Osprey campaign 054 shiloh 1862 the death of innocence

Two Shiloh veterans are present: Logan, seated to Sherman's right, who rose from regimental command at Shiloh to command briefly the Army of the Ten- nessee before returning to corps com

SHILOH 1862

THE DEATH OF INNOCENCE

Elms Court, Chapel Way, Botley, Oxford 0X2 9LP United Kingdom A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s

© Copyright 1998 Osprey Publishing Ltd

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be addressed to the Publishers

ISBN 1 85532 606 X

Editor: lain MacGregor

Design: The Black Spot

Colour bird's eye view illustrations by Peter Harper

Cartography by Micromap

Wargaming Shiloh 1862 by Jim Webster

Battlescene artwork by Alan and Michael Perry

Filmset in Singapore by Pica Ltd

Printed through World Print Ltd., Hong Kong

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I wish to thank the helpful people at Andre Studio/Rockbridge Camera S h o p ; Robert C A r n o l d for his photographic w o r k at the Tennessee State Library a n d Archives; the co-operative staff at the Library of Congress and National Archives; Shiloh National Military Park; Washington & Lee University; and my editor nonpareil, Roberta Wiener

P u b l i s h e r ' s n o t e

Readers may wish to study this title in conjunction with the following Osprey publications:

MAA 37 Army of Northern Virginia

M A A 38 Army of the Potomac MAA 170 American Civil War Armies (1) Confederate MAA 177 American Civil War Armies (2) Union MAA 179 American Civil War Armies (3) Specialist Troops MAA 190 American Civil War Armies (4) State Troops MAA 207 American Civil War Armies (5) Volunteer Militias MAA 252 Flags of the American Civil War (1) Confederate MAA 258 Flags of the American Civil War (2) Union MAA 265 Flags of the American Civil War (3) State and Volunteer WAR 6 Confederate Infantryman 1861-65

WAR 13 Union Cavalryman 1861-65 Elite 62 American Civil War Zouaves

C A M 10 First Bull Run 1861

3 Quorn Close, Attenborough Close, Nottingham NG9 6 B U

The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter

d o w n m u s k e t a p p r o p r i a t e t o h i s s i z e b e c a u s e ' I d i d n o t like

t o s t a n d a n d b e s h o t a t w i t h o u t s h o o t i n g b a c k ' W h e n a n

e n e m y o f f i c e r r o d e u p a n d d e m a n d e d ' S u r r e n d e r y o u

d a m n e d little Y a n k e e ! ' a t C h i c k a m a u g a , C l e m s h o t h i m from his s a d d l e H e r e m a i n e d i n t h e a r m y a f t e r t h e w a r eventually

C O N T E N T S

ORIGINS OF THE

CAMPAIGN

T he United States' strategic plan to subjugate the Confederate

States of America regarded the Mississippi River as a corridor of

invasion which could split the Confederacy Key to the Mississippi

was the border state of Kentucky When war began, Kentucky maintained

an uneasy neutrality as forces massed just over its northern and southern

borders Many believed that whichever side entered Kentucky first would

throw the state into the hands of its rival

Unperturbed by this, in the autumn of 1861 Confederate

com-mander Major-General Leonidas Polk marched his men into Kentucky,

believing that his move would pre-empt a Yankee offensive by

Brigadier-General U.S Grant Polk's impetuosity proved a mistake simply because

the Yankees had more resources to bring to bear than did Polk Grant

countered Polk by rapidly occupying Paducah, in southwest Kentucky

Soon afterwards other Federal forces marched over the Ohio River into

the Bluegrass State Suddenly unshielded, the Confederacy lay

vul-nerable from the Mississippi River east to the mountains

Confederate President Jefferson Davis dispatched the man he considered

the nation's ablest officer, General Albert Sidney Johnston, to the threatened

sector Johnston boldly advanced his small army to Bowling Green, Kentucky,

and by so doing frightened his opponents into inactivity Johnston stretched

his forces to the breaking point as he tried to form a defensive arc covering

the crucial Tennessee border It was all a colossal bluff that gave false

assurances to Confederate leaders, a bluff that Johnston knew would collapse

when the Yankees found an aggressive fighting general

The 1st Arkansas marched to battle at Shiloh cheering Sidney Johnston Johnston responded, 'Shoot low boys; it takes two to carry one off the field.' He told its colonel, 'I hope you may get through safely today, but we must win a victory.' (National Archives)

