Radioactive waste management policies in seven industrialized democracies (2)

zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA I nt roduc t ion Perhaps no aspect of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has caused more controversy than the disposal of radioactive

Radioactive Waste Management Policies

in Seven Industrialized Democracies*

BARRY D SOLOMON,?- Washington, DC, U.S.A

FRED M SHELLEY,+ Los Angeles, CA, U.S.A

MARTIN J PASQUALETTI,$ Tempe, AZ, U.S.A

and

G TOMAS MURAUSKAS,II Norman, OK, U.S.A

Abstract: This paper provides an inventory of radioactive waste managcm~nt policies in seven industrializers democracies: the U.S., France Japan West Germany, Canada, the U.K and Sweden Collectively, these countries account for almost 75% of the world’s installed nuclear power capacity and over 61% of its spent- fuel production Special emphasis is given to siting procedures for both high- and low-/intermediate-level waste repositories Although several low-level repositories are operating or under zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAc o nstruc tio n, only West Germany has selected a site for high- level waste disposal, at Gorleben It is expected that siting decisions will be highly

conflict-laden in each country except for pro-nuclear France The procedures for resolving potential sitingconfiicts are briefly rcvicwed Sweden’sstrategy of siting its low-level repository near Forsmark offshore beneath the Baltic seabed minimizes conflict and may become attractive to other nations Also, transnational agreements may eventually be sought as radioactive waste disposal is an intern~ltional problem

This paper concludes with a comparative discussion of siting policies and their potential impacts zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

I nt roduc t ion

Perhaps no aspect of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has

caused more controversy than the disposal of

radioactive waste products Radioactive wastes must

be disposed of somewhere - in the oceans, in space,

or underground The first option has been banned by

most countries, and the second option is too

expensive and too risky Attention is now focused on

*We wish to thank without implicating Andrew Blowers,

John Fernie and Jim Johnson for helpful comments on an

earlier draft of the paper The views and opinions expressed

herein are solely those of the authors, and not of their

respective institutions

tEnergy Information Administration U.S Department of

Energy, Washington, DC 20585, U.S.A

*Department of Geography, University of Southern

California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0663, U.S.A

§Department of Geography, Arizona State Ul~versity,

Tempe, AZ 85287, U.S.A

[/Department of Geography, University of Oklahoma,

Norman, OK 73019 U.S.A

achieving political and technical acceptability for the third option

Siting decisions will produce unprecedented geographical effects that derive from the unique characteristics of the waste products Unlike wastes from other sources of energy, several types of nuclear wastes remain highly radioactive for long periods -

on the order of thousands of years (HARE and AIKIN, 1984) Attendant health and environmenta risks render many people unwilling to accept local waste repositories This coupled with the requirement of geological acceptability means that the number of sites eventually chosen will be relatively few, increasing average trip lengths for the waste product shipments and increasing real and perceived risks along the routes These concerns have rendered the problem of radioactive waste disposal

an issue of heated political debate in many industrialized countries in recent years

Although international cooperation in formulating

415

approaches and solutions has increased, each country

has addressed the problem of siting waste disposal

facilities in the context of its own geographical, social

and political environment A wide range of expertise

has accumulated, indicating the value of a

comparative inventory of the radioactive waste

disposal experience in different countries

Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to identify

and examine the characteristics of waste disposal

decision-making and progress toward disposal site

sclcction in seven major industrialized democracies

that produce and USC‘ nuclear power: the U.S

Canada, Sweden, France West Germany, the U.K

and Japan Our goal is to identify common elements

~Ipplicabl~ to the resolution of locational conflicts

involving radioactive waste disposal as well as to

contrast the effects of policies unique to individual

nations In this way, we can identify the most

promising approaches to the resolution of siting

conflicts within the context of democratic governance

in the contemporary industrial world

Nuclear Waste Disposal and Siting Conflict

By 1987, the world’s nuclear energy capacity was

nearly 270 GW(e) Three-quarters of this nuclear

energy capacity exists in the seven countries under

study, with the U.S and France alone accounting for

nearly half (Table 1) Collectively, the seven

countries are responsible for over (70% of the world’s

cumulative spent-fuel arisings, with over ~00,000

metric tons of heavy metal expected from the

envisaged nuclear power programs

Although the problem of radioactive waste

repository siting is formidable from a technical

standpoint, it is ultimately a geogrnphicnl and a

political problem It is a geographical problem in that

the siting of a facility results in external effects of

great magnitude which arc often beyond the control

of residents in the local area It is a political problem

in that intense locational conflicts often result from

siting proposals, between representatives of the

proposed facility site and representatives of the

central government as well as among factions in the

vicinity of the proposed site who support and oppose

construction (CARTER 1987)

