Envy, inferiority and injustice three bases of anger about inequality

Although the present volume attests to a broad agreement that envy is based in a sense of domain or global inferiority brought about by a comparison to a successful party and malicious i

Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice: Three Bases of Anger About Inequality

colin wayne leach

Envy is a challenge to God (Aquaro, 2004; Schimmel, chap 2, this volume) In envying

another party’s personality, possession, or position, one questions God’s divine

distribu-tion of good fortune As Chaucer’s (c 1387/1951, p 506) Parson character expressed it

in The Canterbury Tales, envy “is the worst of sins as it [ .] is fl atly against the Holy

Ghost, source of Bounty.” As if standing against God was not enough, envy also puts

one in opposition to (2) the fortune, (3) those to whom the fortune is bestowed, and

(4) the system by which the fortune is bestowed (e.g., God’s divine right) Although

religious teachings also aim at preventing the enmity and aggression believed to be

associated with envy (Aquaro, 2004; Foster, 1972; Schimmel, chap 2, this volume),

envy is wrong and dangerous in religious terms because it is, in essence, a statement of

secularism Only by denying God’s divine system of distribution may mere mortals dare

to desire someone else’s good fortune

Given that God and religion are denied in envy, the feeling must rely on belief in

a secular system by which good fortune should be distributed (for descriptions of such

systems, in this volume, see Belk, chap 12; Lindholm, chap 13; Parrott and

Rodri-guez Mosquera, chap 7; Zizzo, chap 11) Thus, by defi nition, to envy is to advance a

(secular) claim about how fortune should be distributed among people (especially

one-self!) Because justice is an important secular system of distribution, expressing one’s

desire for another party’s fortune in terms of injustice serves to add psychological and

moral)force to one’s claim (for reviews, see Mikula, 1993; Miller, 2001; Lind & Tyler,

1988) Because envy is often expressed in terms such as “I deserve what she has,” some

commentators have argued that a claim of injustice is central, or even necessary, to envy

(Schoeck, 1969; Smith, 1991; van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci,

2006) However, as Thucydides and then Nietzsche taught, enviers’ feelings that they

deserve another’s good fortune are not necessarily based in a sense of justice “Desert

claims [ .] are often based on one’s personal desires” according to Ben-Ze’ev (1992,

p 561; see also Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007) Thus, to believe that one deserves the

good fortune possessed by another one only need desire it Of course, one may also

feel deserving of another’s good fortune because one views oneself as possessing the

requisite ability or skill or as having made the necessary effort to achieve it These

are the bases of felt desert emphasized by Feather (1999) and before him by Aristotle

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (cited in Kauffmann, 1974, p 382) argued that,

“A person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much He

that claims less than he deserves is small souled.”

When people view themselves as generally good or competent, they may also feel

deserving of good fortune, even if it is possessed by another party (Heider, 1958)

In-deed, most people in most circumstances view themselves as good people deserving of

good fortune Thus, felt desert of another’s good fortune may follow from many

judg-ments that have nothing to do with a sense of justice

To envy another party’s good fortune is to feel deserving of it because fortune

should be distributed by some secular system that enables one to claim it for oneself

(e.g., simple desire, ability, effort, general goodness) Thus, as argued in more detail

below, there is little reason to view a sense of injustice as an element of envy Indeed,

by excluding a sense of injustice from envy, scholars are better able to differentiate envy

from righteous, justice-based, anger at inequality (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Miceli &

Castel-franchi, 2007) I also argue below that there is good reason to exclude other elements

widely thought to characterize envy Although the present volume attests to a broad

agreement that envy is based in a sense of (domain or global) inferiority brought about

by a comparison to a successful party and malicious ill will toward this party (for other

reviews, see Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Parrott, 1991; Smith & Kim, 2007), I think

that neither of these elements are necessary to envy Instead, I suggest that envy,

inferi-ority (domain or global), and injustice are best thought of as three distinct bases of anger

about the inequality between oneself and another party These three bases of anger are

illustrated in Figure 6 –1

The main aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between anger about

inequality based in envy and that based in inferiority (domain or global) or injustice