Confederate artillery sited on the Cumberland River stopped the Union gunboats at Fort

6

In the third week of January 1862, Johnston sent his superiors in Richmond an urgent dispatch: 'AH the resources of the Confederacy are now needed for the defence of Tennessee.' It was too late Two weeks later, just as Johnston feared, the North found the determined officer who was willing to take risks Grant advanced to capture Forts Henry and Donelson, the twin pillars that guarded western Tennessee, and thereby opened the way to the Confederate heartland

Across a 150-mile front stretching from the middle of Tennessee to the Mississippi River, three Federal armies lay poised to invade To the west, Major-General John Pope's 25,000-man force prepared to advance against a series of forts and batteries that blocked Federal naval movement down the Mississippi River To the east, Major-General Don Carlos Buell massed a 50,000-man force at Nashville In the centre,

CONVERGENCE ON SHILOH, MARCH 1 8 6 2

By stripping-in secondary theatres, the Confederacy assembles an army at Corinth under the command of A.S Johnston The plan is to defeat Grant before his army unites with Buell

7

advancing against its landward side The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson unhinged Sidney Johnston's defensive barrier and opened the way for the advance upriver to Pittsburg Landing (Author's collection)

Grant's m e n moved up the Tennessee River towards t h e i m p o r t a n t rail

h u b at Corinth, Mississippi If these t h r e e armies co-operated, the

out-n u m b e r e d rebels would be h a r d pressed to o p p o s e t h e m

At this time of crisis C o n f e d e r a t e Maj.Gen Braxton Bragg was serving

in a backwater c o m m a n d comprising Alabama a n d west Florida F r o m

that vantage p o i n t he offered a persuasive strategic analysis Bragg

believed that the C o n f e d e r a t e forces were too scattered He r e c o m

-m e n d e d that secondary points be a b a n d o n e d , that troops be ruthlessly

stripped from garrison duty in o r d e r to c o n c e n t r a t e at the p o i n t of

decision, the p o r t i o n of Tennessee o c c u p i e d by G r a n t ' s army Bragg was

certain that 'We have t h e right m e n , a n d t h e crisis u p o n us d e m a n d s they

should be in the right places' G e n e r a l P.G.T B e a u r e g a r d also believed

in the virtues of c o n c e n t r a t i o n a n d a g r e e d with Bragg It would r e q u i r e

a complex massing of m e n from five different i n d e p e n d e n t c o m m a n d s

By rail, steamboat, a n d foot, soldiers would move from places as far

distant as Mobile a n d New O r l e a n s to j o i n Sidney J o h n s t o n at C o r i n t h

T h e p l a n n e d counteroffensive was a high stakes gamble, b u t Jefferson

Davis approved T h e C o n f e d e r a t e p r e s i d e n t u n d e r s t o o d that success

hinged u p o n two factors: surprise; a n d striking before G r a n t received

reinforcements from Buell

U n b e k n o w n to t h e rebel high c o m m a n d , several factors were

working in favour of t h e counter-offensive On 4 March 1862, U n i o n

Major-General Halleck relieved G r a n t of c o m m a n d because of alleged

neglect a n d inefficiency G r a n t ' s senior divisional c o m m a n d e r , General

C.F Smith, replaced h i m a n d b e g a n a m a r c h south from Fort D o n e l s o n

in the direction of C o r i n t h As Smith advanced a l o n g t h e Tennessee

River, he called u p o n a newly raised division u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of

William T S h e r m a n to raid d o w n s t r e a m to cut t h e M e m p h i s a n d

Charleston Railroad W h e n this e x p e d i t i o n b e c a m e b o g g e d down in

tor-rential rains, S h e r m a n s o u g h t a t e m p o r a r y base He d i s e m b a r k e d his

m e n at the first place above water L o c a t e d on t h e western b a n k of the