In many cases, proposats to site nuclear waste

repositories are met with intense opposition on the

part of local residents, business interests, and

government officials These interests fear the threat

of direct negative externalities, including the dangers

associated with leaking radioactive material and

possible health hazards resulting from contamination In addition, indirect externalities

such as devaluation of property, are often taken into account by opponents of facility siting When residents of the proposed site are united in theiI opposition to siting, the conflict takes the form of the zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

c la ssic ‘no t in m y back ynrd’dilemma (~~PENSHAW

1986): a noxious facility that conveys region-wide benefits but imposes local costs must he constructed somewhcrc in the region but no locality is willing to take on the burden The geographic literature ilr replete with examples of noxious-facility conflicts involving controversial policies such as the location of freeways (WOLPERT (‘I rrl., 1973: FARRIER

1973), mental hcaith facilities (DEAR PI (il., 1977:

SMITH and HA~HAM 1(X31) and the closing cti [ocal schools (REYNOLDS 19X.3)

in some cases, conflict occurs rzvif/Iin the proposed site community iIs well as between the community and higher kvels of government 111 the western LJ.S for LXI~lplt?+ scveroi isoiatcd, rural communities in~ludiI~g Moab, Utah and Edgemont South Dakota, have supported and indeed have actively encouraged proposals to site nuclear wasto repositories Support is based on the notion that construction and operation of the facility will result in jobs and local economic development; thus the facility is regarded as salutary or likely to genera&

positive, beneficial externahtirs in excess of any negative oxtcrnalitics This situation results in a much different pattern of i~)~~iti~)n~ti conflict: intense conflict develops within the ~(~I~~rnuIlit~ bctwecn supporters and opponents of siting, and consequently

conflict becomes evident at the local zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAand at the regional scale rather than solely between the

local community and the central government

(MURAUSKAS and SHELLEY, I%%)

In either case, resolution of the inevit~IL~l~ i~~~~Iti~)rl~Ii conflict that arises from proposals to site nuclear waste repositories requires political choice The political decision process of nuclear waste disposal sitino 0 can be divided into three stages: the establishment and operation of the institutions involved in the siting process in general the procedures that are used by these institutions in uiid~rt~~king a tentative siting decision and the procedures used to resolve conflicts arising from siting proposals and make a final decision Each of these components is examined in the next section in order to develop 21 logical framework for the comparative analysis of radioactive waste repository siting

-~

Geoforum/@olume 18 Number 411987

Aspects of Siting Decision Policy - a Political-

Geographic Framework for International Com-

parative Analysis

The nature of the siting institution

The many functions of democratic governance

characteristic of contemporary industrial societies

can be grouped into three broad categories -

legislative, administrative and judicial The siting of

controversial facilities such as nuclear waste

repositories is variously regarded as either a

legislative or an administrative function Legislative

functions generally require active public participation

in decision-making through voting either by the

public or elected representatives Administrative

functions, on the other hand, generally do not require

voter approval although other forms of public

participation, such as public hearings are often

required

The siting of nuclear waste repositories and the

resolution of siting conflicts often depends on

whether the siting decision is legislative or

administrative This, in turn, can depend on the

location of the siting agency within the overall

structure of the governmental bureaucracy Is siting

carried out by an independent agency or is it regarded

as a function of a larger agency such as the U.S

Department of Energy (DOE) or the Commisariat B

l’I?nergie Atomique (CEA) in France? Does the

agency report to the legislative or administrative

branch of the government? How broad are its

decision powers - must they be reviewed by either

the legislative or executive agencies of the

government, and if so, how?

The selection of individuals involved in the siting

decision process also can influence the political

decision-making process The selection of these

persons and the criteria constraining their decisions

are affected by the extent to which the national

government regards siting as a technological,

locational or political issue For example, are persons

involved in the siting process required or expected to

hold technical degrees in engineering, geology or

related fields? To what extent do those involved in the

siting process rely on the evidence of technical

experts? Reliance on the advice of technical experts

usually implies that the siting process is seen as

technological and administrative rather than as

overtly political or locational In such cases it is also

likely that little opposition to siting decisions will be

tolerated through ordinary political channels

417

The actual siting decision may be affected by numerous factors In several countries, potential sites have been identified, evaluated on the basis of technological, geological, locational and other criteria, and ranked on the basis of suitability for disposal siting, with a decision eventually made among these ranked sites and often modified on the basis of political or economic criteria Constraints may be placed on the evaluation of potential sites These constraints may be technological in nature; for example, mandating that potential facility sites meet particular geological or hydrological standards to reduce the risk of radiation contaminations Alternatively, they may be locational in nature; for example, they may require that sites be chosen in remote, sparsely populated areas or be isolated from major transportation corridors Democracies differ

on the extent to which these technological criteria influence the evaluation process, which in turn can influence dramatically the outcome of political conflicts regarding siting

After evaluation of potential sites, sometimes accompanied by preliminary rccomtnendations, has been completed, the political process must operate in order to develop a final decision This involves two factors-procedures for ratifying and confirming, or else overturning, the preliminary recommendation, and procedures for resolving conflicts associated with the recommendations In the U.S for example, locations in three states - Washington, Nevada and Texas-were announced as potential sites for a high- level repository in early 1986 In the U.K., in

contrast, an extensive public inquiry may be held after

a siting decision has already been made, such as for the proposed nuclear power plant at Sizewell (KEMP

el al., 1984) Procedures of this sort wili vary among

countries: for example, does the site require ratification by the national or local legislature or by the local population? Can the preliminary recommendations of the authority be overturned at higher administrative levels, and if so, on what grounds and in what ways?

