After motivational hedonism feeling bad can be good; feeling good can be bad

9 After motivational hedonismFeeling bad can be good | feeling good can be bad Colin Wayne Leach It is widely believed in psychology and other behavioral sciences that feeling “good” ser

9 After motivational hedonism

Feeling bad can be good | feeling good can

be bad

Colin Wayne Leach

It is widely believed in psychology and other behavioral sciences that feeling

“good” serves a general psychological function of motivating us to continue the advantageous state of affairs that has led to our euphoria, whereas feeling

“bad” functions to motivate us to discontinue the disadvantageous state of affairs that has led to our dysphoria (for reviews, see Buck, 1999; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991) Thus, the assumption is that feeling good functions to

alert us to an advantageous state of affairs that we should approach (if we

know what is good for us) and that feeling bad functions to alert us to a

disadvantageous state of affairs that we should avoid (if we know what is bad

for us) This view is often advanced today through an increasingly integrated approach to affect, emotion, and motivation that combines cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, and behavioral economics (for a review, see Nie-denthal & Brauer, 2012) It is rooted in an older perspective that can be called motivational hedonism (Moore, 2018) as it assumes that human motivation boils down to a basic desire to approach pleasure and avoid suffering (for discussions, see Bastian et al., 2014; Gray, 1990; Higgins, 1997) Motivational hedonism can be distinguished from ethical hedonism which is the view that only pleasure has value more generally, (Moore, 2018)

There can be little doubt that feeling bad about a state of affairs is an important basis for being motivated to discontinue it, and vice versa How-ever, what is generally true is not what is always true (McGuire, 1973) Indeed, what is generally true may give little indication to what is most interesting or important about phenomena In the case of feeling bad, it is quite functional (i.e., efficient and useful affectively) that one is moved to end one’s affective state as quickly and easily as possible with little concern for the causes or consequences of one’s state However, the risk to the individual in such motivational hedonism is that it may function to focus one narrowly on what is good for the self emotionally to the exclusion of what is good for the self ethically, socially, politically, or otherwise (for discussions, see Averill, 1982; Solomon, 1993; Tiedens & Leach, 2004) As such, the motivational hedonism in a functionalist perspective on affect leaves little room for the possibility that dysphoric states of affective suffering can sometimes have other value for the individual experiencing them

Of course, motivational hedonism also tends to neglect the implications that an individual’s dysphoric (or euphoric) state has for individual others, or for the greater good In other words, presuming that it is functional and advantageous for individuals to approach pleasure and avoid suffering makes

it difficult to see how such motivation may benefit or harm the others affected

by the individual’s state (for discussions, see Averill, 1982; Tiedens & Leach, 2004) For instance, wanting to feel good, rather than bad, can affect our willingness to acknowledge our mistakes, tell the truth about our disappoint-ments, or empathize with the suffering of others As such, the perspective of motivational hedonism can obscure the aggregate-level implications that individual’s inter-related affective lives have for the social relations within which human beings are embedded (e.g., families, companies, cities, societies) Indeed, affect is not only an individual phenomenon Its operation in dyads and larger social aggregates means that the value of feeling good or bad must also be examined at social levels of analysis if we are to properly understand

it (Leach, 2016; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; Tiedens & Leach, 2004)

Instances in which feeling bad can do good offer unique insight into feel-ings, and into what is good and bad The same is true of good feelings that do bad Thus, in this chapter, I discuss my own and other’s work on social approaches to emotion to show that feeling bad can do us and others good (e.g., shame, righteous anger) and that feeling good can do us and others bad (e.g., schadenfreude) In the case of shame, for instance, this state of pro-foundly unpleasant self-criticism can move people to want to improve them-selves and their social relations when the intense dysphoria is interpreted as a sign that improvement is necessary and possible In schadenfreude, for exam-ple, the euphoria of feeling good about a bad event befalling another may debase one’s character in addition to harming one’s relation to the unfortu-nate In shame, righteous anger, and schadenfreude, we see that the value of emotion (personal and social) has less to do with the hedonics of the state itself and much more to do with the psychological and social implications

of the emotion as a way of “being in the world” (as Sartre would have it)

