image (for reviews, see

Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995) This view is buttressed by the fact that a good deal of research finds self‐reports of chronic shame to be moderately to strongly correlated with depression, negative self‐evaluation, and low self‐esteem (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995) At least since Lewis’s (1971)

Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, shame has been thought to be so devastating to self‐image because individuals view their failure

as indicative of a global, and thus unalterable, self‐defect (for reviews, see Lansky, 1995; M Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) Given this conceptualization, it is presumed that shame leads people to defensively protect their self‐image from further harm by hiding, avoidance, and withdrawal (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; M Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002)

Whether shame is viewed as concerned with self‐image or social image, there appears to be agreement across the disciplines that shame is detrimental socially and/or psycho-logically This is because shame is typically linked to an appraisal of irreparable damage to self‐image or social image

We offer a contrasting view By reconceptualizing how concern for self‐image and social image guides the experience

of moral failure, we re‐conceptualize shame Based on a review of theory and research, we develop an integrative model that distinguishes the appraisals (of self‐defect and

*Correspondence to: Nicolay Gausel, Østfold University College, Halden, Norway E‐mail: nicolay.gausel@hiof.no

† Both authors contributed equally to this article.

Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.803

other‐condemnation) and feelings (of rejection, inferiority,

and shame) embedded in the shame concept (see also Gausel,

Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, &

Brown, 2011) By identifying three specific appraisal–feeling

combinations, we are able to specify when and why the

experience of moral failure leads to self‐defensive motivation

For example, we review theory and research that suggests that

it is the appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection

combination that is especially tied to self‐defensive

motiva-tion, such as hiding and avoidance Where people appraise

their moral failure as damaging their social image to such a

degree that others will condemn them, they are likely to

defend their social image from further damage by avoiding

others’ opprobrium This has little to do with the feeling

of shame

THE MANY MEANINGS OF “SHAME”

Because moral failure is so important to social image and self‐

image, people can feel very bad about it Shame has received

the most attention in the study of how moral failure is

emotionally experienced However, what scholars mean by

the term “shame” is often unclear For instance, in her

influential view of shame, Lewis (1971) identified more than

seven different appraisals, feelings, and motivations as part of

a single shame concept Most contemporary researchers

conceptualize shame as including at least several of the facets

discussed by H.B Lewis However, there is little agreement

about which appraisals and feelings are necessary to define the

concept of shame

A great deal of work views shame as necessarily including

the appraisal that one suffers a global, unalterable, defect of

the whole self (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins,

2006) Some work views the shame concept as including the

appraisal that others are likely to condemn one for a moral

failure (Braithewaite, 1989; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Scheff,

2000) The shame concept is sometimes thought to include

the painful feeling of rejection and isolation that is associated

with the appraisal of other‐condemnation (MacDonald &

Leary, 2005; Retzinger & Scheff, 2000) In addition, the

shame concept is sometimes said to include the debilitating

feeling of inferiority that is associated with the appraisal of

a global self‐defect (Smith et al., 2002; Tangney & Dearing,

2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006) Finally, some approaches

go so far as to include the self‐defensive motivation

thought to be based on the experience of shame within the

shame concept itself (see M Lewis, 1992; Tangney &

Dearing, 2002)

Including so many different appraisals and feelings about

moral failure in a single concept of shame obscures the precise

(social and psychological) meaning conveyed by each

appraisal and feeling As a result, contemporary theory and

research on individuals’ experience of moral failure cannot

distinguish concern for self‐image from concern for social

image (see also Ferguson, 2005; Smith et al., 2002) This is

important because concern for social image is likely to promote

different appraisals and feelings from concern for self‐image In

addition, including the self‐defensive motivation of hiding and

avoidance in the shame concept makes it difficult to know why “shame” might motivate self‐defense Is self‐defensive motivation tied to the feeling of inferiority that indicates a concern for damaged self‐image? Or, is self‐defensive motivation tied to the feeling of rejection that indicates a concern for damage to one’s image in the eyes of others?

As feelings of inferiority and rejection are both embedded

in the common conceptualization and measurement of shame, it is unclear why such an ambiguous “shame” should be tied to self‐defensive motivation, such as wanting

to hide, run away, or cover up (see also Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b)

A Conceptual Model One way to re‐conceptualize an overly broad concept like shame is to dissect it into its constituent elements (see Leach

& Spears, 2008 regarding envy) A dissection of the shame concept yields at least two distinct appraisals and three feelings (Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Figure 1 shows our model of how these appraisals and feelings connect to each other and to self‐ defensive and self‐improvement motivation Specifically, a

moral failure can be appraised as indicating either that others

will condemn one or that one suffers a self‐defect If the self is appraised as suffering a self‐defect, this self‐defect may be viewed as either global (and thus unalterable) or specific (and thus potentially alterable) These appraisals are the central subjective meaning that people give their moral failure (for general discussions, see Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988) We view these appraisals as representing two distinct concerns: social image and self‐image When people appraise a moral failure as indicating other‐condemnation, they show a concern for their social image (these are the constructs with a white background in Figure 1) Appraising a moral failure as indicating a self‐defect shows a concern for their self‐image (these are the constructs shown with a lightly shaded background in Figure 1)