Once a potential site has been determined and announced, political conflict becomes almost inevitable As previously indicated, intense local opposition is likely to emerge How is this conflict managed? What rights, if any, do local residents have

to overturn or modify siting decisions?

In different countries, scvcral avenues for conflict

resolution exist First, objection to siting proposnla

may be treated in political terms In such cases, the

~~~YI~rn~lnit~~ may he permitted to overturn the

decision through voting p~titi(~nin~ or other

democratic processes

If legislative activity in the light of opposition is not

permitted additional rights such as notice and

hcaring and public ~~~rti~ip~tj(~n in siting policy, may

be granted to community leaders und activists Locitl

leaders may be granted comperzsation or mitigutiorl in

exchange for their support of facility construction OI

in response to specific heahh, safety and cconotnic

concerns voiced by the local population

Compensation implies that other benefits such as

additional governmental facilities, new industrial or

commercial ~~pp(~rtuniti~s or payment of damages

for any disru~?ti~~n caused by facility construction will

be channeled into the host ~~~l~lrnunity Miti~~lti~~n

politics art: designed to tackle the direct and indirect

negative externiilitics associated with radioactive

w;is\1c storage zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAix disposal These can include the

~~~r~stru~ti~~li of ~idditi(~Il~ll safety features, ~U~~I-~lilt~~s

that a specific number of jobs in construction a nd

maintenance of the facility will 1~ rescrvcd for local

residents and financial guarantees to underwrite

expected property vaiuc ~~~pr~ci~ttiot~ Policies such

as these have frequently been iI~~pl~I~l~~~t~d in ctrdcr

to placate opposition to nuclear waste disposal siting

To varying dcgrecs, the industrial democracies of the

world ha ve followed this sequence in attempting to

determine locations for t~~np[~r~lr~ storage and

permanent disposal of radioactive waste products

Each has identified potential disposal sites each has

undertaken preliminary testing or made preliminary

evaluations of the potential sites and each has

experienced substantial political conflict in coming to

;I final siting decision However, the specitic

cxpcrienccs of each country arc unique The next

section of this paper is devoted to II description of the

siting experience of e a c h zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof the seven countries Each

subsection ~li~~lli~hts the site evaluation criteria and

process and the political conflicts that have rcsultcd:

the concluding section is then devoted IO :I

comparative evaulation of the siting process within

thu context of industri~tl democracy

CJ S

The U.S is by far the world’s leading producer of

commercial nuclear power, and has been operating low-level radioactive waste (LLW) facilities for many years (KASPERSON et rd., 1983) The Low Level R~l~ii~~~lctiv~ Waste Policy Act, passed by Congress in December 1%-X), requires state governments to assume responsibility for nuclear wastes produced within their border: this is accomplished through the

~st~iblishm~nt of regional compacts and rcgionnl waste disposal sitcs (KEARNEY and STl.JCKER, 1985; NORMAN, 1983; DiM~N~rO rl al., lc)S5)

Amendments to the original Act adopted in December 1985, extended the original deatlline for

co111pact formation, approved the lirst se ve n

compacts, and rcquircd all ccNllpacts to set up

disposal sites by 1 January IYC).?

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which established procedures for high-level waste (HLW) disposai was approved by Congress in Deccmhtx I%?

(SOLOMON a nd CAMERON 1985) HLW in the U.S includes spent fuel rods a nd reprocessing waste

and will probably include both military and commercial wastes The fcdcral govurnmcnt has carefully charted its ‘mission plan’ for HLW disposal

including the environmental st;mdards and decision- making ‘procedures zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(LJ.S DEPARTME<NT OF ENEKGY 19X5) In contr;lst to most Europc;in

countries, the l1.S does not have an ilit~rIi~~~i~~~t~- level waste (ILW) category; nuclear waste is divided into HLW manrtgcd by the federal government and

