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Optical submarine cables and their security the growth of russian and chinese threats in the atlantic basin and beyo

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Tiêu đề Optical Submarine Cables And Their Security: The Growth Of Russian And Chinese Threats In The Atlantic Basin And Beyond
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2017-2018 , optical submarine cables and the South Atlantic basin, the myth of South-South connections laid bare: in what concerns digital, those connections are nothing but wishful thi

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on the background

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classical geopolitics: a global Atlantic-centric

take

as seen in Google Earth,

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image, NASA, overlooking the North Atlantic

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image, NASA, centered on the wide South Atlantic

A Room with a View

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“classical” global geopolitics: the opening fo the Atlantic as a Mare

Nostrum, and then a Mare Clausum: the Tordesillas Treaty and the

Portuguese commercial routes during the XVIth Century (in blue) and

the “española” ones (these latter ‘de longo curso’ and in white, here)

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revisiting horror: from the first to the early stages of the second wave of globalization: a view of the slave-

trade, Africa-Americas, 1650-1860

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the South Atlantic and the first globalization: ports (harbours) in Atlantic Basin and the Portuguese and ‘Spanish’

routes, 15th to 18th centuries

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a peak at the current reawakening of the South Atlantic , after the Panama enlargement, after the eventual TTIP, if Trump allows it: the

new (but surely not the largest) Basin harbours - those being built,

enlarged or in fieri – shall mostly be located on the south of the Basin

So will likely be active militarization and underlying social movements

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The reawakening of the South Atlantic after a period of dormancy Napoleon fate (beyond the horizon”, after Elba’s failure and Waterloo

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a reawakening: after a light WWI U-boat war, a

heavier one in WW2: the nazi sub U-848, “under

north-american attack”, in the northern reaches of

the South Atlantic, 5th of November, 1943

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a harsh wakeup call: “places (and numbers) where Brazilian ships were sunk

during World War II, after Brazil joined the Allies The grand total of sunk Allied ships was 389, for the 1941-1943 interval” ## ships sunk by the axis per week

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the backlash: known Nazi U-boats sunk , 1941-1943; a few were blown

to bits by the Força Expedicionária Brasileira – but most were taken care of by theAmerican Air Force, ewho then was asked by the

Brazilian Govt To create a majoprAir Force Base in Natal

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President Theodore Roosevelt at the Canal de

Panama, visiting the chantier, 1908

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the almost finished Panama Canal, 1913

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left, USS Missouri, crossing the Panama Canal, 1945, back from Japan to

the USA; right, the old and new routes of the Great White Fleet of

President Teddy Roosevelt, and the shortcut needed after the ‘Conquest

of the West’

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A fast-forward, and a look at technological evolution:

Panama Canal enlargement works, by 2012

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In 2014, Mau Tempo no Canal? The enlargement was

consumated on 6 June 6th, 2016, doubling its width, thus

quadrupling its volume

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the works: “enlargement works and a passing luxury cruise ship”, March 2013

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the whys and the hows Waiting queue, Canal de Panama (2013) on the Pacific side, and the alternatives for the ‘unbottling’ : that of the

“Canal Seco” via Costa Rica (2012) and that of the “Canal de

Nicaragua” (2014) via the latter one; but both with China

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la abertura del Canal de Panama alargado: Monday, June

6th, 2016, at 5:07 pm a Chinese ship blazing the new trail.

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again, a view form above: Panama Canal and PortMiami Renew MOU, as the port welcomes its first NeoPanamax vessel (of course, a Chinese vessel): look at how it fits

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reading things: global density of commercial

exchanges, 2016-2017

The colours: in yellow, the more populated regions, in

reddish, the less populated ones

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map of the regions with more intense emissions of carbon dioxide, CO2, coded in colours In green, the “greener” zones,

which hue from yellow to red as it gets worse (2016).

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another background look: ‘coordinated migrations’ and

urbanization, before the onset of the ‘Syrian crisis’: map of

coordinated migration, and, in yellow shade, countries with

biggest urbanization growth, 2002-2019

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Now, cyber, i.e non-classical geopoplitics:

‘Cyberspace’?

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the first Atlantic cable, a telegrafphy one : the very first Morse code message, sent

on August 16 th , 1858, by Queen Victoria to Presidene James Buchanan, was “Europe and America are united by telegraphy Glory to God in the highest; on earth, peace and good will toward men” The following September the connection was broken Its permanent technical reposition , carried out by the Atlantic Telegraph Company , owned by the same John Pender who had laid the first cables 8 years earlierwas only finished in 1866 The first TransPacific cables, running across from S Francisco to Hawaii, Guam, and the Philppines, were only laid on

1902-1903 Once again huge technological innovations taking place.

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Winding up, while still looking back: “ 1901 , Eastern Telegraph cables”, as the TransPacific cables were only being sketched Metastatising.

