The dynamic development of culture, self and social relations

To illustrate this position semi-otic vehicles of culture are instrumental in the social mediation of the shared meaning systems The American individual endorses a system of pride releva

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DOI: 10.1177/097133360201400105

2002 14: 55

Psychology Developing Societies

Michael F Mascolo and Sunil Bhatia

The Dynamic Construction of Culture, Self and Social Relations

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The Dynamic Construction of

MICHAEL F MASCOLO

Merrimack College, North Andover, Massachusetts

SUNIL BHATIA

Clark University

Selves emerge in development through intersystemic co-action To illustrate this position

semi-otic vehicles of culture are instrumental in the social mediation of the shared meaning systems

The American individual endorses a system of pride relevant cultural values that is organised

around low interdependent themes, which are prominent among Indians However there

are commonalities between the American and the Indian participants too The themes such

as "helping others", "taking care of one’s children and family’; "helping those who are in need" and "working hard" were common to both It is suggested that it might be useful to

think of the cultural differences as embedded within similarities.

Traditionally, many theorists in psychology have made sharp

many psychologists have proceeded under the assumption that it is

* This article was supported by a Ciejek Grant for Research in the Humanities

(Merri-mack College) and a Merrimack College development grant The authors wish to thank Nicholas Buehler, Laura Craig-Bray, Carol Ann Dalto, Kurt Fischer, Mirium Itteyerah,

Bonnie Kanner, Marc Lewis, Girishwar Misra, Catherine Raeff, and Raymond Shaw

for their contributions to the ideas expressed in this article We also would like to

work on this article possible

possible to study &dquo;the behavior of individuals&dquo; independent of any

particular analysis of culture From such a view, psychology proceeds

as an attempt to uncover universal laws that govern the psychological

functioning independent of one’s sociocultural environs More recently,

con-stitution of human action and meaning (Cole, 1996; Harre & Gillett,

the particularities of culture and context Nonetheless, in some versions

ana-lysis of individuals and culture (Bidell & Fischer, 1996; Gottlieb, 1992,

of which they are a part are understood as multileveled, emergent, and

coacting systems The organism-environment system is organised in

terms of a series of embedded biogenetic, agentive, dyadic and cultural

systems Although each level or class of processes functions as a set of

distinct systems, no single system is privileged in an analysis of the

construction of culture or self Thus, an epigenetic systems view suggests

,

The Concept of Individual in Psychology

The view that one can study human activity independent of any

ways For example, in their authoritative elaboration of the information

processing approach to cognitive development, Kail and Bisanz (1992)

representa-tions and processes that &dquo;intervene between observable stimuli and

responses&dquo; (p 230) From this view, in studying cognitive development:

the primary focus is on internal factors Rather than external

/ 57

by the environment, and hence development is construed as

environmental events for cognitive change, but it represents the

view that ’whatever the form of the external environment, the

information-processing system itself must ultimately encode, store,

index and process that environment’ (Klahr, 1989, p 138, as cited

In asserting a strong dichotomy between internal processes and the

cognition&dquo; that defines the main focus of psychological inquiry To be

sure, culture and environment affect cognition, but culture is not

re-garded as an essential ingredient in understanding human acts of

knowing.

example, consider the classic work of Levenger (1980; Levenger &

Snoek, 1972), whose innovative analysis of close relationships continues

proposed a model in which mutuality in close relationships undergoes

a series of systematic changes, beginning with no contact at all and

proceeding through higher-order levels of increased mutuality Level 0

involves no contact between two unrelated persons Level 1 involves a

the exchange of attitudes within limited social interaction Levels of

mutuality increase with additional social interaction Levenger

repre-sents these changes in mutuality in terms of a series of increasingly intersecting circles (representing the self and the other) within a series

of Venn Diagrams At level 0, separateness of self and other is

mutuality is represented in terms of increasing intersection between

Venn Diagrams representing self and other

Levenger’s (1980) focus on the development of mutuality through

social interaction captures important changes in the development of

close relationships Nonetheless, in Levenger’s model, relationships

separate individuals In doing so, Levenger’s model does not considerthe necessary embeddedness of distinct individuals in social relations

their embeddedness in social contexts defined by shared social meanings,

undergoes massive transformation in development, even in ways

devel-opment proceeds from a state in which individuals are initially isolatedfrom each other