Tennessee River, its n a m e was Pittsburg L a n d i n g Inland, a b o u t four

8

miles to t h e south, was Shiloh C h u r c h T h e soaking Federal soldiers did

n o t know that t h e g r o u n d from the l a n d i n g to this c h u r c h would b e c o m e

t h e scene of terrible battle

Meanwhile, when President A b r a h a m Lincoln h e a r d that Halleck

h a d relieved Grant, he was n o t happy Lincoln was n o t a b o u t to lose his best ( a n d at this p o i n t in t h e war apparently his only) fighting general Down t h e chain of c o m m a n d c a m e word that Halleck would have to provide detailed, specific information a b o u t t h e basis for his decision to relieve Grant A l t h o u g h at times Halleck possessed a keen strategic

m i n d , he was most comfortable when e n g a g i n g in a hectoring, p a p e r war against his subordinates Like most bullies, w h e n c o n f r o n t e d with rival force he b a c k e d down So it was w h e n he received t h e War D e p a r t m e n t ' s

r e q u e s t r e g a r d i n g Grant Correctly judging t h e political winds, he wrote

to Grant, 'Instead of relieving you, I wish you as soon as your new army

is in t h e field to assume t h e i m m e d i a t e c o m m a n d a n d lead it on to new victories.'

With characteristic energy, G r a n t b e g a n forwarding troops to the camps a r o u n d Pittsburg L a n d i n g If the r e c e n t battle at Fort Donelson

h a d proved anything, it was that his soldiers badly n e e d e d instruction

a n d discipline T h e clearings a n d fields i n l a n d from Pittsburg L a n d i n g

s e e m e d to offer fine g r o u n d for a large c a m p of instruction As m o r e a n d

m o r e soldiers arrived, their officers distributed t h e m without regard to tactical considerations Instead, t h e various divisions o c c u p i e d sites based u p o n proximity to water, firewood, a n d o p e n g r o u n d for drill No-

o n e seriously anticipated t h e possibility of fighting a battle h e r e Two days before the rebel onslaught, S h e r m a n i n f o r m e d G r a n t t h a t ' I d o n o t

a p p r e h e n d anything like an attack on o u r position.'

In R i c h m o n d , the first week of April 1862 was o n e of n e a r u n b e a r a b l e suspense for the Confederate commander-in-chief Davis w a n t e d to travel west to participate in the p e n d i n g battle, b u t was forced to r e m a i n in

R i c h m o n d because a massive U n i o n army c o m m a n d e d by the woefully

m i s n a m e d 'Young N a p o l e o n ' , Maj.Gen George B McClellan, was slowly advancing u p o n the Confederate capital Still, Davis e x p e c t e d n o t h i n g b u t

g o o d news from Tennessee, telling friends that after Sidney J o h n s t o n ' s victory the future would brighten To J o h n s t o n himself he sent an eve of battle telegram saying, 'I anticipate victory.'

So spring c a m e to western Tennessee, with Grant's unsuspecting

U n i o n army a b o u t to face a major assault from a C o n f e d e r a t e force perately in n e e d of success