To make this possible, envy must be conceptualized in a more narrow way than in most

previous treatments In the fi rst section, I argue that envy is best conceptualized as anger

resulting from a frustrated desire for a fortune that is possessed by another party but is

perceived as possible for oneself (and thus is something one feels one deserves) In the

second and third sections, I suggest that inferiority (domain or global) and perceived

in-justice may serve as conceptually independent bases of anger about inequality Although

inferiority-based anger and justice-based anger may co-occur with envy, become blended

with envy, or be displaced or dissembled expressions of hidden envy, anger based in

(do-main or global) inferiority or injustice should be distinguished from that based in envy

In essence, I echo others in arguing that to understand the association between envy and

a sense of injustice, envy cannot be conceptualized in a way that necessarily includes a

sense of injustice (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Rawls, 1971) or

per-ceived inferiority (domain or global; Leach & Spears, 2007)

Envy without anger is not envy proper (Klein, 1957; Parrott, 1991; Rawls, 1971);

proph-ets and preachers have better things to do than to rail against a “benign envy” that is

more admiration than anger But one may ask, “anger at what or whom?” Envy may lead

Figure 6.1 A, Envy; B, Ressentiment; C, Righteous anger (“resentment,” “indignation”) Greater

expected anger at a target is indicated by a darker shade.

one to anger at God, the fortune, the fortunate, and/or the system by which fortune is

be-stowed (Parrott, 1991; Smith, 2004) Emotion theory suggests that the anger in envy is

directed at those parties viewed as responsible for depriving one of a felt desert that one

lacks (Lazarus, 1991; Parrot, 1991; Smith, 1991, 2004) In this way the anger in envy is

similar to other forms of anger in response to a blockage of one’s goals by another party

or by circumstance (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988)

The anger in envy may also be experienced as a feeling of frustration at lacking a

felt desert that is possessed by another party (Salovey & Rodin, 1986) This frustration

may be experienced as anger at the self for failing to achieve the good fortune possessed

by another party (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Smith, 2004) Where one perceives

oneself as, at least partly, responsible for not achieving an important goal, the anger in

envy may be especially self-directed and self-critical (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988)

It is the frustrated desire for a felt desert, and the possibility that one is partly responsible

for this frustration, that is at the heart of the partly self-directed anger in envy

That the anger in envy may be directed at so many different targets (perhaps all at

once) makes it more diffi cult to identify the basis of envy I think it is this “polymorphous

perversity” of the anger in envy that has led so many scholars to confl ate envy with

sev-eral different types of anger (including resentment, indignation, contempt, and hostility)

and with malicious ill will However, it is important to remember that it is the basis of

envy, rather than the target of its attendant anger, that is most important to how envy is

conceptualized Whether it is directed at the fortune, the system by which fortune is

be-stowed, or oneself, the basis of the anger in envy is the coveting of a felt desert that is

en-joyed by another party and the frustration and disappointment about this specifi c lack

The Elements of Envy

As evidenced in this volume, most observers conceptualize envy as a complex

mix-ture of different perceptions and feelings These commonly include (1) desire for the

good fortune of another party, where (2) comparison to the fortunate highlights one’s

in-feriority in a particular domain or more globally, and promotes (3) hostile anger toward

the fortunate, and (4) a malicious ill will to see the party lose its good fortune and/or to

suffer additional harm In addition, some theorists suggest that envy includes a belief

that (5) the fortune cannot be gained (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Schoeck, 1969)

because (6) it is a limited good whereby the other party’s possession of it necessarily

translates into one’s lack (Foster, 1972; Rawls, 1971); thus, (7) the fortunate is to blame

for the envier’s lack of fortune (Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1969)

Most social scientists have interpreted the quantitative literature as consistent with

the view that most of these seven elements are necessary to envy However, I think

there is good empirical reason to see only two elements as defi ning envy: (1) desire

for a felt desert possessed by another party (which may be associated with frustration,

disappointment, and a sense that one is defi cient because one lacks what one wants

and deserves), and (2) feelings of anger Indeed, when people are asked to report on

their experience of envy, desire of a felt desert possessed by another party and feelings

of anger are shown to be the most characteristic elements For example, in one study,

