2017-2018 , optical submarine cables and the South Atlantic basin, the myth of South-South connections laid bare: in what concerns digital, those connections are nothing but wishful thi
Trang 2on the background
Trang 3classical geopolitics: a global Atlantic-centric
take
as seen in Google Earth,
Trang 4image, NASA, overlooking the North Atlantic
Trang 5image, NASA, centered on the wide South Atlantic
A Room with a View
Trang 6“classical” global geopolitics: the opening fo the Atlantic as a Mare
Nostrum, and then a Mare Clausum: the Tordesillas Treaty and the
Portuguese commercial routes during the XVIth Century (in blue) and
the “española” ones (these latter ‘de longo curso’ and in white, here)
Trang 7revisiting horror: from the first to the early stages of the second wave of globalization: a view of the slave-
trade, Africa-Americas, 1650-1860
Trang 8the South Atlantic and the first globalization: ports (harbours) in Atlantic Basin and the Portuguese and ‘Spanish’
routes, 15th to 18th centuries
Trang 9a peak at the current reawakening of the South Atlantic , after the Panama enlargement, after the eventual TTIP, if Trump allows it: the
new (but surely not the largest) Basin harbours - those being built,
enlarged or in fieri – shall mostly be located on the south of the Basin
So will likely be active militarization and underlying social movements
Trang 10The reawakening of the South Atlantic after a period of dormancy Napoleon fate (beyond the horizon”, after Elba’s failure and Waterloo
Trang 11a reawakening: after a light WWI U-boat war, a
heavier one in WW2: the nazi sub U-848, “under
north-american attack”, in the northern reaches of
the South Atlantic, 5th of November, 1943
Trang 12a harsh wakeup call: “places (and numbers) where Brazilian ships were sunk
during World War II, after Brazil joined the Allies The grand total of sunk Allied ships was 389, for the 1941-1943 interval” ## ships sunk by the axis per week
Trang 13the backlash: known Nazi U-boats sunk , 1941-1943; a few were blown
to bits by the Força Expedicionária Brasileira – but most were taken care of by theAmerican Air Force, ewho then was asked by the
Brazilian Govt To create a majoprAir Force Base in Natal
Trang 14President Theodore Roosevelt at the Canal de
Panama, visiting the chantier, 1908
Trang 15the almost finished Panama Canal, 1913
Trang 16left, USS Missouri, crossing the Panama Canal, 1945, back from Japan to
the USA; right, the old and new routes of the Great White Fleet of
President Teddy Roosevelt, and the shortcut needed after the ‘Conquest
of the West’
Trang 17A fast-forward, and a look at technological evolution:
Panama Canal enlargement works, by 2012
Trang 18In 2014, Mau Tempo no Canal? The enlargement was
consumated on 6 June 6th, 2016, doubling its width, thus
quadrupling its volume
Trang 19the works: “enlargement works and a passing luxury cruise ship”, March 2013
Trang 20the whys and the hows Waiting queue, Canal de Panama (2013) on the Pacific side, and the alternatives for the ‘unbottling’ : that of the
“Canal Seco” via Costa Rica (2012) and that of the “Canal de
Nicaragua” (2014) via the latter one; but both with China
Trang 21la abertura del Canal de Panama alargado: Monday, June
6th, 2016, at 5:07 pm a Chinese ship blazing the new trail.
Trang 22again, a view form above: Panama Canal and PortMiami Renew MOU, as the port welcomes its first NeoPanamax vessel (of course, a Chinese vessel): look at how it fits
Trang 23reading things: global density of commercial
exchanges, 2016-2017
The colours: in yellow, the more populated regions, in
reddish, the less populated ones
Trang 24map of the regions with more intense emissions of carbon dioxide, CO2, coded in colours In green, the “greener” zones,
which hue from yellow to red as it gets worse (2016).