Motivational hedonism, and after

It is important to start with the obvious (and necessary) point that the terms good and bad, positive and negative, are pregnant with normative meaning even when they are used to describe affective states (Solomon, 1993) Feeling bad about an event in one’s life suggests more than simple dysphoria In addition to implying the (un)pleasant quality of affective experience, the terms good and bad, positive and negative, imply that affective states are good or bad for oneself (i.e., psychologically functional for the individual) and good or bad for others and/or the world in general (i.e., moral, ethical)

Thus, it is widely presumed that feeling good is good for us, and often does good in the world (for discussions, see Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991) This

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conflation of at least three different senses of good/positive or bad/negative feeling is likely due to the motivational hedonism assumptions implicit or explicit in much western theorizing of affect, emotion, and motivation (for discussions, see Arnold, 1960; Solomon, 1993) The motivational hedonism assumption is that people wish to approach pleasure and to avoid pain and suffering (for reviews, see Bastian et al., 2014; Gray, 1990; Higgins, 1997) This is facile functionalism at work, as we would be quite irrational creatures, the argument goes, if we didn’t approach what is good for us and avoid what

is bad for us And, if people are, by and large, ethically concerned, then the pleasure they wish to approach should be morally good and the suffering they wish to avoid should be morally bad Numerous overarching theories of human nature can work to explain why feeling bad is bad for us and bad morally (for reviews, see Higgins, 1997; Lazarus, 1991; Solomon, 1993) Rational actors, evolutionary survivors, and self-esteem seekers should all end

up with this confluence of affective valence, functionality, and ethics And, to the degree to which it is assumed that biological, psychological, and social (moral) processes are intertwined in some single grand design which functions

to unite human motivation, the confluence of affective valence, functionality, and ethics may be presumed as necessary and efficient (for discussions, see Barrett, 2006; Buck, 1999; Solomon, 1993; Tiedens & Leach, 2004)

Despite the widespread influence of implicit or explicit motivational hedonism in theories of satisfaction and suffering (see Bastian et al., 2014; Higgins, 1997), it is clear upon reflection that these three senses of good-bad can and should be distinguished from one another The simple truth is that terms like good and bad, positive and negative, are poor descriptions of the (un)pleasantness of affective experience, precisely because they imply some-thing more normative than is necessary (Solomon, 1993) To “feel good” is to experience a pleasant state of euphoria, whereas to “feel bad” is to experience

an unpleasant state of dysphoria When considered simply in terms of affec-tive (un)pleasantness, there is no necessary assumption that people generally wish to feel “good” or “bad” or that either state has consequences that are good or bad for the person, for others or for society at large When good and bad are used simply as descriptive characterizations of an affective state of (un)pleasantness there are no functional or moral implications Thus, it is more precise and more prudent to refer to this dimension of affective states as the (un)pleasantness of the experience, or what many behavioral science approaches to affect and emotion refer to as hedonic valence (for reviews, see Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer, Schorr, & Jonhstone, 2001)

After motivational hedonism, we are freer to consider the many other possible functions that (un)pleasant affective states may serve for individuals and for social relations (Leach, 2016, 2017) In terms of social relations, feeling good can be bad for relationships even if it is pleasant affectively As I discuss below, the malicious satisfaction of schadenfreude is one example, whereby one takes pleasure in the misfortune of another The pleasure of schadenfreude necessarily places one in an antagonistic relation with the less

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fortunate and thereby limits more pro-social states like empathy and com-passion (e.g., Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003; for empirical reviews, see Smith, 2000; van Dijk & Ouwerkerk, 2014)

Freeing our thinking about function from the narrow concern with indivi-dual benefit inherent to motivational hedonism also allows us to consider the way that unpleasant emotional states like anger and shame may serve to alert

us to an unacceptable state of affairs that calls for action in an attempt at improvement (Leach, 2016) Rather than motivating avoidance of a dis-advantageous state, emotions like anger and shame can focus us on altering the causes of our dysphoria In other words, contra motivational hedonism, unpleasant states like anger and shame may encourage approach rather than avoidance And, thus, their function for individuals may be to mobilize effort