Rather than debating whether “shame” is based on concern for self‐image or social image, we specify the ways in which each concern guides the appraisal of, and feeling about, moral failure For instance, the appraisal of a moral failure as making condemnation by others likely should be most tied to a feeling

of rejection The appraisal (e.g., “lying to my best friend yesterday will lead her, and others, to condemn me”) is linked closely to the feeling (e.g., “rejected,” “rebuffed,” “isolated”) This is why the path between this appraisal and feeling combination is thick in Figure 1 The appraisal of other‐ condemnation suggests that one views one’s social image as damaged (i.e., “people will no longer think well of me”) If this damage could still be prevented, one could be motivated

to defend one’s image in the eyes of others But, because one believes that the damage to one’s social image is already done, one is likely to feel rejection This painful feeling of social devaluation and isolation should be associated with a self‐ defensive desire to escape other’s condemnation Thus, we expect the feeling of rejection to best predict wanting to cover

up one’s moral failure and to (physically and psychologically) avoid the moral failure, those affected by it, and those likely to condemn one for it

As shown in Figure 1a, our model proposes that the

appraisal of a specific self‐defect (e.g., “lying to my best

friend yesterday shows that I am not as honest a person as

I should be”) is most tied to the feeling of shame This

appraisal–feeling combination shows a concern for self‐

image As Ferguson (2005) argues, shame is a feeling

about who one is; it is about one’s identity (see also

Ferguson, Brugman, White & Eyre, 2007) However, as the

self‐defect is specific, it is potentially alterable One can

improve a defect by reforming the faulty aspect of the self

and by repairing one’s relationship to those affected by

one’s moral failure This is why we view the feeling of

shame as important to the motivation to improve the self

and social relations The feeling of inferiority that should

be most associated with the appraisal of a global self‐

defect also shows concern for self‐image However, in the

feeling of inferiority, one believes that one’s whole self‐

image is severely damaged This is because a global self‐

defect is viewed as unalterable (Lewis, 1971) Indeed,

there is little that one can do if one believes that lying to

one’s best friends shows that one is generally “a liar.” As

such, the feeling of inferiority should be more debilitating

than the feeling of shame

Our model of the experience of moral failure eschews the

overly broad conceptualization of shame that prevails at

present in favor of a more elemental approach We see the

two appraisals and three feelings often embedded in the

shame concept as forming specific appraisal–feeling

com-binations Each appraisal–feeling combination gives a

distinct meaning to the moral failure that is guided by

concern for either one’s social image or self‐image As

such, each appraisal–feeling combination represents a

particular way of experiencing one’s moral failure Our focus

on specific appraisal–feeling combinations is inspired by Lazarus’s (1991) view that “core relational themes” should define emotion concepts, not (English) emotion words like

‘shame’ Words like ‘shame’ make poor emotion concepts because they are defined by everyday (English) language use rather than formal analysis (Ortony et al., 1988) Thus, researchers, and the participants in their studies, may mean many different things when they describe the experience of moral failure with the polysemous word ‘shame.’

In specifying three distinct appraisal–feeling combinations,

we are better able to specify the motivation that should be tied

to each experience of moral failure (see Figure 1) For instance, the feeling of rejection should be most tied to the self‐ defensive motivation to withdraw, hide, or avoid because the feeling of rejection is an experience of social isolation based

on the appraisal that others will condemn one for a moral failure This motivation is the most logical, and thus most likely, implication of the concern for a damaged social image

that is the core relational theme underlying the appraised

other‐condemnation → felt rejection combination.

Although our model is novel in many respects, each of its elements has been examined in previous theory and research

In the sections below, we review the empirical support for our model offered in previous work Although most previous thinking views shame as debilitating and thus detrimental to self and to social relations, a good deal of research is consistent with our view that this is more true of the feelings

of rejection and inferiority than of shame Indeed, a good deal of prior work is consistent with our view that shame

is associated with the motivation to improve the self and social relations

Figure 1 Conceptual model of the experience of moral failure Note: Top half of figure shows concern for social‐image; shaded, bottom half

of figure shows concern for self‐image

CONCERN FOR SELF‐IMAGE

Appraisal of Self‐defect

Global

In psychology, the widely held view is that the feeling of

shame is closely linked to an appraisal that a failure indicates

that one’s whole self‐image is damaged (for reviews, see

Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Lansky, 1995; Lewis, 1992;

Tangney & Dearing, 2002) This conceptualization of shame

informs numerous measures of the concept For example, four

of the 16 items of the Test of Self‐Conscious Affect (TOSCA)

measure of chronic proneness to shame (Tangney & Dearing,

2002) refer to global self‐defects (e.g., “I am… terrible, …

incompetent, … irresponsible, … lazy) Some recent work on

in‐group moral failure has also incorporated the appraisal of a

global self‐defect into measures (Brown & Cehajic, 2008;

Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi & Cehajic, 2008) and

manipulations (Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007) of the shame

concept For example, Brown and his colleagues measure

“collective shame” about discrimination and violence with

statements such as “we are …racist and mean, … predisposed

to be racist” and “I feel ashamed for the racist tendency of…”

Lewis (1971) viewed the appraisal of a global self‐defect as

the most central element of the shame concept What was

most important for her is that people believe that it is

extremely difficult to improve a self‐image that is wholly

defective It is this appraisal of a global self‐defect as

unalterable that makes shame debilitating in Lewis’s (1971,

p.40) view: “Shame is about the whole self […] This global

target of hostility makes it difficult to find a solution short of a

sweeping replacement of self by another, better one.”