des-CHRONOLOGY

1 8 6 0

November - A b r a h a m Lincoln elected President

December - South Carolina votes to secede from t h e U n i o n

1861

9 February - J e f f e r s o n Davis elected P r e s i d e n t of t h e Confederate

States of America

12 April - P.G.T B e a u r e g a r d supervises b o m b i n g of Fort Sumter

30 August - A S J o h n s t o n n a m e d top-ranking C o n f e d e r a t e field 9

g e n e r a l ; B e a u r e g a r d also on list of t o p five

September - A S J o h n s t o n arrives west to assume c o m m a n d of all

Con-federate forces from Arkansas to C u m b e r l a n d G a p

7 November - U.S G r a n t c o n d u c t s t h e battle of Belmont

15 March - S h e r m a n ' s Division arrives at Pittsburg L a n d i n g

16 March - Buell begins m a r c h to join Grant

29 March - A S J o h n s t o n assumes c o m m a n d of Army of t h e Mississippi

in C o r i n t h

3 April - Army of the Mississippi begins a p p r o a c h m a r c h from C o r i n t h

4 April - 5th O h i o Cavalry e n c o u n t e r s H a r d e e ' s Corps

5 April - Balance of C o n f e d e r a t e army straggles into position before

1000 Hrs - G r a n t a n d S h e r m a n consult; M c C l e r n a n d ' s line

over-w h e l m e d ; assaults against H o r n e t s ' Nest begin

1100 Hrs - J o h n s t o n to t h e r i g h t flank; Bragg assumes tactical control

of assaults against H o r n e t s ' Nest

1400 Hrs - C o n f e d e r a t e r i g h t wing outflanks H o r n e t s ' Nest

1430 Hrs - J o r d a n c o m m i t s last reserves; J o h n s t o n dies; Bowen, Jackson

a n d C h a l m e r s envelope H o r n e t s ' Nest

1500 Hrs - Ruggles begins to assemble g r a n d battery; U n i o n right

retires to final defensive line

0600 Hrs - Buell halts Nelson

0800 Hrs - Federal assault at standstill; C o n f e d e r a t e line stabilised

0900 Hrs - C o m b i n e d Federal armies advance

1000 Hrs - H a r d e e counterattacks Buell

1300 Hrs - H a r d fighting in front of Shiloh C h u r c h

1400 Hrs - Confederate line dissolves

1430 Hrs - B e a u r e g a r d o r d e r s retreat

1 0

1600 Hrs - Confederate r e a r g u a r d retires

7 April - P o p e captures Island N o 10 on Mississippi

8 April - Forrest repulses p u r s u i n g Federals

25 April - In t h e absence of t h e m e n sent to Shiloh, New O r l e a n s falls

30 April - Halleck begins slow advance on C o r i n t h ; G r a n t kicked

upstairs as second-in-command

29 May - B e a u r e g a r d evacuates C o r i n t h

10 June - Having massed 120,000 m e n at C o r i n t h , Halleck unwisely

dis-perses t h e m , thereby missing a great opportunity

June - Halleck s u m m o n e d to Washington to b e c o m e Colonel-in-chief;

G r a n t reinstated

27 June - After B e a u r e g a r d goes on u n a u t h o r i s e d sick leave, Bragg

assumes c o m m a n d of Army of Tennessee

25 November - G r a n t wins battle of C h a t t a n o o g a

28 November - Bragg asks to be relieved of c o m m a n d

1 8 6 4

30 November - Battle of Franklin w h e r e t h e Army of Tennessee is

slaughtered

15-16 December - Battle of Nashville routs Army of Tennessee

Five different Confederate

commands contributed

manpower in order to achieve

the concentration of force

necessary to challenge Grant's

army The camp of the 3rd

Kentucky in Corinth before the

battle The typical lack of

uniforms made many rebel

regi-ments look like a mob of armed

OPPOSING

C O M M A N D E R S

THE CONFEDERATE GENERALS

J o h n s t o n ' s quick-thinking reaction

to a d a n g e r o u s confrontation h a d

probably saved the lives of b o t h himself

a n d Jefferson Davis Thereafter, Davis's

a d m i r a t i o n knew n o b o u n d s T h e

outbreak of the Civil War found J o h n s t o n

posted in California Davis a p p o i n t e d his

friend to o n e of the top five ranking

positions in t h e C o n f e d e r a t e army,

reserved an important c o m m a n d for him,

a n d anxiously awaited his return back east

Like all Civil War generals, J o h n s t o n ' s

e x p e r i e n c e did n o t include c o m m a n d i n g

large n u m b e r s of m e n in battle He was a

big m a n who l o o k e d like a soldier a n d

h a d a c o m m a n d i n g , m a g n e t i c p e r

-sonality However, w h e n J o h n s t o n ' s defence of Tennessee collapsed in

the late winter of 1862, t h e Tennessee congressional delegation asked

the p r e s i d e n t to remove J o h n s t o n from c o m m a n d , saying he was ' n o

g e n e r a l ' Davis replied t h a t if J o h n s t o n was n o t a general, 'we h a d better

give up t h e war, for we have no g e n e r a l ' T h e field at Shiloh would test

this belief

J o h n s t o n ' s deputy, Gen B e a u r e g a r d , did have the e x p e r i e n c e of high

c o m m a n d u n d e r his belt B e a u r e g a r d h a d led t h e C o n f e d e r a t e army at

the war's first great battle along the banks of Bull Run a n d h a d received

m u c h credit after the victory But the lofty Creole h a d quickly fallen foul

of t h e equally p r o u d Confederate president B e a u r e g a r d specialised in

ambitious strategic constructs W h e n o t h e r s dissented, he could b e c o m e

difficult a n d this is what o c c u r r e d after t h e first Battle of Bull R u n T h e

clash of strong-willed personalities h a d p r o m p t e d Davis to rid himself of

this t r o u b l e s o m e s u b o r d i n a t e by s e n d i n g h i m west B e a u r e g a r d a p p r e