1,LW managed by tho states

Extensive technical analyses of host-rock geology and radioactive waste canister behavior have bern conducted in the U.S for over 30 years (KASPERSON 1%3: CARTER 1983) and the

sophistication of these analyses is mat&cd only in Sweden However, nearly all of thcsc studies have been sponsored by the fcdcral government, leaving the states which arc responsible for LLW disposal at 5omo disadvantage In most casts, the regional compacts with authority to choose LLW ai[cs art riot

expected to select s~i~~llt~~v-l~~~~~i burial rcposiforics In contrast, HLW siting is done by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management of the DOE, although ultimately the DOE Secretary nominates sites to the President The DOE issued its siting

~Lli~i~lin~s in Mav 19X4; these guidelines wcrc’ subjti’t

to the concurrence of the iJ.S Nuclear Rcpulntory Commission (NRC)

The mission of the LLW law is to begin the disposal of LLW on a regional basis by 1903 While this process should minimize interstate disputes and conflicts over

CJevforumiVolume 18 Number 411987

waste disposal, it is extremely difficult to estimate the

yuantity of LLW to be generated because of its

numerous origins Thus, it will also be difficult to

determine the required LLW disposal space

(SOLOMON and CAMERON, 1984) The mission

of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which is concerned

with the disposal of HLW, is to safely isolate all

nuclear reactor spent fuel and reprocessing wastes

from the human environment, although military

waste may also be emplaced in the repository

(NEWMAN, 1984) An HLW repository is planned to

begin operations in 2003, after licensing by the NRC,

although it is unlikely that this target date will be met

In the interim, a proposed surface-level monitored

retrievable storage facility in Tennessee could serve

as an away-from-reactor storage site, although a

federal court decision and lack of Congressional

funding stalled this project in 19X6-1987

Most interstate compacts are searching for a single

site each for LLW disposal Use of the three pre-

existing sites in South Carolina, Nevada and

Washington will probably continue, at least

temporarily Siting in other regions will be very

difficult and conflict-laden, although a few

communities, mostly characterized by economic

dependency and isolation, have encouraged testing in

order to be chosen as LLW sites (MURAUSKAS and

SHELLEY, 1986) Interestingly, only one

Midwestern compact has thus far offered attractive

financial incentives to a potential host area to accept a

respository

In May 1986, the DOE recommended three finalists

for the first HLW site The next step will be to

characterize the deep geology at these sites, which

include welded tuffs in Nevada, domed salt in western

Texas, and basalt in Washington Backup sites in

Utah and Mississippi were also chosen Although a

final decision among these sites has yet to be made

and is certain to evoke substantial political conflict, it

is likely that the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada will

eventually be chosen The site is located on DOE-

owned land, has the lowest population density of the

candidate sites, is geologically suitable, and was

ranked as the most highly suitable by both the DOE

and the Nationai Research Council

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act envisaged that two

HLW sites wouId probably be needed, with one

located in the western U.S and the other in the East

However, the DOE has indefinitely postponed its

plans for locating the Eastern site, stirring up

controversy (MARSHALL, 1986) This East-West

419 controversy arose because most high-level radioactive waste is generated at power plants in the East and Midwest Western opposition to being burdened with waste from other regions may result in attempts by Western Senators and Representatives in Congress to block site selection in the West

Management and staff of the DOE and the interstate LLW compacts are comprised of scientific and engineering experts although the highest officials are political appointees Most interstate compacts also include representatives of the lay public Public hearings and comment and review processes for technical documents are relied on for both HLW and LLW repository sitings In addition, technological, locational and political criteria are all used in siting decisions Congress has granted the states a strong role in HLW repository siting decisions since state governors may veto the selection of their states as sites However, a governor’s veto may be overriden

by a majority vote of both houses of Congress

The selection of an HLW site in the West has been slowed by over 30 lawsuits Before the three finalists were announced and the choice of an Eastern site was postponed by the DOE, several states and environmental groups filed lawsuits against the DOE challenging its siting procedures (SOLOMON and CAMERON, 1985) In addition, the governors of the three finalist states have vowed to exercise their veto powers, and the issue has been a major concern of political leaders of both major parties zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Canada

In 1946, the Atomic Energy Control Act gave the Canadian federal government responsibility over nuclear affairs (COOK, 1982) However, the Act does not address provincial rights in siting matters, although preemptive rights are stipulated In implementing the Atomic Energy Control Act, Parliament established Atomic Energy Canada, Limited (AECL), a crown corporation responsible to the federal Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources

Today, AECL serves as a research agency as well as a commercial enterprise It is involved in atomic research and development; the design, engineering and sale of CANDU natural uranium nuclear reactors; the operation of Canada’s heavy-water plants which produce a very high amount of spent fuel (Table 1); and waste management research and development Indeed, the entire nuclear fuel cycle in Canada is dominated by this single agency; the Canadian nuclear industry is devoid of private firms

Moreover, AECL enjoys considerable autonomy from the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources

420 C~eoforurniVoiumc IX Numkcr 3/10X7

Table 1 lnstallcd nuclear power ~cn~~~tin~ capacity and spent fuel by country’