In psychology, Lewis’s view has been examined by

assessing whether shame is strongly tied to internal, stable,

and global attributions for failure Although most of this

research represents itself as consistent with Lewis, measures

of “shame” tend to be only weakly correlated with the

attributions that suggest an appraisal of a global, unalterable,

self‐defect (for reviews, see Ferguson, 2005; Tangney &

Dearing, 2002; but see Miller & Tangney, 1994) Tracy and

Robins (2006) is the most elaborate examination of this issue

In a first study, they found chronic “shame proneness” to

correlate with chronic internal and stable attributions

(r = 24–.39) as well as chronic external attributions

(r = 36–.44) In a second study that asked students to reflect

on their academic performance, reported shame was weakly

correlated to internal (r = 12) and stable (r = 15) attributions.

In a third study, past experiences of shame were no more

likely to be attributed to stable causes than past experiences of

guilt A fourth study asked students to imagine how they

would feel if they did badly on an exam because of self‐

attributes that varied in stability and controllability Failure

due to stable or unalterable attributes (e.g., low ability) did not

lead to greater imagined shame

In contrast to the prevailing view in psychology, shame is

notclosely tied to an appraisal of the self as globally, stably,

and thus irreparably, defective (see also Ferguson, 2005;

Ferguson et al., 2007) Even when measures of shame include

chronic appraisal of global self‐defect, shame’s association with a view of the self as irreparably damaged is moderate at best (e.g., Tracy & Robins, 2006, study 1; for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002) In actuality, internal, stable, and global attributions for failure are more strongly linked to depression, dispositional pessimism, and low self‐esteem than shame (for reviews, see Ferguson, 2005; Gilbert & Andrews, 1998) Unfortunately, the presumed linkage between the feeling of shame and an appraisal of a global self‐defect has prevented attention to the more circumscribed appraisal of a specific self‐defect that is more logically linked to the feeling

of shame

Specific

Rather than viewing oneself as globally, and thus irreparably, defective, one may interpret a specific failure as indicating a specific self‐defect Although this appraisal is discomforting, its focus on a specific aspect of the self should make it less debilitating than a more global and stable attribution for failure (Lewis, 1971) This is because the appraisal of a specific self‐defect shows concern for damage to a specific aspect of one’s self‐image One may more easily imagine improving one’s emotional honesty with intimates than improving one’s whole self, for example A specific self‐ defect is potentially alterable in a way that a global self‐defect

is not

Appraising a moral failure as indicating a specific self‐ defect goes beyond appraising oneself as responsible for the failure and its consequences (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) The appraisal of a specific self‐defect indicates

a serious criticism of the specific aspect of the self that is found wanting (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Thus, the appraisal of a specific self‐defect focuses on one’s identity as a person who wishes to be moral but has failed to

do so In other words, this appraisal is based on a concern that one’s self‐image is at stake in one’s moral failure (for a general discussion, see Lazarus, 1991) The appraisal of a specific self‐defect is about one’s moral identity rather than one’s moral behavior (see Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007) As the feeling of shame is also about one’s identity (Ferguson et al., 2007), shame and the appraisal of a specific self‐defect should be closely linked

Feeling of Shame The feeling of “shame” is often associated with strong self‐ blame and self‐anger (e.g., Miller & Tangney, 1994; Pettersen, 2009; Smith et al., 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996; Tracy & Robins, 2006) Consequently, people report that “shame” and cognate emotion concepts are intensely unpleasant experiences (e.g., Miller & Tangney, 1994; Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Tangney et al., 1996) This

is underlined by the fact that out of the 135 English emotion words that Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O’Connor (1987) had students evaluate, few were more negative than “shame.” The three English emotion words that are most commonly used to express shame are “ashamed”, “disgraced”, and

“humiliated” (see Lewis, 1971; M Lewis, 1992; Retzinger & Scheff, 2000) These three words are very similar in meaning

(Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles,

& Brown, 2011; Shaver et al 1987) As a consequence,

“ashamed”, “disgraced”, and “humiliated” are found in many

established measures of the feeling of shame (for reviews, see

Robins, Noftle & Tracy, 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002)

However, there is great variation in the semantic content of

measures of shame (for reviews, see Robins et al., 2007) This

likely reflects variation in the conceptualization of shame

Interestingly, none of the 16 items of the widely used TOSCA

measure of individual’s proneness to shame makes explicit

reference to “shame;” four items refer to global self‐defects,

seven items refer to a general feeling of inferiority, one item

refers to a feeling of rejection, and five items refer to

avoidance motivation (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002)

Research that assesses “shame” and related feelings

show a small link to self‐defensive responses The feeling

of shame is correlated to wanting to physically avoid the

failure (Roseman et al., 1994; Schmader & Lickel, 2006;

Tangney et al., 1996) and other people (Frijda, Kuipers &

ter Shure, 1989; Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996)

The feeling of shame is also correlated with wanting to

psychologically avoid one’s failure by not thinking about

it and wanting to cover it up (Miller & Tangney, 1994;