-ciated that his victory at Bull Run h a d b e e n greatly aided by Maj.Gen

J o s e p h J o h n s t o n , who h a d r e m a i n e d i n t h e rear w h e r e h e h a d controlled

the dispatch of reserves In Tennessee, B e a u r e g a r d resolved to e m u l a t e

J o e J o h n s t o n ' s service

F o u r rebel generals assumed corps c o m m a n d within t h e Confederate

striking force Major-General Leonidas Polk, who led t h e First Corps,

h a d g r a d u a t e d from West Point in 1827, went on furlough, a n d d e c i d e d

to discard his military u n i f o r m for t h a t of an Episcopal minister Since

General P.G.T Beauregard served as Johnston's second-in- command During the battle's first day he remained in the rear

in order to facilitate the flow of reserves to the front It proved a mistake since he was kept badly out of touch with front-line developments On both days, his tactical instructions were to head for the sounds of the heaviest firing and engage (National Archives)

First Corps Commander Maj.Gen Leonidas Polk 'Bishop' Polk owed his rank to his friendship with Jefferson Davis Although a West Point graduate, he lacked both military knowledge and tactical acumen (Tennessee State Library and Archives)

1 2

Second Corps Commander

Maj.Gen Braxton Bragg A Union

prisoner met Bragg two months

after the battle and found him to

have 'a face rather impatient and

irate in expression, a little

inclined to be contemptuous, and

conveys a general impression of

a man who would require a great

deal more of others than of

himself (Library of Congress)

Third Corps Commander

Maj.Gen William Hardee

Con-federate soldiers widely admired

Hardee, judging him to be a

soldier's general (National

Archives)

Reserve Corps Commander

Brig.Gen John Breckinridge

Shiloh was Breckinridge's first

combat action (Library of

Congress)

that time he h a d n e i t h e r studied war, n o r

c o m m a n d e d on a battlefield His recent

u n h a p p y e x p e r i e n c e in Kentucky was the sum total of his field experience

Major-General Braxton Bragg, whose strategic suggestion h a d c o n t r i b u t e d to the massing of t h e rebel force in western Tennessee, led t h e S e c o n d Corps A West Point g r a d u a t e , Bragg h a d fought in Mexico w h e r e he h a d p e r f o r m e d well But this war would show that his tactical

n o t i o n s were l i m i t e d t o t h e d i r e c t

a p p r o a c h : t h e e n e m y is t h e r e , we will attack h i m frontally with the bayonet Bragg also served as t h e army's chief of staff It was a dual responsibility that would have o v e r b u r d e n e d a n y o n e a n d

c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e sloppy staff work that characterised t h e army's

a p p r o a c h m a r c h to battle

Major-General William H a r d e e c o m m a n d e d t h e T h i r d C o r p s Officers n o r t h a n d south believed the West Point-educated H a r d e e to be

a fine general In fact, H a r d e e ' s r e p u t a t i o n resided in his a u t h o r s h i p of

a pre-war tactical m a n u a l which was little m o r e than a translation of a

F r e n c h drill book, a n d in his service as tactics t e a c h e r at West Point He

h a d fought in t h e Seminole War, t h e Mexican War a n d h a d studied at

t h e F r e n c h cavalry school at Saumur H a r d e e w o u l d serve in corps

c o m m a n d t h r o u g h o u t t h e war a n d failed to display anything b e y o n d average talent