(kmulative ~LirI~u~~itiv~

Capacity iis of power that ia Csings ~1s of arisings at end

-.-_I _ _ - ~ ~_ ” _.- _ - U.S 8.5 r! 16 No 12 w7 I 39 (It I( 1

Scscn-country total

‘So~rc~v: HARMON CI CJi zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(1086): Nwhr Ne~1.v August IYXh: LJ.S DEPARTMENT OF ENEKC;Y ( 1057)

-;-In GW(c)

$:lrr tons of ur~~niunl oxide

#In metric tons of heavy metal; assuming ;I 30-year re:tctor lift in Sweden, whcrc ;iII nuclezr power plants will hc

ducommissioned by 2010, and ;1 40-year reactor life elsewhere, for ail nuclear power plants operating, king built

or plannod

Currently CANDU reactor operation is restricted to

three eastern provinces Ontario has the zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAlio n’s share

of commercial reactors, including 2 1 province-owned

reactors ;it four operational nuckar plant sites, 3s well

;IS the $1 1 billion Canadian nuclear power plant at

Darlington recently slated for construction Quebec

and New Brunswick have one commercial reactor

apiece With the majority of nuclear reactors in

Ontario it has been agreed by the governments of

Canada and Ontario that any waste repositories

should be located there In June 1978, the

governments of Canada and Ontario agreed to

coopcrate in the development of technologies for the

safe, permanent disposal of nuclear wastes (AIKIN ef

01 1977) Llnder the terms of the agreement, Ontario

Hydra, the provincially-owned electric utility is

responsible for the development of technologies for

interim storage and transport of spent fuel, while

AECL is responsible for coordinating and managing

the research and development program for the

immobilization and disposal of HLW (RUMMERY

ct rrl I 1983)

The Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management

Program has three phases leading to the eventual

disposal of nuclear waste: concept assessment, site

selection, and construction of a demonstration vault

The concept assessment phase entails gcotechnical and hydrological research and cxperimcntation at various sites in the plutonic rock of the C’anadian Shield (RUMMERY r’i (II., 1953) The concept assessment phase is cxpectcd to be completed bl

1991, The timetahlos for the remaining phases hnvc not been set, and the permanent siting of HLW is not

cxpccted to occur bcforc 2020 (HARMON c>f (II., 19X4)

A key component of the concept assessn~ent phase is the construction of an underground research laboratory (URL) by the AECL Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishnlent near Lac du Bonnet, Manitoba This facility has been controversial since it was initially proposed by AECL In 1981, residents of

LX du Bonnet began vigorously opposing the construction of a 300-m shaft in granite pluton near their town Opposition was countcrcd by reassurances by AECL employees that the URL was intended strictly for research purposes However

despite assurances from the governments of Canada and Manitoba that nuclear waste disposal would occur in Ontario AECL personnel have recently asserted that Manitoba cannot be excluded as a potential site for an eventual HLW repository

Concerned Manitobans fear that Ontario’s nuclear

GeoforumiVolume 18 Number 4/1987

waste may be dumped in their back yards

(EDWARDS, 1986)

Although permanent disposal of HLW is not

expected to begin for more than 20 years, a process

for the review and evaluation of potential disposal

sites has already been announced by the governments

of Canada and Ontario This process involves three

stages: a regulatory and environmental review, a full

public hearing, and a decision by the Canadian and

Ontario governments based on the recommendations

and information from the previous stages The

federal government has designated the Atomic

Energy Control Board, which is responsible to the

federal Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, as

the lead regulatory agency overseeing this process

(RUMMERY et al., 1983) In contrast to the

program to site an HLW repository, government

agencies have paid less attention to strategies to

dispose of LLW Currently, there are four temporary

LLW storage sites - two on AECL-owned land and

two on Ontario Hydro property (HARMON et af.,

1984)

While public hearings on waste disposal siting are not

required by law, a formal approval process was

initiated in 1978 by AECL and the Ontario Hydro

Co-ordinating Committee Initiation of this process

followed an incident in Madoc, Ontario over test

drilling, where 1200 angry citizens crowded into a

school auditorium to voice their disapproval and

discontent (EDWARDS, 1982) In this approval

process, AECL is required to disseminate literature

regarding any testing to the local public and to brief

local municipal councils, local media and other

concerned local groups If field testing is proposed in

unorganized territory, AECL is still required to seek

the approval of the nearest municipal council Only

upon the approval of the local municipal council can

AECL submit a formal proposal for field research to

the Co-ordinating Committee The Committee then

reviews the proposal along with the comments of

national and provincial Members of Parliament

representing the area

Initially, this process was very successful for AECL

testing proposals; over 50 were accepted and none

were rejected Subsequently, however, non-local

anti-nuclear activists began to use the process to

prevent further field testing The anti-nuclear

activists emphasized to local councils that no local

benefits could be derived from local testing

Ultimately, their success led to the suspension of the

local approval process in 1981 Along with the

421 suspension came the announcement that two new test-drilling sites had been selected and that local approval would not be sought