Roseman et al., 1994) The TOSCA measure of shame

proneness tends to yield small to moderate correlations with

self‐defensive motivation (e.g., O’Connor et al., 1999; for a

review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002) However, the

inclusion of self‐defensive motivation in the TOSCA itself

likely exaggerates this link In addition, our conceptual model

suggests that by emphasizing the appraisal of a global self‐

defect, and feelings of rejection or inferiority, the TOSCA

exaggerates its association with self‐defensive motivation

It should be clear from this brief review that the feeling of

shame is not as closely linked to self‐defensive motivation as

is commonly claimed (see also de Hooge, Breugelmans, &

Zeelenberg, 2008; Ferguson, 2005) What is even more

difficult to reconcile with the prevailing conceptualization of

shame in psychology are the small to moderate correlations

that the feeling of shame has with the motivation to improve

the self and social relations, which we describe in the

following paragraphs By viewing the feeling of shame as

closely tied to the appraisal of a specific self‐defect that is

potentially alterable, our model explains why shame is linked

to the motivation to self‐improve

Self‐improvement Motivation

The feeling of shame is based on concern for the damage

done to one’s self‐image by a failure Although self‐

defensive motivation can temporarily alleviate the unpleasant

feelings produced by this concern, it cannot address the

concern directly Avoiding one’s moral failure, and the self‐

defect it indicates, does nothing for a damaged self‐image A

concern for one’s self‐image is most directly addressed by

facing one’s self‐defect and identifying the means by which it

can be improved (see Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite, &

Braithwaite, 2001; Ferguson et al., 2007) Although it can

be unpleasant to recognize a self‐defect, it is a necessary first

step in the motivation to improve the self (e.g., Miller &

Tangney, 1994; for discussions, see Ferguson et al., 2007;

Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002) Of course, if one does not feel bad about one’s specific self‐defect, one has little reason to try to improve it When based on an appraisal of a specific self‐defect, the serious self‐criticism of shame should motivate effort to improve this particular aspect of the self‐ image (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011)

Conceptualizing the feeling of shame as based on an appraisal of a specific self‐defect that is potentially alterable serves to explain why shame is linked to the motivation to improve a self‐image damaged by moral failure For instance, Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994) asked participants

in four studies what they would change if they had experienced

a shame‐eliciting event Participants reported most wanting to change themselves rather than simply changing their behavior Consistent with this, Roseman et al (1994) found recalled experiences of shame to be characterized by a moderate degree

of wanting to undo and correct one’s mistake, improve one’s performance, and try harder However, the most direct evidence

of a link between shame and self‐improvement motivation comes from several recent studies by de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans (2010) Here participants recalled, or experi-enced, shame about an achievement‐related failure de Hooge

et al found felt shame to predict moderate levels of the

motivation to restore a positive self‐evaluation Shame was also

associated with wanting to achieve in the face of failure and with making greater effort to achieve In most of the studies of

de Hooge et al., shame was more strongly linked to the motivation to restore self‐image than to protect it from further damage by responding self‐defensively

Social‐improvement Motivation Self‐improvement may also be achieved through efforts at the improvement of the social relations affected by one’s moral failure Thus, our model proposes that the feeling of shame is associated with social‐improvement motivation through the motivation for self‐improvement (see Figure 1) Although it is rarely acknowledged in psychology, the feeling of shame has small to moderate correlations with motivation to improve the individual’s social relations (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Schmader

& Lickel, 2006) For example, Tangney et al (1996) found that felt shame was correlated with wanting to make amends Miller and Tangney (1994) found that felt shame was characterized

by apologizing and trying to make things better Roseman et al (1994) found that felt shame was characterized by wanting to make up for what was done and to apologize for it In three studies, de Hooge et al (2008) had participants imagine, recall,

or experience failure The feeling of shame led individuals to act more pro‐socially toward those who knew of their failure Perhaps because few psychologists expect shame to be related

to social‐improvement motivation, these are some of the only studies to examine how shame encourages actual pro‐social behavior Nevertheless, there is clear and consistent evidence that feeling shame is linked to the motivation to improve the social relations affected by one’s moral failure

Feeling of Inferiority

In English, the word “ashamed” can be used to express a general feeling of inferiority (e.g., Leach & Spears, 2008;

Smith et al., 2002) Thus, when lay people state that they feel

“ashamed”, they may mean that they feel inferior because they

appraise a failure as indicating a global, and thus unalterable,

self‐defect When a general feeling of inferiority is not

explicitly assessed, the expression of “shame” may be

confounded with the debilitating feeling of inferiority (Gausel,

Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) For this reason alone, most

measures of “shame” are ambiguous in meaning Somewhat

less ambiguous are those measures that purposefully assess

the shame concept as mainly a feeling of inferiority At least

since Lewis (1971), psychologists have tended to

conceptu-alize a general feeling of inferiority as central to the shame

concept For example, seven of the 16 items in the TOSCA

scale of chronic proneness to shame (Tangney & Dearing,

2002) refer to general feelings of inferiority (e.g., “I feel…

like a rat, … stupid, … inadequate”) This fits with Lewis’s

(1971, p.84) argument that “Shame of failure is for an

involuntary event It results from incapacity.”

Like the appraisal of a global self‐defect to which it is tied,

a general feeling of inferiority views the self as unalterably

defective Partly because Lewis (1971) viewed a general

feeling of inferiority as central to shame, it made sense for her

to expect shame to promote self‐defensive responses to

failure, such as avoidance, hiding, and covering up However,

it is the feeling of inferiority embedded in the shame concept

that provides a clearer psychological basis for self‐defensive

responses to failure (for discussions, see Ferguson, 2005;