at changing circumstances, either by avoidance or approach

After motivational hedonism, we are freer to also consider the ethical or moral implications of (un)pleasant affective states in a way that goes well beyond what is good for the individual hedonically In the case of schaden-freude, we may ask what implications these pleasant states have for the ethical codes by which we expect people to experience the world Is it legitimate, kind, or decent to take pleasure in another’s suffering? (see Kristjánsson, 2006; Leach, Spears, & Manstead, 2015) Is it reasonable to be angry about believed injustice and to act in hostile opposition to the presumed unjust? (see Averill, 1982; Leach, 2008) By considering the moral good of affective states,

we can move further beyond the individual and experiential concerns of motivational hedonism to examine what feeling bad and feeling good does ethically for the moral aspects of oneself and for the moral dimension of how one treats others and the world at large (for discussions, see Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015; Solomon, 1993)

Feeling good can be bad

The most prominent examples of pleasant affective states involve earned suc-cess, good fortune, or other events that benefit the self and perhaps others (Lazarus, 1991) Pride, joy, and satisfaction are all pleasant experiences because some benefit is bestowed (Leach et al., 2015) The pleasure of scha-denfreude is thus noteworthy because one experiences satisfaction at a bad fortune rather than good fortune (Ortony et al., 1988; Smith, 2000)

Schadenfreude

Feeling good about something bad (that befalls another) is inherently mal-icious, as some level, as it implies dislike and ill will (Smith, 2000) Indeed, an antagonistic relationship with another that is marked by strong dislike facil-itates the dramatic divergence in feeling that is satisfaction at another’s suf-fering (Leach et al., 2003; Smith, 2000) In schadenfreude, the value of (another’s) suffering is the hedonic pleasure it provides one who wishes to see

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another suffer (Leach et al., 2003) There are numerous reasons to want to see and enjoy another suffer (for a review, see van Dijk & Ouwerkerk, 2014) Most prominent among them are intense rivalry, a sense of inferiority, and a view of another’s misfortune as deserved comeuppance (Leach et al., 2003) Empirical research in psychology has shown that these subjective judgements can all contribute to various degrees to the pleasure that individuals take in the misfortune of a rival as long as the misfortune is not so extreme that it makes a little pleasure at a mishap seem indecent (for a review, see van Dijk

& Ouwerkerk, 2014)

Empirical research in psychology has also shown that the actual procedural fairness of the other party’s position or success has little do to with schaden-freude at their fall (Leach & Spears, 2008; Leach et al., 2015) Thus, as Nietzsche (1967/1887) suggested years ago, schadenfreude appears to have little to do with a genuine sense of morality Instead, as Nietzsche suggested, schadenfreude has more to do with feelings about ourselves and the unfortu-nate than the apparent or believed deservingness of our fortunes (for reviews, see Leach, Spears, & Manstead, 2014; Leach et al., 2015; van Dijk & Ouwerkerk, 2014) Although “schadenfreude” is now used in English to describe satisfaction at seeing justice done to another who is seen as deserving punishment or some other adverse circumstance, such pleasure is more precisely

described by the German term Genugtuung ( Leach et al., 2014).

The notion that people can gain “satisfaction” from seeing others “pay” for wrongdoing is long-standing in systems of criminal law and tort In the

German legal system, for example, Genugtuung is used to refer to a sense of

satisfaction that the proper punishment has been meted out for wrongdoing (Prittwitz, 1999; Stoll, 1970) In many legal systems, punitive damages, restoration, or proper compensation, are designed to redress the harm of a crime by providing victims their satisfaction We can see the attempt at formal justice here by the guiding principle that the victim’s satisfaction should be proportionate to the harm caused More generally, justice may be done via the (formal or informal) punishment of a wrongdoer or by a popular

recognition of the wrongdoer’s culpability One may also feel Genugtuung

about the vindication of a falsely accused, or maliciously maligned, rightdoer

It is in Genugtuung that we may see some psychological and social value in seeing others “suffer for their sins”, as the pleasure in Genugtuung is about the

(retributive or restorative) justice accomplished by the suffering rather than

being about the suffering itself Thus, Genugtuung is a case where feeling good about something bad can be good The pleasure of Genugtuung may be

delivered to by a kind of cosmic justice that can be thought of as the “hand of justice,” “karma,” “comeuppance,” or “just deserts” Of course, one may also take pleasure when witness to authorities or groups punishing wrongdoers on behalf of the community at large We can imagine that being pleased at seeing justice done serves to reinforce a concern for justice and perhaps even encourages faith in social systems of adjudication and punishment that mete out appropriate justice This is an important question for future research