Trang 25another background look: ‘coordinated migrations’ and
urbanization, before the onset of the ‘Syrian crisis’: map of
coordinated migration, and, in yellow shade, countries with
biggest urbanization growth, 2002-2019
Trang 26Now, cyber, i.e non-classical geopoplitics:
‘Cyberspace’?
Trang 27the first Atlantic cable, a telegrafphy one : the very first Morse code message, sent
on August 16 th , 1858, by Queen Victoria to Presidene James Buchanan, was “Europe and America are united by telegraphy Glory to God in the highest; on earth, peace and good will toward men” The following September the connection was broken Its permanent technical reposition , carried out by the Atlantic Telegraph Company , owned by the same John Pender who had laid the first cables 8 years earlierwas only finished in 1866 The first TransPacific cables, running across from S Francisco to Hawaii, Guam, and the Philppines, were only laid on
1902-1903 Once again huge technological innovations taking place.
Trang 28Winding up, while still looking back: “ 1901 , Eastern Telegraph cables”, as the TransPacific cables were only being sketched Metastatising.
Trang 29some of the new dimensions of geopolitics:
Trang 302017-2018, “optical submarine cable on the oceanic depths of the northern Atlantic Basin”
Trang 31as Mark Twain so aptly wrote, “History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme a lot”
Optical fibers, zooming in: the internet and optical cables attached around here, up
closer, still in 2015-2016, not very different from today’s patterns Look at the Atlantic lines and compare Portugal (not Spain or France, with the Mediterranean bend) with
Belgium, The Netherlands (i.e The Flanders) and the UK; see, also, Denmark, A
‘repetition’ of the patterns of colonial maritime connectivities?
Trang 32Problematising matters, both politically and economically :
submarine cable map, 2009 Note the almost total absence of cables ‘attached’ to Portugal So the pattern repetition, at least in
the Portuguese case, actually is recent !!! Why is that?!? What
does it resonate with, or respond to?
Trang 332017-2018 , optical submarine cables and the South Atlantic basin,
the myth of South-South connections laid bare: in what concerns
digital, those connections are nothing but wishful thinking
Trang 34optical cables in Asia, centered of the
Straits of Malacca, 2017
Trang 35laying down optical submarine cables by Telecom-Marine, René Descartes; to the right, a
France-"submarine optical cable cross-section”
Let us see more of both ships and cables
Trang 36another specialized ship
Trang 37one type of cable laying
Trang 38the innards: fiber optical cable laying, ship interiro
Trang 39variants: yet another cable laying vessel with its spool of cable about to be laid
across the ocean
Trang 40four meter diameter stern sheaves of optic cable laying ship CABLE INNOVATOR
Trang 41giants of the sea: Cable Innovator
fibre optic cable laying vessel
Trang 42simpler ships
Trang 43less simple ones: fibre optic cable
laying vessel Tyco Responder in
Curaçao
Trang 44unrolling: the 12,184 tonne cable ship Resolute sits a kilometre
off the Porthcressa Beach on the Isle of Scilly The cable laying ship is working to repurpose a fibre optic cable which used to connect England to Spain so that BT can deliver super fast
broadband to the tiny island
Trang 45safety risks, 2012: France Telecom-Orange on Friday announced that an unexplained fire had erupted on its cable ship, The Chamarel,
off the Skeleton Coast of Namibia in the Atlantic Ocean All 54 crew
members were safely “The entire crew of 56 escaped the Chamarel
safely, and were recovered by a Namibian fishing vessel
and were taken to Walvis Bay”.
Trang 46yet another, laying it all out
Trang 47rolling it all out
Trang 48laying out the cables
Trang 49laying down the cables
Trang 50down it goes
Trang 51ploughing it down at bottom, as seen from below
Trang 52on a (un)roll: submarine cable marine
services
Trang 53connections: France Telecom-Orange
launches-ACE submarine-cable in first 13 countries
Trang 54cable joint and deployer 'vehicle'
Trang 55this is how things go in these cases:
deploying an optical cable
Trang 56burying a cable with a sort of plough
Trang 57self-explanatory
Trang 58laying down the submarine
fiber-optic cables
Trang 59plowing the seabed: submarine optic cable being laid out deep down
Trang 60fiber-fiber-optic cables of all kinds
Trang 61more examples…
Trang 62a diagramatic take on what cables look
like down there
Trang 63good morning, lights beams!