Leach & Spears, 2008) As one believes that there is little that

one can do to alter the defective self, the feeling of inferiority

drives the motivation to escape the painfully inadequate self

and the failure that indicates one’s inadequacy

A wide range of research in psychology shows the feeling

of inferiority to be a moderate to strong predictor of

maladaptive responses to failure (for reviews, see Ferguson,

2005; Leach & Spears, 2008) For example, Smith et al

(2002, Study 4) asked participants to recall a time when they

felt bad about doing something wrong or being inferior

Feeling angry and vengeful at the time was more highly

correlated to feeling inferior (r = 34) than was feeling

ashamed (r = 23) In a study of chronic individual differences,

O’Connor et al (1999) showed that the feeling of inferiority

was more strongly associated with maladaptive responses than

“shame.” They found chronic “self‐hate” to be more strongly

correlated to hostility, low self‐esteem, and psychopathology

than the chronic proneness to shame measured by the TOSCA

Given the debilitating degree of self‐reproach in the feeling

of inferiority, it is also possible that this feeling immobilizes

people (Lewis, 1971) For this reason, Leach and Spears

(2008) describe the pain of inferiority as a state of extreme

passivity that promotes externalized hostility only when easy

opportunities arise Thus, our model proposes that the feeling

of inferiority has only a tenuous link to self‐defensive

motivation (see Figure 1a)

CONCERN FOR SOCIAL IMAGE

Having others view one as honest, trustworthy, and fair is

important for a moral social image in one’s own eyes

(Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008) and in the eyes of others (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995; de Waal, 1996) Thus, if a moral failure threatens to damage one’s social image, it also threatens to damage one’s “social bond” (Scheff, 2000) to others (Ahmed et al., 2001; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; de Waal, 1996) This is exemplified by the fact that a moral failure can lead groups to exact social punishment by marginalizing, ostracizing,

or excluding the offender (Braithewaite, 1989; de Waal, 1996) Thus, our model proposes that those concerned with their social image can appraise others as likely to condemn them for their moral failure (see Figure 1a) This form of social marginalization should be most linked to a painful feeling of rejection against which people should want to defend themselves

Appraisal of Other‐condemnation For some time in sociology, damage to social image has been central to the shame concept (e.g., Cooley, 1902; for reviews, see Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff, 2000) Despite the fact that Lewis (1971) is widely referenced as arguing that shame is intensely self‐focused, she also argued that “The ‘other’ is a prominent and powerful force in the experience of shame” (p.41) Thus, she conceptualized shame as, at least partly, based on concern for social image: “the self is thus divided in

shame; it is experiencing condemnation from the other or from

the field, and it is simultaneously acutely aware of itself” (p.39, italics added) Lewis’s (1971) emphasis of this appraisal

of other‐condemnation likely followed from the fact that her research on “shame” was of “neurotic” clients who came to view their therapists as the “laughing; ridiculing, powerful, active” other

A number of recent psychological approaches to the shame concept include the appraisal of other‐condemnation in combination with the typical emphasis of global self‐defect (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2002) For example, Iyer et al (2007) told US and British participants that Iraqis believed their national character to be corrupt and arrogant This manipulation increased the feeling of shame and a measure akin to the appraisal of other‐condemnation However, the manipulation aims to damage both self‐image and social image, making it impossible to gauge the role of each in the feeling of shame Such oscillation between conceptualizing shame as based on concern for self‐image or social image is consistent with Lewis’s (1971) insistence that the shame concept include a variety of appraisals and feelings However, folding the appraisal of other‐condemnation into

“shame” obscures the role of social‐image concerns in the experience of moral failure As a remedy, our model isolates the appraisal of other‐condemnation and ties it to the feeling

of rejection in an appraisal–feeling combination that shows a distinct concern for damage to one’s image in the eyes of others (see Figure 1)

Feeling of Rejection Lewis (1971) argued that “for shame to occur there must be an emotional relationship between the person and the ‘other’ such that the person cares what the other thinks or feels about the self In this affective tie the self does not feel autonomous

or independent, but dependent and vulnerable to rejection”

(p.42) Consistent with this, Scheff and Retzinger (1991)

conceptualize shame as involving feelings of rejection and

rebuff about the threat of social isolation engendered by a

moral or other failure Even the TOSCA measure of shame

proneness includes “feel alone and apart from…” as an item,

although it does not include a feeling of rejection in its

conceptualization of shame

Although the feeling of rejection has rarely been explicitly

included in psychological approaches to the shame concept,

psychologists have long viewed the feeling of rejection as

central to the experience of condemnation or other social

devaluation (for a review, see Baumeister & Leary, 1995)

And, a great deal of research shows that individuals

experience social devaluation as an intensely unpleasant

emotional experience (for reviews, see Baumeister & Leary,

1995; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009) In fact, MacDonald and

Leary (2005) reviewed a great deal of evidence that shows the

emotional experience of social devaluation to involve the

same physiological systems as physical pain Consistent with

this, a great deal of research shows that the feeling of rejection

is extremely debilitating (for reviews, see Baumeister &

Leary, 1995; MacDonald & Leary, 2005) For instance, in a

meta‐analysis, Gerber and Wheeler (2009) showed

experi-mental manipulations of social exclusion to have moderate to

large effects on self‐esteem, mood, positive affect, and a sense

of control Although people can describe this feeling as

“shame” (MacDonald & Leary, 2005), it is more accurate to

call it a feeling of rejection or isolation The label is important

because the appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection

combination is a more precise description of the social

psychological basis for self‐defensive motivation

Self‐defensive Motivation

As reviewed above, the feeling of shame has a small empirical

link to self‐defensive motivation However, the more

debilitating feeling of rejection, often embedded in the shame

concept, has a more considerable link to self‐defensive

motivation (for a review, see MacDonald & Leary, 2005)

This suggests that felt shame only appears to be linked with

self‐defensive motivation because it is conceptualized and

measured in a way that emphasizes felt rejection Thus, our

model identifies the other‐condemnation → rejection

combi-nation of appraisal and feeling as a more precise explacombi-nation

of self‐defensive motivation than the more general concept of

shame that prevails at present (see Figure 1)