Parrott and Smith (1993, study 1) asked students to recall a time when they felt “strong

envy” and to indicate to what degree their experience was characterized by a long list

of attributes Participants reported that longing and wishing for something possessed by

another was very characteristics of their envy experience Participants also appeared

to report that disappointment about lacking what they wanted was very characteristics

of their envy (e.g., feeling frustrated, unhappy, upset; see also Salovey & Rodin, 1986,

studies 2 and 3) Anger (e.g., anger, bitterness, resentfulness) was judged to be only

somewhat less characteristic of participants’ envy than their frustrated desire and

dis-appointment However, a sense of inferiority and the intense sadness associated with it

(e.g., humiliation, shame, self-doubt, feeling like a failure), helplessness (e.g., helpless,

not in control), and malicious ill will (e.g., hate, urge to get even) were judged to be only

moderately characteristic of the experience of envy In a similar study, Smith, Parrott,

Ozer, and Moniz (1994) asked university students to recall a time when they felt envy

and to indicate to what degree their experience was characterized by a sense of

inferior-ity, as well as feelings of hostility (e.g., hostile, hate, dislike) and depressiveness (e.g.,

low, lacking energy, depressed) Participants judged inferiority, hostility, and

depres-siom to be only moderately characteristic of their experience of envy

Bers and Rodin’s (1984) study of the reactions of 6- to 11-year-old children to a story

about a child’s failure also showed frustrated desire for a felt desert to be more central to

envy than malicious ill will or intense sadness When reporting how the story’s

protago-nist would feel, these children reported very high levels of desire for success and viewing

success as deserved and moderate levels of sadness, anger, and anger at the better-off

peer Malicious feelings, such as wanting to get back at the peer, were fairly low (see also

Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Salovey & Rodin, 1986, studies 2 and 3) Shaver, Schwartz,

Kir-son, and O’Connor (1987, study 1) infl uential study of the semantic similarity between

a large set of emotion words also challenges the notion that envy necessarily involves

malicious ill will or inferiority and its attendant emotional pain Participants in this study

viewed envy as a subcategory of a broad anger prototype The envy subcategory of anger

was adjacent to the disgust subcategory of anger (e.g., disgust, revulsion, contempt) as

well as the suffering subcategory of sadness (e.g., agony, suffering, hurt, anguish) The

subcategory of sadness terms more indicative of inferiority feelings, such as defeat,

inse-curity, and humiliation, were quite distant from envy Thus, participants judged envy to

be a particular type of anger that is distinct in semantic meaning from emotion terms that

connote hostility, ill will, or the painful feelings associated with inferiority

Shaver et al (1987, study 1) also provided important evidence about the underlying

dimensions of envy They found envy to be clearly negative in valence but characterized

by high potency and low activity As such, envy appeared different to malicious anger

terms that were higher in activity, such as wrath, hate, scorn, vengefulness, or

resent-ment Envy’s high potency and low activity also differentiated it from the subcategory

of sadness terms more indicative of feelings regarding inferiority, which tended to be

low in potency However, envy’s high potency and low activity made it similar to

sad-ness terms higher in potency than feelings regarding inferiority, such as agony, hurt,

displeasure, and disappointment These terms are indicative of the more circumscribed

and unstable feelings of disappointment that come from frustrated goal pursuit (see

Ortony et al., 1988)

The research reviewed above suggests that envy is best characterized by anger about

a frustrated desire for a felt desert that is possessed by another The anger in envy is not

necessarily associated with malicious ill will or the desire to harm the fortunate party

However, because people reported that anger was central to their experience of envy, it is

clear that the envy in these studies was not benign Indeed, in most studies there was little

indication of the admiration or competitive aspiration that characterizes benign envy

(see Belk, chap 12, this volume) Although envious people may also feel frustration and

disappointment about lacking what they desire and feel defi cient as a result of this lack,

these feelings appear to be specifi c to the comparison with the fortunate party and the

lack of the desired fortune Envy-based anger does not necessarily include a sense that

one is inferior in an entire domain or more globally (as a person) Thus, there appears

to be good empirical reason to more narrowly specify the elements of envy in the way

I have suggested Conceptualizing envy as necessarily including four to seven of the

elements commonly listed in defi nitions yields an unnecessarily complicated and vague

omnibus construct There is also good conceptual reason to conceptualize envy as not

necessarily including malicious ill will or (domain or global) inferiority

Malicious Ill Will?