Nuclear waste disposal has also become politicized among the communities of Northern Ontario along the Canadian Shield In particular, dissent emphasizes the fact that Ontario Hydro, while operating nuclear power plants in the densely populated South, looks largely to the North, and potentially to Manitoba for potential nuclear waste repository sites (EDWARDS, 1986)

Sweden

Sweden has been a leader in political decision-making

on nuclear power and radioactive waste management, The Nuclear Stipulation Act was passed by Parliament in April 1977 This Act prevented the fuel loading of new nuclear reactors unless the operator has shown how and where the spent fuel would be stored with absolute safety (ABRAHAMSON 1979) This condition had to be met whether or not the spent fuel was reprocessed The Stipulation Act was seen by opponents of nuclear power as a means of preventing new nuclear reactors from obtaining operating licenses

In March 1980, a plurality of the Swedish electorate voted, following extensive political debate and a voter turnout of nearly 75%, to limit the nuclear power program to 12 units (BARNABY, 1980) All

of these plants will be decommissioned by the year

2010 Soon after passage of the referendum, Parliament implemented the policies In the interim, the Stipulation Act was invoked by the utilities to justify completion and licensing of six nuclear reactors that were built between April 1977 and June

1984

The Stipulation Act was formally abolished on

12 December 1985, and critics have charged that the law was circumvented in reactor licensings (BJORKLUND, 1983, 1984) A new nuclear energy law took effect on 1 February 1984 and relaxed the central government’s technological requirements for waste disposal Instead, the new law simply requires ongoing research by the utilities on an acceptable method for radioactive waste disposal

With debate over new nuclear power reactors out of the way, the Swedish government has shifted its focus

to nuclear waste management The main responsibility in this area has been given to the

Svensk Karnbranslehantering AB, also known as the

Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management

Company or SKB The SKB is a wh~)lly-o~?ne~~

subsidiary of the private and public electric utilities It

must applv to several state and local agencies fol

permits before the central government grants final

approval for a waste disposal or storage site The

utilities hve iIlstituted several safety studies since

1977 in accordance with the requirements of the

Stipulation Act The first such report, KRS-I was

issued in December 1977 and was based on the

assumption that Sweden would fullypursuc spent fuel

rqrocessing (KAl~NE-BRANSI~E-SAK~RH~~-

197X: JOHANSSON and STEEN 1X1) Thcsecond

report, issued in 197X considered the disposal of

unreprocessed spent fuel However, KRS-2 was

never accepted by the government, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAand it was replaced by KBS-3 in 19X3 The latter was used by the

government to justify licensing the final two nuclear

reactors

Since the Swedish government decided against

further reprocessing of spent fuel in 19X5 the SKB

knows approximately how much radioactive waste

must ultimately be disposed (Table I) The SKB

plans to store this waste for at last 6 months at the

l3ower plants and then ship it to xl aw;ty-from-reuctt)r

storage site at Sinipev~lrl3 near the Osk~lrsh~~r~~n

power station on the Baltic coast Also called CLAB

this intcrmedlate storage facility, which opened on 1 1

.IuIy lOS5 is designed to store spent zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAfue l for 10 years Afterwards the spent fuel will hc encapsulated in

cctrmxion-resistant copper and disposed nt 500 m

underground in a geologic respository (SKB, 1985:

ANONYMOUS 19X5:1)

The SKB has been investigating IO sites for 2% HLW

repository to be known as the SFL Half of the

potentiar sites are in the Nclrth and half arc in the

South closer to the nuclear plants (BLOWERS

IYXAa) While core hole drillings at some of the sitcs

began in 1977, ;I preferred site will not be chnscn until

the end of the century It is then envisaged that the

encapsulated spent fuel will bc emplaced in the

crystalline rock, starting in 2020 (SKB 1985)

The SKB is also building B repository for Sweden’s

LLW and ILW reactor wastes, which do not emit

heat Most of this waste consists of filters and ion

exchange resins that have been used for cleansing

water systems in the power plants This repository,

called SFR, has been under construction since I983

near the Forsmark nuclear power station Its first

phase is scheduled to be operational in lY88 The SFR

is unique in that it is situated (30 m keneath the Baltic seabed and connected to the mainland by two IOt)O-m tunnels The rock caverns and concrete silos in the SFR will be able to house YO,OOO m’of reactor wastes

by the year 2000 (SKB 1985) Radioactive waste in the SFR may decline to harmless levels after 1000 years in contrast to the much longer-lived radioactive isotopes to he buried in the SFL The SFR site ensures a slow hydraulic gradient since it is below sea level, and the groundwater around the repository site will be nearly stagnant (PETTERSON and HEDMAN, 1 S-5) Yet the major strategic advantage

to the SKB from the facility may be that its offshore location prevents a lo c a l government land use veto