Trang 64details, and the scale of a small cable
Trang 65an alternative and a complement:
parallel cables in a cluster
Trang 66• submarine-cable-20-638
Trang 67how to create a network: submarine fiber-optic cables central nexus somewhere on the coast
Trang 68bigger stuff: “cable extension for the
Southeast network, Alaska”, 2017
Trang 69at low depths, mending things down below; at depths of 4,5 kilometers one needs a really sturdy
bathyscaph, and strong lights
Trang 70here is one example, the French HROV Ariane (tested before 2014, now one of the many in
use for all sorts of purposes)
Trang 71there it is, deep down
Trang 72small and rare risks: of sharks and cables; now we have kevlar cables
Trang 73warning signs of larger risks: ”The Russian nuclear submarine Dmitrij Donskoj sails through Danish waters in July 2017”.
Trang 74the ultimate form of hybrid warfare: 2015, National
Interest, War Strategy – “Attack threat and Defense
on Deep-Sea Fiber Optic Cables”
Trang 75mid-Atlantic alarm bells ringing: harsher game, set, and match risks? On (one of the) the Russian threats
Trang 76high and more recent risks, more strident alarm bells. On December
2015: Russian warships hovering above optical cable hubs Such
agressive moves have been repeated since then
Trang 77Russia hovering over cable hubs, 2015-2016,
and the Western (US and UK) reaction
Trang 78Washington Post, December 22, 2017, ”Russian
submarines are prowling around vital undersea cables Understandably, it is making NATO nervous”
Trang 79small fry hawking over the cables
Trang 80“Russian Spy Submarines Are Tampering with”, The
National Interest, August 19, 2018 Caption:
“Undersea Cables That Make the Internet Work”
Trang 81“Russian Subs Are Sniffing Around
Transatlantic Cables” (Defense One,
last January 17)
Trang 82“Officials say presence has increased to levels unseen
since the Cold War” (Reuters/Pavel Rebrov)
Trang 83cables at risk
Trang 84“Russia Could Attack Underwater Internet Cables,
Warns British Military Chief”, BBC
Trang 85UK Chief of Staff: "military prioritising defence of undersea telecoms cables amid Russian threat"
Trang 86“Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables”
(Lawfare, last March 5) How it could happen
Trang 87another Russian attack tactic: “Russian navy ship may be a threat to world’s internet cables "A Russian navy research ship carrying mini- submarines is at the centre of fears about the risk of a catastrophic attack
on underwater internet cables ", (The Australian, May 7th, 2019)
Trang 88yet another: Russian Yantar 4000
Trang 89here goes: Russian Yantar observed near Submarine
Communications Cables in the Persian Gulf
Trang 90Losharik Delta, a specialized set of Russian subs targetting optical cables
Trang 91a detailed view of a Losharik sub
Trang 92small but mean: a sense of scale
Trang 93what we think they look like inside –
a Losharik cutaway
Trang 94July 1, 2019, as the 14 Russian officers died in a security
incident
“Whether or not the submarine’s titanium hull and nuclear reactor
were damaged is not clear.
But Moscow’s determination to retrieve the deep-diving vessel, believed capable of tapping into undersea intercontinental internet
cables, is not in doubt.
Trang 95Kommersant says Kremlin officials have deliberately exploded several similar battery packs since the accident to determine what components failed — or if
the Losharik had been sabotaged The picture below : “The funeral of the 14
officers killed in the (July 1 st 2019) Loksharik disaster”
Trang 96I security, yes But even without the Russians, really serious vulnerabilities:
launching the inter island cable from Toco while the Cable Ship Intrepid waits offshore to begin laying the cable on the sea floor between Tobago
and Trinidad Is this safe? Are we really that stupid?