Physical or psychological withdrawal and avoidance can

militate against the appraisal of other‐condemnation and

feeling of rejection by reducing one’s exposure to those

expected to condemn one (Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles,

2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Thus, one

can prevent further damage to one’s image in the eyes of

others by removing oneself from the scene of failure

(Ferguson, 2005; Thomas, 1997) Given that the damage to

social image is believed done, there is little else that one can

do but defend one’s social image against further damage

Wikan (2008) offers what we view as an example of the link

between appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection and

self‐defensive motivation She describes Rahmi Sahindal’s

motivation for murdering his daughter Fadime for bringing

“shame” on the family by publicizing her relationship with a non‐Kurdish Swede and the family’s resultant ostracism and threats of violence Although Sahindal described his feeling

as shame, he believed that his social image was so damaged

in the eyes of his extended family, community, city, and the whole of Sweden that “he no longer could bear to get on the bus between his job and his home; he wanted to move to a new place He couldn’t bear going to work” (p.117) This sounds like a feeling of rejection tied to an appraisal of widespread moral condemnation

A damaged social image can also promote self‐defense through the externalization of the painful feeling of rejection

(Lewis, 1971; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991) Thus, the appraised

other‐condemnation → felt rejection combination should also

be tied to hostile anger and aggression toward those who can

be blamed for the damage to one’s image in the eyes of others (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, 2011a) In their meta‐analysis, Gerber and Wheeler (2009) found the feeling of rejection to be linked to anti‐social responses MacDonald and Leary (2005) argue that feelings about devaluation lead to aggression when other forms of self‐defense, such as escape, are not easy This seemed to be the case in Rahmi Sahindal’s horrific murder of his daughter Fadime

Social Defense of Social Image

A moral failure puts our social relations at risk because it puts our social image in those relations at risk (Goffman, 1959; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Scheff, 2000) This risk is real The damaged social image that can follow from a moral failure can lead communities to exact material punishment including starvation, physical isolation, and violence (see

de Waal, 1996) As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, communities can also exact social punishment for moral failure, including social marginalization, ostracism, and exclusion (Braithwaite, 1989; de Waal, 1996; Goffmann, 1959) Fear of this sort of social punishment is the basis for the feeling of rejection specified in our model As a poor social image poses a serious risk to our social relations, we have good reason to worry about the material and social consequences of moral failure

Because the risk is so great, individuals should be motivated to defend their social image against such potential damage where possible Indeed, those who have experienced

or witnessed the feeling of rejection tied to the appraisal of other‐condemnation should wish to avoid this painful feeling

by engaging in social defense of their image in the eyes of others In instances when a moral failure does not yet appear

to have damaged one’s image in the eyes of others, concern about social image should implicate the self less This should make emotion and emotion‐based motivation less likely (Lazarus, 1991) Instead, individuals should be most focused

on defending their social image from the potential damage

that their moral failure may do to their social relations This is most easily done by improving one’s social relations—an alternative pathway incorporated into our model at the top of Figure 2 Thus, a moral failure may directly motivate efforts at social defense of one’s social image when one views the potential damage to social image as preventable

By expressing a desire to improve one’s relationship with

those affected by one’s moral failure or with the relevant

com-munity, one may pre‐emptively defend one’s social image from

the condemnation that could otherwise follow from a moral

fail-ure Public statements of responsibility or regret can lead others to

view one as having re‐established one’s moral standing in the

group (Braithwaite, 1989) Expressions of humility may similarly

work as an appeasement strategy that reduces the need for

punishment or condemnation (de Waal, 1996; Keltner & Harker,

1998) This socio‐functional view of the social defense of social

image has been examined in ethological approaches to social

groups It also fits with a socio‐functional view of emotion As the

feeling of rejection is highly aversive, people should be motivated

to defend their social image in ways that prevent the appraisal of

other‐condemnation and feeling of rejection A number of

sociological approaches to the shame concept also emphasize

that the possibility of other‐condemnation can motivate

individ-uals to defend their social image before serious damage is done

(e.g., Braithwaite, 1989; for a review, see Scheff, 2000) For

example, Goffman’s (1959) notion of face‐work suggests that

people engage in social defense of their image in the eyes of

others Goffman presumes little involvement of the self and thus

gives no pride of place to emotion as a basis of motivation

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL

IMPLICATIONS

Why do some people respond self‐defensively to moral failure

while others respond by wanting to improve themselves and

their social relations? The prevailing view in psychology is

that shame promotes self‐defensive motivation, whereas guilt

or remorse promotes more positive motivation Across sub‐ disciplines of psychology, shame is thought to be based on an appraisal of global self‐defect and is thus driven by concern for an irreparably damaged self image As a result, shame is thought to motivate people to defend themselves from further damage to their devastated self image through avoidance or withdrawal Although this view is popular, it suffers from several important problems Notably, “shame” is only modestly related to self‐defensive motivation And, in direct contrast to the prevailing view, shame is at least as strongly linked to motivation for self‐improvement and social im-provement Thus, we thought it necessary to rethink shame

We first differentiated the subjective feeling of shame from

the ambiguous concept referred to as “shame” by researchers and by their research participants In our view, the feeling of shame is a dysphoric experience of contrite self‐criticism about a failure in a domain important to the self‐concept This feeling of shame is only one of the numerous appraisals and feelings embedded in the prevailing concept of shame Thus, rather than continuing to conceptualize shame as an ambiguous admixture, we dissected the concept into two distinct appraisals and three feelings Our model proposes how these elements combine to form distinct experiences of moral failure Each experience is suggestive of a distinct motiva-tional pathway As such, we offer social psychological explanations as to why people respond to moral failure with self‐defensive or self‐improvement motivation Rather than invoking the ambiguous experience of “shame”, our model proposes that people travel down one or the other path because of a specific pattern of how they appraise and feel about their moral failure