Although the SKI3 is clearly the key decision-maker

on radioactive waste managcmcnt, its chair is

~~pl3oillted by the central g(3v~rnnient and thus it rcRects the current government’s policies Its management and staff arc comprised of scientific and cngincering experts in the field of nuclear power

Swden WCS ;I limited public hcaring l3roccss and

gov~rnnl~nt decisions cannot bc ~t~~lleI~g~~l in the courts Tht SKB uses technological and locational criteria in its siting decisions with safety being one of

several factors considered In addition, the SKB circulatts its plans to government agcncics experts and other interested parties for rcvicw and comtncntb The prime nhstaclc to siting decisions ih the municipal council which has the right to veto any

niiljor land use project Pnrliament could though, if it was deemed to 13~‘ ncccssary enact a spccinl law to preempt this loc;tl lantl use veto pow\:“-

I?nvironmentaI and anti-nuclear group5 in Swccfen have focused their opposition on the KHS studies

although they hnve also held llllIllcI-olIs

ctemonstratitrnx at nuclear powcl- plants :tncl proposed waste disposal sitcs (I~~(~l~KI.I!ND 108.3 10X(>)

France has developed a11 aggressive policy of nuclear plant ~on~tructi~~n and reliance on nuclear power It has the second largest installed nuclear power capacity in the world after the ‘tJ.S., and it is ;I leader

in the development and export of nuclear energy technology and services Government estimates show that 70% of France’s electricity l)r(3~lu~tiol~

comes from nuclear sources - the highest such percentage in the world (U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 1987)

The French program for radioactive waste management involves spent-fuel reprocessing at La

Geoforum/Volume 18 Number 4/1987

Hague and Marcoule, and short-run internal storage

of HLW in engineered surface facilities followed by

eventual disposal in suitable geological formations

Currently, a surface facility for LLW and ILW is in

operation at La Manche, near the La Hague

reprocessing plant in northwestern France This

facility’s capacity of 400,000 m3 of waste is expected

to be reached by 1990 Consequently, the French

CEA is actively searching for two additional LLW/

ILW sites A site at Soulaines (east of Paris) has

already been selected, while the second site will be

either Indre or Vienne in southern France

(BARTHOUX and FAUSSAT, 1986) These

facilities are scheduled to begin operating by 1990

Meanwhile, the CEA is planning a site for a deep

geological laboratory to open by 1992 as a test and

evaluation facility If in situ research there proves

favorable, the site would be eventually converted

to an LLW/ILW repository and a monitored

retrievable storage facility for the vitrified HLW from

the reprocessing plants (PAIGE and NUMARK,

1985)

French democracy is highly centralized and has been

so since the days of Napoleon This centralization is

applicable to decisions concerning the location of

nuclear waste disposal sites: the central government

maintains the right to make unilateral siting decisions

regardless of local community attitudes The

conservative government of Giscard d’Estaing

invoked this authority on several occasions, including

the establishment of the La Hague site However, the

socialist government of Mitterrand, elected in 1981,

has relaxed this policy with the intent of increasing

the voice of locally elected officials in siting decisions

In France, two agencies are involved in siting:

research and development concerning the closing of

the fuel cycle is handled by the Compagnie G&&ale

des Mat&es Nucleaires (COGEMA), while long-

term waste management is undertaken by the Agence

Nationale pour la Gestion des Dechets Radioactifs

(ANDRA) Most of the components of the nuclear

fuel cycle in France are owned by the state

COGEMA is currently active in vitrification of HLW,

and its operations currently include the development

of two vitrification facilities at La Hague

(DAMET-IE et uf., 1985)

The functions of ANDRA include the location,

construction and management of long-term waste

disposal sites Applications for facilities throughout

the nuclear fuel cycle, including nuclear waste

management facilities, must be submitted through

ANDRA to the Ministry of Industry, an executive

423 branch of the French Government During the early 1980s ANDRA completed a national inventory of potential sites for the deep geological laboratory, examining both sedimentary and hard rocks The most important criteria considered in the national inventory were technological, including long-term stability, low permeability, and nuclide retention (BARTHOUX, 198.5) Approximately 30 sites were included on this inventory, and ANDRA intends to select a single site by late 1987

Although the central government retains ultimate jurisdiction over siting, the French legal procedure requires the solicitation of input from local officials The selection of new disposal or reactor sites requires formal application to the central government, which details potential technological and locational impacts The Minister of Industry gives the completed application to the Prtfet of the Department, or local government unit, in which the proposed facility is to be located It should be noted, however, that the Prefet is a central government appointee rather than a locally elected official The Prefet then appoints a Commission of Inquiry (Commissaire enqueteur), which is responsible for public notification of the proposed project The public is permitted to examine the application and record observations and questions on an official register The Prefet then reviews this register and submits it, along with his/her recommendation, to the Ministry of Industry