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At some level, the emotion of Genugtuung has some similarities to the idea

that the “altruistic punishment” of wrongdoers can be experienced as a form

of psychological reward or satisfaction For instance, Singer et al (2006) found men who witnessed an unfair game player “punished” with shock showed activation in brain regions associated with reward processes This psychological reward to seeing just suffering may reinforce within the indivi-dual a faith in the personal value of fair, or otherwise, moral action and also reinforce a faith in other’s accountability It is possible that both effects on the individual may reinforce and facilitate cooperation and other ethically-guided action within social systems (Leach et al., 2015)

Feeling bad can be good

Feeling good – pleasant affective experience – can be bad As in the case of schadenfreude, pleasure may be malicious if it is satisfaction at another’s suf-fering as it sets one against others for petty and pernicious reasons Feeling good about a bad thing befalling another can also be good, if it is an affir-mation of a shared moral code that enables cooperation and trust as in the

case of Genugtuung Thus, consistent with the idea that the (un)pleasantness

of emotion is good or bad in a way different from moral, or psychological, goodness, there is no simple one to one relation between feeling and function This may be most dramatically demonstrated in the case of feeling bad being good (for oneself or others)

The motivational hedonism underlying a great deal of thinking about emotion and action has wielded its influence most clearly in the under-standing of dysphoric emotions like anger and shame Because western psy-chology views pleasant and optimistic feeling and thinking about the self as a key sign of proper psychological function and well-being (for a discussion, see Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000), unpleasant feelings about disadvantageous events such as tragedy or wrongdoing are widely viewed as maladaptive (for discussions, see Bonanno, 2004; Allen & Leach, 2018) No state of dysphoria illustrates this more clearly than the emotion of shame, which has long been considered among the aversive and destructive emotions (for discussions, see Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach, 2017) Another challenge to the motivational hedonism that suggests that feeling bad is bad may be found in the emotion of anger which was long considered aversive and thus a counter-productive basis of avoidant or destructive action (for a discussion, see Averill, 1982)

When dysphoric emotions like anger and shame are considered outside the constraints of motivational hedonism, we may more easily imagine the many ways in which feeling bad can be good That is, there are many ways in which unpleasant emotions, like anger and shame, may encourage individuals to think, feel, and act in ways that improve the self or the situation that has led

to the dysphoria In a recent review of research and theory on self-control, Inzlicht and Legault (2014) argue that emotional distress works as an alarm

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When the alarm is heeded it orients people to expend effort at the regulation of their cognition, affect, and behavior to more efficiently and effectively exercise the self-control needed to address the alarming circumstance Thus, emotions are indicative of one’s relationship to the world, to paraphrase Sartre (1948) Unpleasant emotions indicate an unwanted relationship to an unacceptable world and thus motivate efforts at altering the world, or one’s relationship to the world (Leach, 2016, 2017) This is one value of (emotional) suffering

Shame

Shame is widely considered one of the most unpleasant and aversive emotions that human beings can experience (for reviews, see Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007) This is because shame about one’s physical impairments, moral improprieties, intellectual failings, or social dis-graces has long been thought to mark the body or the soul as abject (for reviews, see Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach, 2017) As such, shame is often considered a sort of stigma that is burned deep into one’s psyche and is also apparent to others through visible signs of one’s wretchedness on the body or otherwise In case abjection might not be noticed, there are many means by which people can be given “the mark of shame.” Examples include the branding of slaves, sartorial signs of heresy (like the scarlet letter or yellow star), and the dunce cap Thus, there is a longstanding view of shame as

marking individuals inside and out More formally, we can think of this dual

abjection as a view of shame as rooted in a stigma that damages one’s self-image and one’s social-self-image (Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach & Cidam, 2015) Indeed, in a great deal of work on shame, self- and social-image are conflated likely because damage to one is presumed to facilitate and reinforce damage

to the other in a vicious cycle of internal and external processes of stigma (for reviews, see Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach, 2017)