Anger at a frustrated desire for a felt desert that is possessed by another party is

not the same as the malicious ill will in wanting to see the envied party lose its fortune

or be harmed One may be angry that another has what one feels one deserves without

wishing that person to suffer Indeed, research on the experience of anger shows that

people tend not to feel malicious ill will toward those who have made them angry They

intend to act on malicious ill will toward the target of their anger even more infrequently

than they experience this desire for harm (for a review, see Averill, 1982) Despite this,

many conceptualizations view malicious ill will as a necessary element of envy Given

that malicious ill will is not very characteristic of envy, or of anger more generally,

I think that it is useful to view malicious ill will as a possible consequence of envy

rather than as a necessary element This distinction is akin to the effort at separating

the emotion of anger from the desire to aggress, which is only moderately tied to anger

(see Averill, 1982) Conceptualizing envy as a basis of anger makes it clear that it is

not benign admiration or aspiration, while acknowledging that envy is often free of the

malicious ill will that is typically presumed to be a defi ning characteristic of envy

The fact that people are most often envious of those who are most emotionally close

to them (see Tesser, 1988) probably helps explain the fact that the anger of envy tends

to be less full of ill will and aggression than the murderous envy in the Bible and other

dramatic portrayals Although it is clear that envy can be associated with strong dislike of

the envied party and psychological distance from them, it is more diffi cult to feel strong ill

will toward one’s intimates For example, Fischer & Roseman (2007) recently showed that

anger, especially toward intimates, is associated with efforts to gain what one wants by

coercion and the ultimate aim of reconciliation Although wanting to verbally attack the

source of anger is a fairly strong impulse, people rarely want to aggress against the target

of their anger or to see the target harmed (see also Averill, 1982) This is partly because, as

in envy-based anger, people are most often angry at intimates and other close others

Inferiority or a Specifi c Lack?

Most conceptualizations argue that envy is the product of an unfl attering

compari-son with a more successful party that leads one to view oneself as inferior in a particular

domain or more globally (for reviews, see Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1969; Smith & Kim,

2007) Most authors in the present volume view the upward comparison in envy as

psy-chologically painful because, as Exline and Zell (chap 17, this volume) put it, “envy

does not only tell people about their desires; it also provides a signal that they see

them-selves as lacking on some important dimension” (in this volume, see also Alicke & Zell,

chap 5; Duffy, Shaw, & Schaubroeck, chap 10; Lindholm, chap., 13; Smith, Combs, &

Thielke, chap 16) This specifi c lack is typically thought to lower more global

evaluation because envy is presumed to be associated with lower self-esteem, self-worth,

or self-evaluation (in this volume, see Alicke & Zell, chap 5; Belk, chap 12; Duffy,

Shaw, & Schaubroeck, chap 10), and attendant feelings of shame, humiliation, and

de-pression (in this volume, see Exline & Zell, chap 17; Smith et al., chap 16)

Although it is clear that lacking a felt desert that is enjoyed by another party is likely

to be experienced as disappointing, frustrating, and perhaps as highlighting something

that one lacks, there is little evidence that these aspects of envy necessarily imply a view

of oneself as inferior in an entire domain or more globally As shown in the research

reviewed above, feelings of inferiority and attendant feelings of shame, humiliation,

and intense sadness are not very characteristic of people’s experience of envy Neither is

envy characterized by the low potency typical of domain or global inferiority (as shown

in Shaver et al., 1987) Thus, it does not seem wise to conceptualize (domain or global)

inferiority as an essential element of envy

Although the envious may view themselves as comparatively “inferior” to those

who possess a desired fortune, what the envier lacks is specifi c This is why the lack

of a felt desert is experienced as a circumscribed feeling of disappointment (Salovey &