One might argue that much of current social psychology continues

to proceed from the standpoint of the isolated individual For example,

the study of social cognition (Bercheid, 1994; Fiske, 1993, 1995) examines

ways in which individuals represent knowledge about social

relation-ships with other people This work proceeds from the view that

indi-viduals regulate their social behaviour by drawing on knowledge

represented in memory about social relationships that is garnered from

others Rather than focusing on static knowledge structures that are

negotiated between people in actual on-line social interactions

Concepts of Culture in Psychology

Although psychologists often work to examine the role of culture in

the genesis of human activity, culture and social context are often treated

Psychology is the scientific study of human behavior Its presumptive

goal is to achieve universal status by generalizing results found in

particular ecological, social, legal, institutional, and political settings

Such a generalization requires testing in maximally different

1987, p 713)

/ 59

must be controlled or explained away rather than investigated in its

own right As such, culture is a variable that can obscure a scientific

analysis of individual behaviour and human nature, the quest for which

is seen as the legitimate subject matter of psychology Again, Bond

We adopt Poortinga’s (1992) broad position on culture as a set of

may be married to a position of universals, in which ’it is assumed

independent of culture’ (Poortinga, 1992, p 13) Cultural constraints

process.

As a set of external &dquo;constraints&dquo;, culture provides the &dquo;boundary

the overt expression of internal processes that are understood to be

ex-ternal variable which influences the behaviour and internal processes

The goal of studying culture as a variable in psychological researchhas prompted attempts to quantify cultural variability using a series of

comparative dimensions For example, social psychologists (Markus

& Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1990, 1996) have compared cultural groups

in terms of the individualism-collectivism dimension Cultures may be

atti-tudes, beliefs, norms, role and self-definitions, and values of members

themselves, and that individuals should actualise their selves in

Collectivism refers to the subordination of individual needs and goals

to the goals, standards, norms of the larger cultural group Triandis

nations are generally considered individualist, whereas many Asian

reported clusters of differences between individualist and collectivist

cultures in cognition, motivation, emotion, self-representation, andsocial behaviour (Marcus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1996).

Recently, Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) attempt to define and egorise culture through dichotomous distinctions such as &dquo;individualism

&dquo;interdependent&dquo; inappropriately represents each culture as

homo-geneous and monolithic Similarly, Hermans and Kempen (1998) have

argued that cultural dichotomies such as individualism and collectivism

do not fully capture the complex relationship between global cultures

and the construction of self They note that globalisation has led to a

hybridisation of cultural practices and meanings that:

may create such multiple identities as Mexican School girls dressed

boy of Asian origin playing for a local Bengali cricket team and at

the same time supporting the Arsenal football club, Thai boxing by

Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, and native Americans celebrating

The above examples demonstrate that, for many of us, cultural identities

cannot be described in terms of fixed or narrow categories Rather, as

Hermans and Kempen (1998) argue, it might be more appropriate to

indi-viduals and groups from different cultures could hold similar, yet

distinct views about the meaning of a particular emotion, a nonverbal

sign, or a social ritual In the words of Shweder and Sullivan (1993),

In recent years, a variety of approaches have emerged that argue forthe centrality of culture in understanding the production of human

action These approaches include cultural psychology (Cole, 1996;

Shweder, 1990; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993), cultural-historical psychology

(Cole, 1996), sociocultural psychology (Rogoff, 1990, 1993; Valsiner, 1997;

Wertsch, 1991), social constructionism (Burr, 194; Gergen, 1989; Shotter

1997) and discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Harre &

Gillett, 1994) Although these approaches differ from each other, they generally embrace a set of common assumptions First, sociocultural

psychologists reject the idea that individuals can be understood in terms

inde-pendent of culture and social context According to Shweder (1990),

&dquo;[t]he main force in general psychology is the idea of [the] central

pro-cessing device The processor, it is imagined, stands over and above, or

transcends, all the stuff upon which it operates It engages all the stuff

of culture, context, task and stimulus material as its content&dquo; (p 80).