In addition to a number of other problematic assumptions, the prevailing view of shame is rooted in the pervasive motivational hedonism that frames feeling bad as bad (for oneself, for others, and for the world at large) Indeed,

if it is not escaped, the intense pain of shame is thought to eventually destroy the self in part or in whole, by leading to psychological disorder, self-harm, or even suicide This is why shame is central to discussions in psychology of depression, low self-worth, and a wide variety of other “dysfunction” (for reviews, see Leach, 2017; Tracy et al., 2007) In “body shame” for example, psychologists imagine a state of deep hatred of the (physical) self that one wishes to obliterate by eating oneself to death or starving oneself to death Or,

in “gay shame,” psychologists imagine a psychological flight from the authentic self (from the self and others) so as to avoid aspersions (from the self and others) Thus, here too, an external stigma from others is thought to

be internalized and paralleled by an internal stigma of secret self-hate

If not internalized as self-destruction, the pain of shame is thought to be externalized as a rancorous hostility and hatred toward available scapegoats

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who can be made to suffer on one’s behalf This externalization of profound suffering has been called humiliated fury or the shame-rage spiral and it is prominent in psychological theories of rancor, aggression, and violence

(Gausel & Leach, 2011) It is not dissimilar to Nietzsche’s notion of ressenti-ment and more recent uses of this concept to explain revolution and other

social upheaval from those lower in station or success in society (for

discus-sions, see Leach, 2008; Leach & Spears, 2008) In the case of ressentiment, a

sense of serious personal inadequacy is seen as so painful that an available target is blamed for one’s pain so that one may redirect one’s dysphoria by transforming into a hostile and rancorous anger toward others (Leach & Spears, 2008)

Given the common characterization of shame as a state of profound emo-tional suffering, we may wonder what value it could have for anyone The truth is that the motivational hedonism view of shame leaves little room for positive (productive) potential in shame A more social view of shame, found

in social sciences like in sociology and anthropology, is less pessimistic It focuses on the possible social function that shame alerts individuals that their reputation as morally decent and capable member of the community is at risk (for a review, see Gausel & Leach, 2011) Based to some degree in primatol-ogy, the social view interprets shame as more of a signal of social abasement rather than as a psychological sign of self- abasement Thus, like other pri-mates, human beings may adopt a supplicant posture – lowered and con-tracted body; lowered, avoidant head and gaze; facial expression of sadness –

to express appeasement By submitting oneself to the judgment, or punish-ment, of others, the act of abasement expresses a recognition of failure and an interest in redress (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012) The great apes

do it And, so can we What is implied in this sort of social shame is that one believes that one can repair the social-image one has put at risk with one’s moral or other failure To show the signs of appeasement is to expect, or hope, that the powers that be in the community recognize one’s contrite pos-ture and take it as evidence of one’s willingness to make redress and to improve one’s one performance going forward (Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach

& Cidam, 2015)

Recent empirical research in psychology has examined the emotional experience of shame rooted in a concern for protecting a damaged social-image (for a review, see Gausel & Leach, 2011) Leach and Cidam (2015) conducted a quantitative synthesis of this small body of studies They found that shame was moderately linked to effort at improving the social-image put

at risk by a failure under circumstances that suggested that such effort might

be effective Indeed, shameful expressions of appeasement make little sense if one doubts that one can convincingly display appeasement or that the powers that be in one’s community will notice or accept such a gesture For instance, some violations of community standards are so extreme that shameful abase-ment is not considered sufficient Or, one’s pride may prevent convincingly contrite abjection

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Although interesting and important, the socio-functional view of shame as appeasement leaves undisturbed the motivational hedonism view of shame In the absence of a desire to win others over with shame, the common pre-sumption is that a more internally-oriented shame is too psychologically devastating to be useful or sustainable Because the motivational hedonism view of shame seems so clear about the lack of (individual) value in shame, over the last eight years my colleagues and I have developed an argument for its value to the individual (see Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach, 2017; Leach & Cidam, 2015) Despite our departure from the prevailing view, we acknowl-edge that shame is often experienced as a debilitating state of profound self-criticism that threatens to destroy the self and social relations that highlight the serious failure that caused the shame In many instances, shame is destructive because there appears to be little option other than to escape the circumstances of one’s devastating failure The key, however, is in under-standing that it makes most sense to destroy oneself or one’s social relations when there appears to be little prospect of improvement Running away, hiding, wishing to disappear are reasonable responses to shame about a fail-ure that is catastrophic and thereby beyond repair Catastrophic failfail-ure hap-pens And, one can give up on oneself Some of even the most profound of failures, however, can be repaired Thus, shame in such instances need not be considered as having little to no value to the self or to others