Rodin, 1986, studies 1 and 2; Smith et al., 1994) rather than more general and profound

feelings of shame, humiliation, and despondency associated with domain or global

in-feriority (Leach & Spears, 2007; for a discussion, see Lewis, 1971) Disappointment is

a more circumscribed feeling of sadness about the failure to achieve a particular goal

(Higgins, 1987; Ortony et al., 1988) In contrast, the emotional pain of domain or global

inferiority is more far-reaching and intense, because such inferiority presents a greater

psychological threat to one’s self-concept than a more circumscribed disappointment

over lacking what is possessed by a single party (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956; Lewis,

1971) As I describe in more detail below, where one’s lack of a specifi c thing leads to

a sense of domain or global inferiority, this provides a different basis of anger, distinct

from envy Although a particular episode of envy, or repeated episodes of envy, may

lead one to view oneself as being inferior in a domain, or more globally, any resultant

anger is then based in the inferiority not in the more distal envy This is what Scheler

(1915/1960) argued in the book Ressentiment.

Where one views oneself as inferior in an entire domain or more globally, felt

des-ert is likely depressed Those suffering domain or global inferiority are likely to view

themselves as impotent, and thus good fortune may appear impossible for them In

con-trast, envy presupposes that what is coveted could become one’s own, even if the actual

likelihood is low (see Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Elster [1998] as cited in Smith & Kim, 2007;

Heider, 1958) As Lazarus (1991, p 255) put it, “if our future expectations about what

we yearn for are hopeful then envy is sustained.” That what is envied could become

one’s own is also made clear by the fact that envy should end if one gains what one

lacks According to Scheler (1915/1960), as envy is directed at the “specifi c objects” of

the good fortune that is wanted:

It should disappear when these objects are gained: usually revenge and envy still have

spe-cifi c objects They do not arise without special reasons and are directed at spespe-cifi c objects, so

that they do not outlast their motives The desire for revenge disappears when vengeance has

been taken, when the person against whom it was directed has been punished or has punished

himself, or when one truly forgives him In the same way, envy vanishes when the envied

possession becomes ours (p 47)

Only the position or possession of those who are similarly situated could easily

become one’s own (Heider, 1958) If one is inferior in a domain as a whole, or more

globally, one has little basis to think that another party’s good fortune could be one’s

own In addition, it is the fortune of those similarly situated that should belong to one,

as one’s similarity of situation suggests that one deserves similar fortune (Ben-Ze’ev,

1992; Heider, 1958) Although it is widely agreed that targets of envy are typically those

of a similar status or circumstance (for reviews see Smith & Kim, 2007; Tesser, 1988),

many commentators maintain that inferiority is essential to envy However, these two

suppositions are mutually incompatible (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992) If envy is typically directed

at those of a similar level within a particular domain, then the fact that one lacks what a

similar other possesses cannot indicate that one is inferior in this domain or more

glob-ally The upward comparison in envy only indicates that one is relatively “inferior” to

the party who possesses a felt desert Thus, the “inferiority” in envy is more specifi c, and

more circumscribed, than is typically acknowledged Given that one feels frustrated and

disappointed (rather than ashamed and humiliated) about lacking a felt desert, I think it

is more precise to say that envy is based in an upward comparison that establishes this

lack of a felt desert Lacking a specifi c position or possession that is enjoyed by another

is the basis of the specifi c form of anger that is envy This anger is different from anger

based in inferiority (domain or global)

Inferiority-based Anger: Ressentiment

Excluding (domain and global) inferiority from envy enables envy to be distinguished

from the inferiority-based anger that Nietzsche (1887/1967) referred to as

ressenti-ment (see Figure 6 –1B) Unlike envy-based anger, the anger of ressentiment is based

in “impotence”—one is so inferior that there is nothing one can do to attain good

for-tune Thus, one must either accept one’s inferiority or oppose the system that exalts

good fortune (for a discussion, see Kauffmann, 1974) Nietzsche was an outspoken

critic of ressentiment because, as a feeling of impotence, ressentiment was bereft of the

“will to power.” Thus, like Hegel before him, Nietzsche thought that those suffering

dis-advantage were best off using their innate human potential to strive for good fortune (for

discussions, see Deleuze, 1983; Kauffmann, 1974)