Trang 97once more, is this safe?
Trang 98now, really, is this the safe way to go? submarine fiber-optic cables for all to see
Trang 99carelessness: optical cables at hand, end of 2016, early 2017 Well, it doesn’t look safe to me, not when even penguins know where these
critical infrastructures are
Trang 100when we take these risks, are we stupid? Yes, we are.
Obvious vulnerabilities, 2017(Tumon Bay cable landing)
Trang 101a very tangible lack of security; submarine
fiber-optic cables for all to see
Trang 102optical cable SAT 3, arriving at the beach, Sesimbra,
2001
Trang 103cable works, Sesimbra, 2009
Trang 104low tech hig-tech, 2017: “Philippines’ Globe-Telecom strengthens connections to Boracay with subsea fiber-optic cable Secure?
Trang 105here is how it all works, in one example:
how India is connected to the internet
Trang 106moving up above, in 2017-2018 (before Elon Musk, still now, this accounts for less than 2,7% of our internet connections – 98,3% of the Internet flows through optical cables): the network of communication satellites and their orbits As was the case with telegraphy, it all was first wired; later it became wireless As concerns the internet connections, we still did not significantly go wireless, outside our homes…
Trang 107another, earlier and wider, take, 2013,
on communication sattelites
Trang 108geostationary communication sattelites, 2015-2019;
this does not include classified military satellites
Trang 109here is one of them, in 2016, one of ours: “an Advanced Extremely
High Frequency communications satellite relays secure communications for the United States and other allied countries”
Trang 110a WildBlue satellite Internet dish, and a
foldable Bigpond internet satellite dish; a
competitive market growing
Trang 111the back panel of a satellite modem, with coaxial connections for both incoming and outgoing signals,
and an Ethernet port for connection
Trang 112back to context and interpretations : giving it all
context: “world map of internet users”, re-scaled
Trang 113focal points: distribution-localization of
friendship sharing on Facebook
Trang 114again, background,2016: the ‘gravitational force’ of the geography of the
global: connections and friendships local, regional, and global: “global
visualization of every connection between two people on Facebook”
Trang 115What a Wonderful World , 2016: Paul Butlers map of local, regional, and global
Facebook friendshipsthe clear preference of multiple connection hubs to the local,
‘the economiy, stupid’ , demography, and rising patterns of urbanization A truly
“global visualization of every connection between two people on Facebook”
Trang 116echoes or ressonances? A very similar map;
this one entitled , global GDP density, 2015
Trang 117similar, but now when looking at twitter: the so-called
geolocated tweets, 2015; echoes of galloping urbanization
and of growth in the economy; assymetrical inequalities are
nowadays (2019) getting to be even worse
Trang 118Breaking it down; the mobility flows of twitter users between 58 cities, 2015 The twitter city flows – a
repeated pattern?
Trang 119Poliitcally ‘centralized’ Action vs Decentered Choices: an example of selectivity as concerns the old social media: countries compressed or
streched according the the news on them published by Guardian Online
from 2010 to 2012
Trang 120potential connectivities, chokepoints and power, in the
Atlantic Basin and its surroundings: possessions françaises, in October 2019 What do they mean, the end of the “West”?
Trang 122October, 2019, “British possessions and British exclusive economic
zones” (in pink) e “French possessions and NATO countries territoires,
as well as those of our Allies, in the Atlantic Basin and some of its
‘chokepoints’” Under the Cape if Good Hope, French and Norwegian
islands and archipelagoes
Trang 123again my hypothesis of reduplication of maritime ‘colonial’ connectivity and centrality, seen with perhaps greater graphic clarity in a neater map background How can we
interpret this?