While the proposed project is undergoing public scrutiny as indicated above, the Minister of Industry must also solicit approval of the proposed project on technical and public safety grounds The CEA must undertake an analysis of its technological impacts while the Ministry of Public Health examines potential safety hazards The project cannot be constructed without approval of the Ministry of Public Health Once this approval has been secured, the Minister of Industry and the Prime Minister sign a decree authorizing the installation and defining any special requirements with which the operator must comply in order to operate the facility

The court system in France, while it has heard cases involving local objections to nuclear power projects, has tended to rule in favor of the ‘public’ or government interest, which is generally on the side of nuclear plant construction (DEESE, 1982) This is consistent with the fact that French law, based on the Napoleonic Code and Roman law in contrast to the Anglo-American legal tradition, places the public

324

interest above private interests Thus, challenges to

France’s pro-nuclear siting policy on procedural

grounds have generally gone unheeded in French

courts In France, unlike many other European

countries, both major politica parties favor increased

reliance on nuclear power

West Germany

West Germany has embraced nuclear power as a

source of energy in varying degrees since the 1960s

During that decade and in the early 197&, West

Germany was a strong advocate of nuclear power and

a leader in the construction and export of nuclear

technology However, the socialist-oriented

governments of Willy Brandt and ~IelrnLit Schmidt

during the late 1970s were somewhat less supportive

of nuclear power especially in light of the formation

of the small but influential anti-nuclear Green Party

(CARTER, 1987) Recently, the mare conservative

government headed by Helmut Kohl has again

increased its support for nuclear power, although

support is again wavering in light of the Chernobyl

disaster in early 1986

In contrast to France West Germany is a more

locally-oriented, decentralized system of govern-

ment Review of nuclear waste siting proposals

occurs at national state and local levels,

and care is taken to manage and avoid locational

conflict at each level Recently the government of

West Germany made a decision to use dry-storage

casks for highly radioactive wastes as opposed to wet

pools The fact that dry-storage casks are mobile and

easily transported is thought to reduce public

opposition to the construction of a nuclear waste

disposal facility

Currently two repositories are being zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAb uilt in West

Germany The first is a LLW facility proposed at the

site of the inactive Konrad iron ore mine near

Salzgitter The second is a unique repository to be

built for all levels of radioactive waste at Gorleben,

where a deep salt dome wo uld be used for disposal

(MALTING et al 1985) The Konrad repository

could be ready by 1989, while completion of the

Gorleben repository is scheduled for 1998 The

Gorleben site was originally planned as a complete

spent fuel recycling and waste management center,

including interim spent fuel storage, reprocessing,

uranium and plutonium conversion and storage, and

disposal of solidified waste Political considerations,

however, induced the government of Lower Saxony

(where Gorleben is located) to advocate that

~coforum/Volume 18 Num he r 411 O H7 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

reprocessing be undertaken at smaller plants elsewhere

Recently, the community of Schwansdorf/

Wackersdorf in Bavaria has emerged as a potential site for a reprocessing piant As in several communities in the American West, local opposition

to siting has been overshadowed by several considerations inducing large numbers of local residents to support siting Several reasons, including the enthusiastic support of the state’s Premier, high unemployment, the potential of obtaining low-cost power from nuclear sources and general acceptance

of safety considerations as prepared by the German Company for the Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuels (DWK) have been advanced to explain local support for a reprocessing plant siting in this area (PAIGE and NUMARK 1985),

The Gorleben site which is expected to rcccivc 33,000 drums of LL.W and ILW and 2300 canisters of HLW annually, was one of 26 usable salt domes which had been considered on the basis of geological criteria for preliminary study as potential sites

Political opposition to siting at Gorlehen, once widespread has diminished in recent years in the light of potential economic benefits and the government’s excellent nuclear safety record (PAIGE and NUMARK, 1985) N~~nethcless, other sites such as Ahaus and the Asse salt mine (a formci LLW/ILW storage site) have been considered as backups to Gorleben Gorleben Ahaus and Wackersdorf are planned to be used as away-from- reactor storage sit6 for spent fuel awaiting reprocessing

Authority forwaste management in West Germany is split between the utilities as represented hy the DWK, which is responsible for all waste management activities up to the point of final disposal, and the federal government which is responsible for final disposal The nuclear fuel cycle in West Germany is primarily in private ownership, with some components including fuel fabrication and utility management and reprocessing in joint state and private ownership The Physikalisch-Technischc Bundcsanstalt, a national scientific and engineering laboratory under the auspices of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, has the responsibility for permanent repository siting decisions Its authority includes research and development experimental investig~~ti~~n and licensing waste repository sites proposed by the DWK (REUSE, 1982)