In rejecting the notion of transcendent central processor, cultural

psych-ologists seek to understand &dquo;the ways subject and object, self and other,

psyche and culture, person and context, figure and ground, practitioner

and practice, live together, require each other, and dynamically,

dialect-ically, and jointly make each other up&dquo; (p 73) As much, culture, values,

shared meanings and social context help constitute the very process of

explica-tion of humah activity requires the study of persons as intentional

beings-agents whose actions are always directed toward some aspect

structured by human intentional states (beliefs, desires, emotions, values, shared understandings).

Common to sociocultural approaches is a strong appreciation of

psychological processes (Cole, 1996; Harre & Gillett, 1994; Vygotsky,

of Vygotsky’s notion of thought as internalised speech According toVygotsky (1978), thinking has its origins in sign activity that emerges

the capacity to internalise and use socially-created signs, they begin to

use signs to organise their own thinking and action This occurs first

in the form of private external speech, and later in the form of inner

speech, or thinking Because signs represent shared meanings that exist

prior to any given individual within social relations and cultural

trad-itions, thinking becomes governed by the informal rules and meanings

of one’s local linguistic community (Harre & Gillett, 1994) As such,

thinking and higher-order psychological functions have social ratherthan personal origins.

Mindful of the dangers of discounting human agency in sociocultural

issue of how individuals participate in the cultural construction of

meaning (Harre & Gillett, 1994; Shweder, 1990; Valisner, 1996) For

example, Rogoff (1990, 1993) has criticised the traditional concept of

occurs Rogoff argues that the notion of internalisation implies the

presence of a barrier between a child and his or her social world That

is, through internalisation, cultural forms that initially exist outside of

view, there is no barrier between the self and other to be traversed To

Rogoff, development occurs through a process that she calls guided

participation Children necessarily act as participants in

help constitute the social interactions of which they are a part Children

cannot be said to simply internalise cultural forms that exist initially

themselves-aspects of the co-constructive activities and meanings that evolve

children not only transform the social interactions of which they are a

part, they also modify cultural meanings as they appropriate them toexisting understandings and skills Thus, sociocultural approaches ex-

plicitly reject the notion that the subject matter of psychology consists

of analyses of the bounded individual

Questions for a Sociocultural Approach to Human Activity

entities Nonetheless, the compelling idea that psyche and culture &dquo;make

complete analysis of culture and individual First, to say that self and

inde-pendent, they must nonetheless function as at least partially distinct

entities or systems It makes no sense to say that self and other make

each other up if self and other cannot be regarded as in some way

dis-tinct from each other (Mascolo & Dalto, 1995) If individuals are distinct

yet interpenetrating systems, to what do we refer when we speak of

individual selves? Second, if individuals and cultures make each other

cul-tural meanings from their everyday interactions, then just what is it

(Mascolo et al., 1997) As meanings are appropriated and used, how

do interacting individuals transform the local cultures of which they

are a part?

Third, the idea that self and other participate in each other suggests

individual, dyadic or cultural system arises from relations among

are multiple levels and layers of the systems that make up individuals

and their social contexts Any given human act is necessarily and

simul-taneously a biological, psychological, social and cultural product As

such, there is no reason to privilege any particular process, element or

culture, individual or some process that is regarded as a central

way down, then surely biology goes all the way up As such, a complete psychology would be bio-psycho-socio-cultural psychology rather than

simply a cultural psychology As long as the various layers and

com-ponents of human systems are seen as interpenetrating rather than

independent, nothing is lost by embracing a more encompassing oretical framework for thinking about the production of activity and

the-meaning In the beginning, we suggest that epigenetic systems

ap-proaches to human development hold out the promise of offering

integrative metaphors for thinking about the interpenetration of

,

The Dynamic Construction of Culture,

’