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some of the new dimensions of geopolitics:

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2017-2018, “optical submarine cable on the oceanic depths of the northern Atlantic Basin”

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as Mark Twain so aptly wrote, “History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme a lot”

Optical fibers, zooming in: the internet and optical cables attached around here, up

closer, still in 2015-2016, not very different from today’s patterns Look at the Atlantic lines and compare Portugal (not Spain or France, with the Mediterranean bend) with

Belgium, The Netherlands (i.e The Flanders) and the UK; see, also, Denmark, A

‘repetition’ of the patterns of colonial maritime connectivities?

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Problematising matters, both politically and economically :

submarine cable map, 2009 Note the almost total absence of cables ‘attached’ to Portugal So the pattern repetition, at least in

the Portuguese case, actually is recent !!! Why is that?!? What

does it resonate with, or respond to?

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2017-2018 , optical submarine cables and the South Atlantic basin,

the myth of South-South connections laid bare: in what concerns

digital, those connections are nothing but wishful thinking

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optical cables in Asia, centered of the

Straits of Malacca, 2017

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laying down optical submarine cables by Telecom-Marine, René Descartes; to the right, a

France-"submarine optical cable cross-section”

Let us see more of both ships and cables

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another specialized ship

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one type of cable laying

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the innards: fiber optical cable laying, ship interiro

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variants: yet another cable laying vessel with its spool of cable about to be laid

across the ocean

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four meter diameter stern sheaves of optic cable laying ship CABLE INNOVATOR

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giants of the sea: Cable Innovator

fibre optic cable laying vessel

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simpler ships

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less simple ones: fibre optic cable

laying vessel Tyco Responder in

Curaçao

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unrolling: the 12,184 tonne cable ship Resolute sits a kilometre

off the Porthcressa Beach on the Isle of Scilly The cable laying ship is working to repurpose a fibre optic cable which used to connect England to Spain so that BT can deliver super fast

broadband to the tiny island

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safety risks, 2012: France Telecom-Orange on Friday announced that an unexplained fire had erupted on its cable ship, The Chamarel,

off the Skeleton Coast of Namibia in the Atlantic Ocean All 54 crew

members were safely “The entire crew of 56 escaped the Chamarel

safely, and were recovered by a Namibian fishing vessel

and were taken to Walvis Bay”.

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yet another, laying it all out

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rolling it all out

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laying out the cables

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laying down the cables

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down it goes

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ploughing it down at bottom, as seen from below

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on a (un)roll: submarine cable marine

services

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connections: France Telecom-Orange

launches-ACE submarine-cable in first 13 countries

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cable joint and deployer 'vehicle'

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this is how things go in these cases:

deploying an optical cable

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burying a cable with a sort of plough

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self-explanatory

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laying down the submarine

fiber-optic cables

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plowing the seabed: submarine optic cable being laid out deep down

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fiber-fiber-optic cables of all kinds

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more examples…

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a diagramatic take on what cables look

like down there

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good morning, lights beams!

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details, and the scale of a small cable

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an alternative and a complement:

parallel cables in a cluster

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• submarine-cable-20-638

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how to create a network: submarine fiber-optic cables central nexus somewhere on the coast

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bigger stuff: “cable extension for the

Southeast network, Alaska”, 2017

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at low depths, mending things down below; at depths of 4,5 kilometers one needs a really sturdy

bathyscaph, and strong lights

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here is one example, the French HROV Ariane (tested before 2014, now one of the many in

use for all sorts of purposes)

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there it is, deep down

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small and rare risks: of sharks and cables; now we have kevlar cables

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warning signs of larger risks: ”The Russian nuclear submarine Dmitrij Donskoj sails through Danish waters in July 2017”.

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the ultimate form of hybrid warfare: 2015, National

Interest, War Strategy – “Attack threat and Defense

on Deep-Sea Fiber Optic Cables”

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mid-Atlantic alarm bells ringing: harsher game, set, and match risks? On (one of the) the Russian threats

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high and more recent risks, more strident alarm bells. On December

2015: Russian warships hovering above optical cable hubs Such

agressive moves have been repeated since then

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Russia hovering over cable hubs, 2015-2016,

and the Western (US and UK) reaction

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Washington Post, December 22, 2017, ”Russian

submarines are prowling around vital undersea cables Understandably, it is making NATO nervous”

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small fry hawking over the cables

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“Russian Spy Submarines Are Tampering with”, The

National Interest, August 19, 2018 Caption:

“Undersea Cables That Make the Internet Work”

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“Russian Subs Are Sniffing Around

Transatlantic Cables” (Defense One,

last January 17)

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“Officials say presence has increased to levels unseen

since the Cold War” (Reuters/Pavel Rebrov)

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cables at risk

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“Russia Could Attack Underwater Internet Cables,

Warns British Military Chief”, BBC

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UK Chief of Staff: "military prioritising defence of undersea telecoms cables amid Russian threat"