An alternative response to a deep and devastating failure is to take it as an occasion for a profound self-reproach also experienced as shame (Gausel et al., 2012) Rather than being rid of the self through self-annihilation, one may wish to be rid of the self through replacement What I mean here is a sort of symbolic suicide whereby the intense dysphoria of shame moves one to wish for a better self in place of the failed self (Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach, 2017) We can see the value in shame here because a less profound feeling would promote a less profound change in the self (Leach, 2017) If some aspect of the self is rotten to the core, a constructive response is to replace the core The motivational hedonism view of shame does not allow for the important, if rare, possibility of self-transformation after failure Yet, it is often only through the profound failure that one can recognize a real need for profound change Thus, my colleagues and I argue that when shame is experienced about a failed aspect of the self that seems improvable, the intense dysphoria of such self-reproach can fuel serious intent to jettison the failed self in favor of an improved version of the self We can imagine shame about

an alcoholic, criminal, or unfaithful self as encouraging deep self-criticism that creates the need for profound self-improvement Outside of its potential social value, or societal/moral value, in regulating behavior (see Leach et al., 2015), shame has psychological value for the individual if it facilitates self-reform

A growing body of work in psychology now supports the idea that shame can be a productive – self-improving and/or pro-social – dysphoria (for reviews, see Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach, 2017) For example, in Gausel, Vignoles, and Leach (2016), we asked university students to imagine

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betraying a friend’s trust or almost doing so Imagining the actual moral failure led participants to expect to view themselves as suffering a serious moral defect and it increased feelings of shame Those who felt more shame also reported greater contrition for the harm caused as well as a greater desire

to make restitution and repair the damage done In two studies by Gausel et

al (2012) we showed a similar pattern for Norwegian adult’s shame about recently documented eugenicist policies and other racism against “Gypsies”

in Norway It is important to note that this evidence does not mean that shame is always, or even often, predictive of constructive responses to moral

or other failure Indeed, a recent statistical synthesis of 90 study samples by Leach and Cidam (2015) showed the link between felt shame and constructive motivation and behavior to range from moderately negative to moderately positive

Because so much of the behavioral science literature endorses (implicitly or explicitly) the motivational hedonism view of shame, many published papers

do not discuss the possibility that shame can be linked to a constructive approach orientation to failure (i.e., motivation, intentions, and actual beha-vior that approaches a failure in order to improve upon it) To skirt this potential bias in the published literature, in Leach and Cidam (2015) we used meta-analytic statistical techniques to re-estimate the links between shame and constructive approach orientation in individual samples from the pub-lished literature This separated the empirical links observed in studies from the presumed conceptual link argued in the papers that reported the studies Interestingly, in many papers that argued for a negative link between shame and constructive approach orientation, the link was actually positive or close

to zero Rather than arguing that shame is generally approach-oriented or avoidance-oriented, Leach and Cidam argued that the motivational implica-tions of shame are modulated by the apparent possibility for improvement of the moral, achievement, social or other failure that precipitated shame Thus, they examined each study in their analysis and gauged whether the context or method of the study implied that failure was improvable For instance, some studies prevented participants from subsequently interacting with a person they had harmed and therefore precluded the chance of repairing the harm by apologizing or making other restitution As expected, the improvability of the failure about which shame was felt had dramatic effects on the motivational implications of shame in the sample In those samples where the failure appeared improvable, shame tended to have a moderate and positive link to constructive approach orientation such as working to improve on one’s failure

or helping a person one had harmed Where failure appeared not to be improvable, the link between shame and constructive approach orientation was moderately negative In addition to offering an integrative explanation of what would otherwise be an inconsistent empirical literature, the Leach and Cidam analysis shows how the assumption that feeling bad is bad (for oneself and others) can obscure evidence of the opposite (for a general discussion, see McGuire, 1973)

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