In contrast, the politician who led t h e army's Reserve Corps, J o h n Breckinridge, a former US vice-president, would rise to display sur-prising battlefield abilities But at Shiloh, his first e x p o s u r e to combat, Breckinridge d e f e r r e d to the Mexican War veterans a n d West Point

g r a d u a t e s who, everyone assumed, possessed s u p e r i o r talent

In short, the C o n f e d e r a t e Army of the Mississippi e n g a g e d at Shiloh u n d e r the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d of an officer who h a d never before led a sizeable force in combat; a s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d who h a d little staff

e x p e r i e n c e , yet was serving as the de facto chief of staff; a n d with a corps

structure that was less than a week old

THE FEDERAL GENERALS

Across the field, t h e rebels c o n f r o n t e d an army that was m u c h the same,

a l t h o u g h t h e r e was o n e i m p o r t a n t difference At this stage in t h e war, Ulysses S G r a n t h a d already c o n d u c t e d several c a m p a i g n s a n d fought two field battles T r u e e n o u g h , t h e battle of B e l m o n t h a d b e e n a narrowly averted disaster, a n d t h e rebel b r e a k o u t attack at Fort Donelson

h a d f o u n d G r a n t far from t h e field having failed to leave a d e q u a t e instructions for his subordinates But at t h a t battle G r a n t h a d seen his soldiers r u n from t h e e n e m y a n d h a d calmly r e s p o n d e d to crisis by rallying his m e n a n d r e t u r n i n g t h e m to t h e fray M o r e t h a n any o t h e r Civil War general, he u n d e r s t o o d t h a t even at t h e darkest m o m e n t the 1 3

enemy was subject to all of the problems

- prominently including disorganisation, shock, and anxiety about the opponent's intentions - that afflicted his own men in battle In his first important service in

1861, Grant had found himself fronting the severe self-doubt associated with independent command It had been a pivotal, formative experience that taught him that the enemy 'had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his' He had been tested, and displayed the moral courage necessary for high command

con-A corps structure was late to catch on among the western Federal armies Con- sequently, Grant's Army of the Tennessee featured six divisions, but no corps Like their opponents, the command

structure included political appointees such as John McClernand, an

Illinois lawyer friend of Abraham Lincoln, as well as West Point graduates

and Mexican War veterans who had never commanded any sizeable body

of men Surprisingly, five of the six men commanding divisions in

Grant's army had not attended West Point The exception was William T

Sherman, who had led a brigade at Bull Run and then transferred west

While serving in Kentucky, he had worried excessively that his command

was about to be attacked by overwhelming force, and his anxieties led to

a nervous breakdown He lost the administration's confidence, with

some saying that this man was so inept that he was certifiably insane

Reinstated, Sherman now commanded the raw Fifth Division Whether

he was worthy of divisional command was an untested proposition

Moreover, although four of the six Federal divisions included many units

who had fought during the Fort Donelson campaign, the two most

inex-perienced divisions occupied the forward position closest to the

Confederate base at Corinth

Unlike Sidney Johnston, at Shiloh, Maj.Gen Ulysses Grant already had campaign and battle experience Still, he was extremely fortunate to win the battle of Shiloh Never again did

he repeat the mistakes he made

on this field (National Archives)

Sherman (seated centre left) and his principal subordinates during his Georgia campaign Two Shiloh veterans are present: Logan, seated to Sherman's right, who rose from regimental command at Shiloh to command briefly the Army of the Ten- nessee before returning to corps command; and Hazen, standing

on Sherman's right, who reached divisional command At Shiloh, Sherman had three horses shot out from under him, a nearby aide killed, a buckshot wound to the hand, and a spent ball strike his shoulder (Library of Congress)

1 4

OPPOSING A R M I E S

A western Federal division in

battle formation: from front to

back, individual skirmishers, a

squad (lying down) as picket

supports, a company (lying down)

as picket reserve, three battle

lines with artillery support on the

flanks, and a reserve brigade in

right rear Maintaining command

and control of a linear formation

in Shiloh's tangled terrain proved

impossible (Author's collection)

T he volunteer regiments that made up most of the Federal fighting

force had no battalion structure Instead they featured ten panies (a legacy of the nation's British military heritage), with overall command exercised by a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, and a major A captain commanded each company, supported by a first and a second lieutenant, one first sergeant, four sergeants, and eight cor- porals This assembly led 82 privates An average volunteer regiment went to the front with about 1,000 men Attrition quickly reduced strengths to 200 to 300 men The volunteer regiment's ten companies were lettered according to their captains' seniority Again in keeping with British tradition, two companies - A and B - served as semi-elite flank companies Company A had pride of place on the right, since this was the position that would meet danger first when the regiment marched by the right flank Company B stood on the left flank Often, particularly early in the war, the flank companies received superior weapons and performed hazardous duties

com-The typical regiment comprised companies raised from the same community and regiments recruited from the same region Thus friendship, kinship, and shared backgrounds and values knitted a unit together The soldiers elected their officers, which could cause problems because the best stump speaker or most liberal dispenser of pre-election whisky might not prove the most able tactical leader Still, this demo- cratic system did mean that the men knew their officers and were more likely to respect their orders than if a total stranger had been imposed upon them Because the battle of Shiloh quickly degenerated into a