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“Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables”

(Lawfare, last March 5) How it could happen

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another Russian attack tactic: “Russian navy ship may be a threat to world’s internet cables "A Russian navy research ship carrying mini- submarines is at the centre of fears about the risk of a catastrophic attack

on underwater internet cables ", (The Australian, May 7th, 2019)

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yet another: Russian Yantar 4000

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here goes: Russian Yantar observed near Submarine

Communications Cables in the Persian Gulf

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Losharik Delta, a specialized set of Russian subs targetting optical cables

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a detailed view of a Losharik sub

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small but mean: a sense of scale

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what we think they look like inside –

a Losharik cutaway

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July 1, 2019, as the 14 Russian officers died in a security

incident

“Whether or not the submarine’s titanium hull and nuclear reactor

were damaged is not clear.

But Moscow’s determination to retrieve the deep-diving vessel, believed capable of tapping into undersea intercontinental internet

cables, is not in doubt.

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Kommersant says Kremlin officials have deliberately exploded several similar battery packs since the accident to determine what components failed — or if

the Losharik had been sabotaged The picture below : “The funeral of the 14 

officers killed in the (July 1 st  2019) Loksharik disaster”

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I security, yes But even without the Russians, really serious vulnerabilities:

launching the inter island cable from Toco while the Cable Ship Intrepid waits offshore to begin laying the cable on the sea floor between Tobago

and Trinidad Is this safe? Are we really that stupid?

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once more, is this safe?

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now, really, is this the safe way to go? submarine fiber-optic cables for all to see

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carelessness: optical cables at hand, end of 2016, early 2017 Well, it doesn’t look safe to me, not when even penguins know where these

critical infrastructures are

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when we take these risks, are we stupid? Yes, we are.

Obvious vulnerabilities, 2017(Tumon Bay cable landing)

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a very tangible lack of security; submarine

fiber-optic cables for all to see

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optical cable SAT 3, arriving at the beach, Sesimbra,

2001

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cable works, Sesimbra, 2009

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low tech hig-tech, 2017: “Philippines’ Globe-Telecom strengthens connections to Boracay with subsea fiber-optic cable Secure?

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here is how it all works, in one example:

how India is connected to the internet

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moving up above, in 2017-2018 (before Elon Musk, still now, this accounts for less than 2,7% of our internet connections – 98,3% of the Internet flows through optical cables): the network of communication satellites and their orbits As was the case with telegraphy, it all was first wired; later it became wireless As concerns the internet connections, we still did not significantly go wireless, outside our homes…

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another, earlier and wider, take, 2013,

on communication sattelites

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geostationary communication sattelites, 2015-2019;

this does not include classified military satellites

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here is one of them, in 2016, one of ours: “an Advanced Extremely

High Frequency communications satellite relays secure communications for the United States and other allied countries”

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a WildBlue satellite Internet dish, and a

foldable Bigpond internet satellite dish; a

competitive market growing

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the back panel of a satellite modem, with coaxial connections for both incoming and outgoing signals,

and an Ethernet port for connection

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back to context and interpretations : giving it all

context: “world map of internet users”, re-scaled

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focal points: distribution-localization of

friendship sharing on Facebook

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again, background,2016: the ‘gravitational force’ of the geography of the

global: connections and friendships local, regional, and global: “global

visualization of every connection between two people on Facebook”

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What a Wonderful World , 2016: Paul Butlers map of local, regional, and global

Facebook friendshipsthe clear preference of multiple connection hubs to the local,

‘the economiy, stupid’ , demography, and rising patterns of urbanization A truly

“global visualization of every connection between two people on Facebook”

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echoes or ressonances? A very similar map;

this one entitled , global GDP density, 2015

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similar, but now when looking at twitter: the so-called

geolocated tweets, 2015; echoes of galloping urbanization

and of growth in the economy; assymetrical inequalities are

nowadays (2019) getting to be even worse

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Breaking it down; the mobility flows of twitter users between 58 cities, 2015 The twitter city flows – a

repeated pattern?

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Poliitcally ‘centralized’ Action vs Decentered Choices: an example of selectivity as concerns the old social media: countries compressed or

streched according the the news on them published by Guardian Online

from 2010 to 2012

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potential connectivities, chokepoints and power, in the

Atlantic Basin and its surroundings: possessions françaises, in October 2019 What do they mean, the end of the “West”?

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October, 2019, “British possessions and British exclusive economic

zones” (in pink) e “French possessions and NATO countries territoires,

as well as those of our Allies, in the Atlantic Basin and some of its

‘chokepoints’” Under the Cape if Good Hope, French and Norwegian

islands and archipelagoes

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again my hypothesis of reduplication of maritime ‘colonial’ connectivity and centrality, seen with perhaps greater graphic clarity in a neater map background How can we

interpret this?

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