Self and Interpersonal Relations

In recent years, systems metaphors have become increasingly prominent

in the analysis of psychological processes (Barton, 1994; Bidell &

Fischer, 1996; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Fogel, 1993; Mascolo & Harkins,

proposed epigenetic systems approaches to psychological development

that are build on systems metaphors (Bidell & Fischer, 1996; Gottlieb,

systems theory provides a solution to the traditional nature-nurture

controversy Recent progress in the articulation of epigenetic systems

theory provides a framework for understanding the interpenetration

of personal and cultural processes in human development.

An Epigenetic Systems Framework

Drawing upon Gottleib (1991, 1992 1997), an epigenetic systems

per-spective maintains that anatomical and behavioural structures emerge

in development through inseparable coactions between and among

sys-tems in a multi-leveled person-environment system Epigenesis provides

on the one hand, and empiricist and environmental views on the other

means that such structures simply do not exist until they are formed

in development Systems of action, thought and feeling emerge in

devel-opment through coactions among multiple levels of the

multiple coacting and embedded levels of functioning The genome

autonomously; their expression and action is modulated by a series ofcomplex coactions within its local and embedded environments Genes

including the cell matrix, the cell itself, cell assemblies or organs, organ

systems and the organism itself Further, the organism is embedded

dyadic interactipns, and a series of embedded socio-cultural contexts.

From an epigenetic systems perspective, any developmental

gene-gene, cell-cell, organ-organ, organism-organism, culture-culture).

a system (for example, gene-cell matrix; cell organ; organism-organ

system; culture-individual) Gottlieb (1991, 1992, 1997) describes manycompelling examples of how anatomical structures emerge in develop-ment as a result of such coactions For example, some parasitic wasps

can lay their eggs in either a fly or butterfly host Wasps that develop

alone, but instead by coactions between genes and local and embedded

environments An additional and particularly fascinating example,

development, cell cytoplasm is altered in such a way that leads to the

development of a second pair of wings (Ho, 1984) Remarkably, this

develop-ment from vertical and horizontal coactions between and among

In extending these metaphors to an analysis of how human

differ-entiate among four categories of embedded levels, processes or systems

cultural-linguistic systems The basic presupposition of an epigenetic

systems view is that although the systems that compose the

are not independent For example, although any two interacting

inseparable from each other as causal processes in each other’s activity Living systems can be both distinct but interpenetrating, and in doing

so, co-regulate and mutually constitute each other The interpenetrating

systems; agentive-cultural) and horizontal (cardiovascular-respiratory

Biogenetic Systems Biogenetic systems consist of the biological

sub-strate and physical medium which provides biological and genetic bases

the genome, neurochemical systems, neuromuscular processes, the

etc From our perspective, biogenetic processes include the neural

activity and experience (Greenfield, 1995; Edelman, 1988) Ontogenetic

changes in biogenetic systems both support and are spurred by

propose that discontinuities in the emergence of each of the 13 levels

of cognitive and affective skills are supported by developmental

dis-continuities in brain growth and activity For example, a spurt in brain

development at 18-24 months prompt neurological changes that

the ability to pretend to make a doll talk or in pretend play, or to use

though neurological development supports the production of children’s

cognitive skills, individual and social action also influence

Huttenlocher, 1994; Gottleib, 1992; Edelman, 1988).