Figure 2 Expanded conceptual model of the experience of moral failure Note: Top half of figure shows concern for social image; shaded,

bottom half of figure shows concern for self‐image The core model is shown in dark gray

We were able to distinguish the different pathways in our

model partly because of what each pathway suggests about a

person’s overriding concern in their moral failure Those most

concerned with their self image are thought most likely to

appraise their moral failure as indicating a defect of the self

Unlike the prevailing view in psychology, we thought it

important to distinguish the appraisal of global self‐defect,

presumed central to the shame concept, from the appraisal of a

specific self‐defect that seems more appropriate to moral

failure This more circumscribed appraisal of self‐defect also

seems more likely in non‐clinical populations (Ferguson,

2005) We reviewed theory and research that suggests that

shame is actually tied to an appraisal that one’s self image

suffers a specific self‐defect in need of repair As self‐

improvement is the most clear and direct way to repair a

damaged self‐image, we reasoned that shame about a specific

self‐defect should best predict self‐improvement motivation

and thus social‐improvement motivation However,

improve-ment is a more difficult aim for those who appraise a moral

failure as damaging their global self‐image As a feeling of

ontological inadequacy implies that one’s entire self‐image is

irreparably damaged by a moral failure, it should encourage a

feeling of inferiority Although people may describe this

experience as a feeling of shame, a feeling of inferiority is a

more accurate conceptualization and description Inferiority is

a highly unpleasant and intense feeling of self‐criticism that

people wish to be rid of Thus, as shown in the research we

reviewed above, there is some reason to expect felt inferiority

to predict self‐defensive responses to moral failure Indeed,

escape and avoidance is a reasonable response to an unalterable

self‐defect What else can one do but run away? However, given

the debilitating degree of self‐reproach involved in the feeling if

inferiority, it is even more likely that individuals become passive

observers of their fate, unable to flee or do much else besides

reproach themselves (Leach & Spears, 2008)

Rather than attributing the defense of self‐image to shame,

we propose that this motivation is closely linked to a feeling of

rejection Building on theory and research on the shame

concept and on social exclusion, our model views the feeling

of rejection as tied to the appraisal that a moral failure suggests

that others will condemn one Thus, this appraisal–feeling

combination indicates a damaged social image and thus social

bonds at serious risk Given this appraisal and feeling, a self‐

defensive response to moral failure makes most sense If the

damage to social image is already done, there is little that one

can do to improve it Instead, individuals focus on trying to

defend their social image against further damage by escaping

condemnation By identifying the subjective appraisal of

other‐condemnation and feeling of rejection as distinct from

shame, our model explains the social psychological basis

for self‐defensive motivation more precisely than the

ambiguous shame concept

Guilt?

Because shame is typically thought to promote self‐defensive

motivation, other self‐critical feelings have been tied to self‐

improvement and social‐improvement Guilt is chief among these

emotions In fact, a great deal of theory and research in

psy-chology views guilt as the pro‐social antithesis of an anti‐social

shame concept (for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002) Given this, some may wonder whether our conceptualization of shame comes too close to the prevailing view of guilt

We do, in fact, view shame and guilt as closely related feelings that have a great deal in common (see Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, 2011b; Leach et al., 2006) However, research has established a number of small differences between the feelings (for a review, see Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Most important for the present purposes is that guilt focuses more narrowly than shame on the appraisal of agency (i.e., causality, responsibility) for moral failure (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 1994; Roseman et al., 1994) Thus, as Lewis (1971) argued, the concern

in guilt is the moral failure rather than the self‐image of the failed Given this focus on the agency for moral failure, guilt is a likely motivator of efforts at social improvement that ameliorate the effects of the moral failure (e.g., Leach et al., 2006; for a discussion, see Leach et al., 2002) This pathway is shown at the bottom of the expanded model shown in Figure 2

As shame shows a greater concern for self‐image than guilt, shame should be a greater motivation for the improvement of self‐image As one’s identity is not implicated in the same way

in guilt as in shame (Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007), guilt may be more easily dealt with by improving the social consequences of the moral failure for which one appraises oneself as an agent In the experience of shame, the agency for moral failure is appraised as having the more profound implication of highlighting a specific defect in the self Thus,

as shown in Figure 2, we view the appraisal of agency as modestly associated with the appraisal of self‐defect thought to

be central to shame An example may prove helpful Because of

a consistent failure to recycle, one may appraise oneself as contributing to global warming and thus as the agent who caused this moral failure However, this appraisal does not imply that one views oneself as suffering a defect in one’s self‐concept What of the Non‐moral?