Nietzsche (1887/1967) suggested that the emotional pain of inferiority was so

aver-sive that individuals externalized it in the form of malicious anger at successful parties

As he put it, “this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back on oneself—is the

essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always fi rst needs a hostile

external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at

all—its action is fundamentally reaction” (pp 37–38) Thus, Nietzsche argued that the

inferiority-based anger of ressentiment led people to be hostile toward those more

suc-cessful than they This hostility, he believed, was full of an ill will aimed at destroying

the successful and the system by which they were able to gain success

It should be clear that Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment is nearly

indistinguish-able from prevailing notions of envy because ressentiment includes all the elements

considered central to envy This may be why numerous commentators have referred

to Nietzsche’s view of ressentiment as a theory of envy (Rawls, 1971; Schoeck, 1969;

Smith & Kim, 2007) This confl ation of envy and ressentiment may be due, in part,

to Scheler’s (1915/1960) infl uential attempt to clarify and extend Nietzsche’s view In

Ressentiment, Scheler repeatedly argued that envy is often the basis of ressentiment

In a number of places, Scheler appeared to use the terms envy and ressentiment

inter-changeably (pp 52–53) Nevertheless, Scheler made repeated attempts to differentiate

the anger of envy from the inferiority-based anger of ressentiment For example, he

argued that envy remains envy rather than becoming ressentiment, as long as one seeks

to gain what one lacks: “Nor will the envious fall under the dominion of ressentiment if

he seeks to acquire the desired possession by means of work, barter, crime, or violence”

(p 48) Only where what is wanted no longer seems achievable, can envy turn into

ressentiment:

Ressentiment can only arise if these emotions [such as envy] are particularly powerful but

must be suppressed because they are coupled with the feeling that one is unable to act them

out—either because of weakness, physical or mental, or because of fear Through its very

origin, ressentiment is therefore chiefl y confi ned to those who serve and are dominated at the

moment, who fruitlessly resent the sting of authority (Scheler, 1915/1960, p 48)

Thus, Scheler argued that unlike envy, ressentiment is based in an inferiority that makes

one impotent and thus unable to alter the inferiority He went on to suggest that

inferior-ity is debilitating because it is viewed an unalterable defect rather than a potentially

al-terable lack As Scheler (p 50) put it, ressentiment “is directed against lasting situations

which are felt to be ‘injurious’ but beyond one’s control—in other words, the more the

injury is experienced as destiny.”

A good deal of theory in psychology shares Nietzsche’s view that inferiority

pro-motes feelings of impotence, defensive malice, and ill will Likely due to Nietzsche’s

infl uence, the psychoanalyst Alfred Adler built an entire theory of personality around

the idea of an impotent “inferiority complex” (for reviews, see Ansbacher & Ansbacher,

1956) He suggested that inferiority promotes a destructive anger that undermines

so-cial relationships and societal bonds Helen Lewis (1971) also argued that feelings of

(inferiority-based) shame could be redirected away from the self into hostile anger

to-ward others Scheff (1994) extrapolated this argument to the group level in his

con-ceptualization of a “shame-rage spiral” where groups who suffer painful feeling of

inferiority-based shame are prone to a hostile anger that can serve as a basis for

aggres-sion or other malevolence Dollard and colleagues’ argument that chronic frustration is

often “displaced” into aggression is a precursor of this line of thinking at the group level

(for discussions, see Spears & Leach, 2004; Wills, 1981)

Although there have been few direct examinations of ressentiment, some

contem-porary work is consistent with Nietzsche’s approach A good deal of contemcontem-porary

psychological work has examined (domain or global) inferiority and anger For

ex-ample, research at the individual (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992) level

is supportive of the idea that chronic shame leads to anger, hostility, and ill will toward

others (for a review, see Wills, 1981) At the group level, a wide range of work shows

that pre-existing or experimentally created domain inferiority can lead to the

devalu-ation of other groups (for reviews, see Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001;

Spears & Leach, 2004; Wills, 1981) However, the most direct evidence for

Nietz-schean ressentiment comes from two recent studies on intergroup relations by Leach

and Spears (2007)

In two studies, students were led to believe that universities in their country were

engaged in a competitive quiz game similar to Britain’s “university challenge.”