Individual-Agentive Systems Complex organisations of biogenetic

sys-tems support and give rise to personal-agentive systems Personal-agentive

systems function at the level of the experiencing and meaning-making

actor As such, individual-agentive processes reflect the functioning level

as psychological are best understood as either a type of activity or as

an aspect of activity (Shotter, 1975) As used here, the concept of human

activity is used to refer to several interrelated properties: (a) Activity

(b) Activity is channelised by meaning As such, human activity is

and feelings are about something that has significance or meaning to an

feelings, thoughts and actions are always directed at some meaningful

event Third, (c) human activity is embodied in bodily, affective and

conscious experience The experiential aspects of human activity exert

an organisational effect on behaviour For example, experienced affectplays a role in the selecting and organising of the goals and meanings

public aspect of an ongoing activity.

Given the foregoing, any given human act can be understood as a

/ 67

of any given psychological act in terms of its components, namely the

specific goals, meanings, phenomenal experiences and overt actions

press, b) Current neo-Piagetian systems approaches provide rigorous conceptual and theoretical tools for parsing any given instance of human

activity into its component parts and their interrelations Using such

tools, one can not only specify the dynamic structure and contents of

any given action as it occurs on-line in a given context, but one can

also chart the developmental transformations in acting, thinking and

feeling as they occur over time in the course of development.

The functioning of individual agents contributes directly to

psych-ological development Although biogenetic changes support

develop-mental changes in any given skilled activity, in order to take advantage

individual-agentive level of functioning, persons must effortfully perform acts to

possible Any complex or higher-order action or representation is posed of multiple component actions and parts For example, a twoyear-old may be capable of constructing single representations of the

com-meaning of events, such as &dquo;I throw ball!&dquo; or &dquo;Mommy throw ball!&dquo;

Beginning from 31h to 4 years of age, children gain the capacity to

represent the relationships between two or more single representations.

For example, a four-year old might represent the relation between

these two previously-constructed single representations in terms of

similarity (for example, &dquo;I can throw the ball just as far as Mommy can!&dquo;), difference (for example, &dquo;Mommy throws the ball far, but I can

only throw it a little way.&dquo;) or some other relation (Mascolo & Fischer,

1998, in press, a) Thus, attainment of a given level of neurological development is not sufficient to ensure the construction of a new skill

and representations into increasingly higher-order actions, thoughtsand feelings (Bidell & Fischer, 1996) Thus, a major developmental

process that occurs at the personal-agentive level consists of the active,

hierarchical coordination of component systems of action to form

higher-level actions, thoughts and feelings (Bidell & Fischer, 1996; Mascolo

et al., 1997; Weiss, 1970).

Relational-Dyadic Systems Although individuals function as distinct

and integral systems, they are neither bounded nor autonomous There

is no activity that occurs outside of an environmental or social context.

The object of an activity always exerts a direct effect on the ongoing

action (Bateson, 1971) This is especially so in the case of social action Individual-agentive functioning is transformed through its

nature of human communication, Fogel (1993) has distinguished

be-tween discrete state and continuous process communication systems In

discrete state communication, such as mail, email, telegraph, etc., only

message originates in one party and is transmitted to another In so

doing, the message remains fixed as it travels through its communication

change roles and act as a sender and construct a new message In contrast,

in continuous process communication, which consists of most

face-to-face human interaction, both parties are simultaneously active in the

process of communication Both partners act simultaneously as sendersand receivers of information that is continuously forwarded and modu-

mes-sages are not fixed and can change in the very process of tion As such, face-to-face communications are socially created between

com-munication traditional metaphors such as &dquo;message&dquo;, &dquo;transmission&dquo;,

&dquo;sender&dquo;, and &dquo;receiver&dquo; begin to break down

Co-regulation refers to the processes by which individuals continuously adjust their actions to the on-line and anticipated actions of their social

autonomously Control over action is jointly distributed throughout

the dyad; each individual functions as an actual part of the process of

joint functioning Thus, even though individuals function as distinctand integral systems, self and other are inseparable as causal factors in