There are few failures more important to self‐image or social image than moral failures Nevertheless, non‐moral failures can

be important Indeed, much past work has examined “shame” about failures of competence, such as performing poorly at work or school As in moral failure, we believe that examinations of failures of competence need to distinguish the feeling of shame from the feeling of inferiority and appraisal

of global self‐defect that are often embedded in the shame concept We expect that examinations of competence failure will show that what has been previously described as “shame”

is actually an appraised (global) self‐defect → felt inferiority

combination Failures of competence may also encourage concern for social image, where such failure is important to one’s view of oneself in a group or community Thus, self‐

defensiveness may also flow from the appraised other‐

condemnation → felt rejection combination when social‐image

concern drives the experience of failures of competence The concept of shame is also used quite often to refer to peoples’ experience of negative events that are not clearly about morality or competence and not clearly an example of failure For example, shame is often used to describe the experience of stigmas, such as physical deformity, severe disability, extremely low status, and rape or other serious

victimization We believe that dividing the broad concept of

shame into specific appraisals and feelings should aid any

examination of the emotional experience that people refer to

as “shame.” Although a survivor of sexual assault may tell a

therapist that she feels “ashamed,” our model requires an

analysis of this utterance to go beyond the survivor’s or the

therapist’s common‐sense understanding of “shame.” Our

model may be used to examine whether the survivor says that

she is ashamed because she feels that her family or community

will condemn her Unlike other approaches, our model can

differentiate this concern for serious damage to her social

image from the concern for damage to her self‐image

Referring to both of these experiences of sexual assault as

“shame” does little to clarify the survivors’ actual experience

Describing the former experience as felt rejection and the

latter as felt inferiority goes much further in representing the

meaning the event has for the survivor As such, these more

precise characterizations may better guide how therapists or

loved ones may best engage the experience and how it may be

more carefully and accurately researched

Methods and Models

Distinguishing the appraisals and feelings that are commonly

embedded within the shame concept enables methodological

approaches that are more flexible and more precise than the

unitary scales that prevail at present Rather than combining

appraisal, feeling, and motivation into a single scale of

“shame,” we advise the measurement of each individual element

(see Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach,

Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) This allows the direct assessment

of the inter‐relations between measures of appraisal, feeling, and

motivation Structural Equation Modeling is one excellent way

to simultaneously estimate patterns of covariation to examine

the latent structure of peoples’ experience of moral failure (for a

general discussion, see Leach, 2010) Our studies of moral

failure have provided consistent evidence that our differentiated

model of appraisals, feelings, and motivations is a more

appropriate measurement of the experience of moral failure

than a single, omnibus concept of shame (Gausel, Leach, &

Vignoles, 2011a,b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011)

Examining the experience of moral failure with distinct

appraisals and feelings also allows researchers to validate the

subjective meaning of the feelings that participants express by

tying each feeling to an appraisal that helps define it (for

general discussions, see Lazarus, 1991; Leach, 2010) Thus,

participants’ expression of felt shame has a specific meaning

when it is especially linked to the appraisal of a specific self‐

defect If, for some reason, an expressed feeling of shame is

closely linked to an appraisal of global self‐defect, this

particular meaning of “shame” would be evidenced in the

empirical model In this way, we could know that this

particular expression of shame is equivalent to our

concep-tualization of the feeling of inferiority despite its expression as

“shame.” Thus, our model enables research to distinguish

between participants’ semantic expression of feelings and the

more consistent and considered conceptualization of emotion

required of those who generate theory and conduct research

As such, our model helps to specify what exactly participants

and researchers mean when they refer to the shame concept

It may also be important to note that our conceptual model need not be thought of as a simple, unidirectional, causal model Although appraisal often does lead to feeling and motivation, this is not the only causal direction possible Based on Lazarus (1991), we prefer to view our conceptual model as a network of inter‐related elements (for a discussion, see Leach, 2010) Each element implies its concomitant elements as well as the motivation that best suits each combination Thus, the self‐defensive motivation of avoidance

is implied by a feeling of rejection about an appraisal of other‐ condemnation This motivation is socially and psychologically consistent with self‐defensive motivation

Self ⇔ Social Our separation of concern for self‐image and social image is not meant to imply that the two concerns are mutually opposed Rather, we wish to suggest that one or the other concern is prepotent in each feeling in our model In the feeling of rejection, for instance, concern for social image is prepotent; concern for self‐image is secondary However, one feels rejection because it is important to one’s self‐concept to

be accepted and valued by others This is why the appraisal that others condemn one harms the self and thus feels bad (for

a general discussion, see Lazarus, 1991) Concern for social image that does not involve the self‐concept is not emotional

in our model It is experienced as a more purely social concern for the defense of one’s social image in an effort to avoid the potential social costs of moral failure (see Figure 2)

Although concern for self‐image is at the heart of felt shame, it is clear that self‐image is grounded in social relations regulated by moral standards More obviously, the moral failure that precipitates felt shame is typically social in nature Moral failures often involve other people who one has wronged in some way Thus, the concern for self‐image that is illustrated in moral shame is inherently social This is part of the reason that shame motivates not just improvement of the self but also improvement of the social relation If self‐image

is inherently social, then the improvement of self‐image is also

an improvement of social relations

Because self‐image is inherently social, it is also possible that concern for self‐image can dovetail with concern for social image in felt shame Indeed, individuals are likely to be aware that improving their self‐image and their social relations is also likely to improve their social image It has long been recognized that others can interpret one’s expression of shame as a signal that one wishes to improve one’s social image and one’s social relations (see Braithwaite, 1989; Ferguson et al., 2007; Scheff, 2000) in addition to improving one’s self‐image As such, the feeling of shame is an illustrative example of the way in which the self and the social are bound together in a dynamic whole

REFERENCES

Ahmed, E., Harris, N., Braithwaite, J., & Braithwaite, V (2001) Shame

management through reintegration Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-sity Press.

Baumeister, R F., & Leary, M R (1995) The need to belong: Desire for

interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation

Psycholog-ical Bulletin , 117, 497–529 DOI: 10.1037/0033‐2909.117.3.497