Partici-pants were then informed that their university had lost most of their matches against

a pool of half of the universities in the country The emotional pain of inferiority that

students felt in response was assessed with terms such as ashamed, inferior, and

threat-ened After this, students were presented with evidence that another university in the

same city had been very successful in the other pool of competition Feelings about the

other group’s success were then assessed Consistent with the notion of ressentiment,

those students who expressed the most pain about their group’s domain inferiority

ex-pressed very strong anger in response to the out-group’s success This inferiority-based

anger was highly predictive of schadenfreude at the out-group’s subsequently presented

failure in the competition In contrast, schadenfreude was very weakly predicted by

pre-existing dislike of the other party or desire of the other party’s success The perceived

or actual injustice of the other party’s success was modestly associated with anger and

was thus a modest predictor of schadenfreude Thus, inferiority-based anger (i.e.,

res-sentiment ) was most predictive of subsequent schadenfreude Based on these results,

I think it is fair to ask how much independent association envy has with schadenfreude,

or other malice, after one accounts for the inferiority-based anger that is often embedded

in measures of envy (see also Spears & Leach, 2004)

Righteous, Justice-based Anger

Where people believe in a secular system by which fortune is distributed, they may use

a notion of justice to judge their own and others’ fortune If they judge the

distribu-tion to be unjust they are likely to feel righteous anger (Averill, 1982; Lazarus, 1991;

Ortony et al., 1988) Differentiating sinful anger from the righteous variety, Chaucer’s

(c 1387/1951, p 506) Parson character said, “Anger is the wicked will to vengeance

Anger against wickedness, however, is good wrath, without bitterness.” Thus, to be a

righteous, justice-based, anger about the inequality between oneself and another party,

anger must be free of the “bitterness” of envy or ressentiment Rawls made a similar

point in his infl uential treatise A Theory of Justice He (1971) referred to righteous,

justice-based anger about inequality as “resentment”:

If we resent our having less than others, it must be because we think that their being better

off is the result of unjust institutions, or wrongful conduct on their part Those who express

resentment must be prepared to show why certain institutions are unjust or how others have

injured them What marks off envy from the moral feelings is the different way in which it is

accounted for, the sort of perspective from which the situation is viewed (p 533)

In other words, Rawls argued that righteous anger could be distinguished from envy

because righteous anger is based in a demonstrable concern for injustice, whereas the

anger of envy is based in a concern for oneself

Rather than relying on the divine distribution of fortune, systems of justice use

principles such as equality, equity, and effort, to judge how much good fortune any

given person should receive (for reviews, see Feather, 1999; Lind & Tyler, 1987; Miller,

2001) For example, according to the equity principle of justice, individuals who invest

the most should receive the most In contrast, the equality principle of justice suggests

that all parties should receive an equal share of good fortune Where another’s fortune,

or one’s lack of fortune, is thought to be unfair by some standard of justice it may be

the basis of a righteous anger at the fortunate or at the system of distribution (see

Fig-ure 6 –1C) In practice, however, it is diffi cult to assess the righteousness of anger This

is partly due to the fact that English speakers appear to use the word “envy” to refer to

situations they view as fair as well as those they view as unfair For example, Salovey

and Rodin (1986, study 1) found that common examples of envy varied widely in their

degree of unfairness–fairness Having a younger sibling who has a better job was

associ-ated with moderate envy, despite the fact that it was viewed as fair and deserved Thus,

people’s use of the terms envy and justice cannot be taken as unproblematic indications

of the role of justice in their anger at inequality

Assessing the role of justice in anger about inequality is made more complicated by

the fact that some approaches blur the boundaries between justice-based anger and envy

by defi ning envy in broad terms that include a sense that the inequality between oneself

and another is unfair (Heider, 1958; Schoeck, 1969) For example, Smith (1991) argued

that a “subjective” sense of injustice is an important element of envy He defi ned

sub-jective injustice as an idiosyncratic perception of injustice not validated by rule, social