Relational-dyadic interaction is necessary in the formation of

/ 69

co-regulated social interaction, especially when it occurs between

the developmental level of an individual’s activity to heights that would

meaning and skilled activity often emerge in joint activity As such,

coordin-ate his or her actions into higher-order skills and meanings (Rogoff, 1990) However, as indicated above, to develop, individuals must per-

higher-order meanings that have their origins in social interaction In

this way, higher-order actions and meanings are jointly produced in

co-regulated activity, but personally coordinated by individual children (Eidell

& Fischer, 1996; Mascolo & Fischer, in press; Mascolo et al., 1997;

Cùltural-Linguistic Systems Biogenetic, individual-agentive and

relational-dyadic processes are themselves embedded within larger cultural-linguistic systems By culture, we refer to the shared meanings,

practices and social artifacts that mediate and frame the actions and

interactions of members of any given local community Again, we

rather than as a fixed form According to Fogel, the shared meanings

in a community In co-regulated social interaction, meanings are created

Then, these meanings and ways of relating become crystallised into

to interact, communicate and operate on cultural artifacts From this

view, culture is defined in terms of the networks of continuously

com-munity To Fogel (1993):

maintained by a human population and transmitted from one

generation to the next’ Culture is the active, interpretive process

co-participants: meaning in a culture is just the extent to which

communicating communities co-regulate stable themes of

informa-tion (p 161)

Thus, although cultural meanings may remain stable for generations,

via co-regulation between [interlocutors] In the process, the frame

changes in its structure and use by the dyadic process of mutual

agree-ment to play a game, to use a toy, tool or word&dquo; (p 169) Thus, from

this view, culture is not a fixed form, but instead an active continuous

process that is continuously negotiated between persons As such, it is

not helpful to think of cultures as monolithic or as defined by national

boundaries Within any given nation, community, or social group,

consists of the shared meanings and practices that frame interpersonal

are social groups One can speak of the cultures of a nation, of ethnic

groups within a nation, of communities, professions, scientific

organisa-tions, departments of psychology, and even families

Consistent with sociocultural theory, language and semiotic processes

figure prominently in the constitution of cultural-linguistic systems

To the extent that culture consists of a system of shared meanings and

practices, and because sign systems are capable of representing shared

meanings, language functions as a quintessential vehicle of culture.Members of any given community represent, communicate and modify

is not the only cultural vehicle Culture arises in non-verbal and

affectively-based communications, and exists in both linguistically (for example, books, computers, street signs), and non-linguistically (for example, the physical layout of space, the structure of a tool, etc.)

communication Individuals and dyads use cultural tools and sign

systems to coordinate their actions and interactions, whether they be

words, numbers, metaphors, narratives, syllogisms, logic, song, art,

meanings, when people act using signs, the sign systems themselves

help to constrain and direct the on-line construction of meaning In

psychological act.

Intersystemic Processes in Individual and Cultural Development

Figure 1 provides a pictorial representation of the ways in which

biogenetic, individual-agentive, relational-dyadic and cultural-linguistic

systems coact in the emergence of any given psychological structure.

interlocking yet permeable systems From an epigenetic systems

per-spective, no single system or subsystem in the organism-environment

relationship is privileged in an explanation of the development of either

that compose individuals and their sociocultural contexts are distinct

from each other, they are nonetheless inseparable as causal processes ineach other’s activity.

Figure 1 provides a representation of the interaction among two

persons, Person A and Person B Persons A and B are each composed

of coacting component processes, including appraisal, affective and

overt action systems (Mascolo et al., 1998) As such, at the level of the

individual-agentive system, human activity consists of some

experi-ences (for example, affect) and overt manifestations of these processes

(for example, overt voluntary and involuntary action) Although each

person has integrity as a distinct individual-agentive system, human

agents mutually regulate each other in social interaction Mutual

adjusts hisor her interpretations, goals, feeling states and overt actions

to the ongoing and anticipated actions of the other

The co-regulation and co-construction of action and meaning occurs

on cultural objects within sociocultural contexts and is mediated by

the use of cultural tools The interpenetration of culture in dyadic

activity is represented at Points D and E in Figure 1 In interaction,

the dyad necessarily appropriates shared meanings, practices or artifacts