1 5

teristic slouch hats (National Archives)

small unit brawl, the performance of field-grade officers would be

par-ticularly important

During the war's earliest battles, the regiment was the largest tactical

entity As armies grew larger, the need for higher levels of organisation

became apparent This led to the formation of brigades and divisions

Nominally, a brigadier-general led a brigade, but at Shiloh many colonels

actually commanded the combat brigades By US War Department

order, and unlike the Confederate practice, there was no effort to create

brigades composed of regiments from the same state Most of Grant's

infantry brigades at Shiloh had four or five regiments Sherman's raw

division was still forming and consequently his under-strength brigades

had only three regiments

The US War Department decreed on 3 August 1861 that three

brigades would form a division, and each division would be led by a

major-general Few Federal soldiers felt any particular attachment to

whichever division their regiment was assigned For their officers,

however, the division structure greatly eased the problems of command

and control At the battle of Belmont, Grant had issued orders to

indi-vidual regiments In his next campaign against Fort Donelson, he was no

longer concerned with individual regiments, but instead thought in

terms of divisions From the Federal command viewpoint, the battle of

Shiloh was a divisional battle

From a practical standpoint, this meant Grant had to control the field

through the five divisional commanders who were present when the

rebel attack began The lack of a higher corps structure impaired

co-ordination One division might hold hard while the two adjacent

divisions would (and did!) retreat, exposing the tenacious division to

attack in the flank Instead, if the divisions had been bound by a

corps-level attachment, there would have been greater harmony of

manoeuvre

Regular cavalry regiments had three battalions of two squadrons

each, and two companies made up a squadron By regulation, each

company included a captain, first lieutenant, second lieutenant, first

sergeant, a company quartermaster-sergeant, four sergeants, eight

cor-1 6

The 11th Indiana, a well-trained

Zouave unit, served in Lew

Wallace's division Camp

recreation scenes at top;

middle-left, deployed as skirmishers;

middle right, rallying by fours;

bottom, formed in hollow square

The civilian spectators in lower

right admire the square, but in

reality it proved wholly

unneces-sary on the battlefield (Library of

Congress)

porals, two musicians (usually buglers), two farriers, a saddler, a wagoner, and 56 privates The fact that 12 sergeants and corporals were deemed necessary to manage 56 cavalry privates (the same number of non-com- missioned officers who controlled 82 infantry privates) indicates that authorities recognised that a mounted man required more control than his foot-slogging brethren The battalion featured 316 company officers and men, along with a major, an adjutant, quartermaster/commissary lieutenant, sergeant-major, quartermaster-sergeant, commissary sergeant, hospital steward, saddler sergeant, and a veterinary sergeant giving a total minimum strength of 325 men The regiment added a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, adjutant, quartermaster and commissary lieutenant, two chief buglers, and a 16-man band The volunteer cavalry regiments consisted of four to six squadrons, with each squadron having two companies At Shiloh the Union cavalry had yet to form into a brigade structure Instead, they served as independent battalions and regiments under the direct command of the divisional general

The battery was the basic field artillery unit Its minimum authorised

composition included a captain, first lieutenant, second lieutenant, first sergeant, company quartermaster sergeant, four sergeants, eight cor- porals, two musicians, two artificers, one wagoner, and 58 privates As was the case with the cavalry, the authorities recognised that the artillery, the most technical of the three branches of service, needed a greater proportion of non-commis- sioned officer control than did the infantry A field artillery battery had four or six artillery tubes, which were

a combination of guns and howitzers Volunteer artillery regiments had a 12- battery organisation, with each battery containing 144 officers and men The artillery's regimental structure was purely an administrative convention Although the Union batteries had informal associations with specific infantry brigades, like the cavalry they operated independently under the command of the divisional com- mander This was a flawed organisational practice Too often a harassed infantry division general overlooked his artillery, thus leaving the gunners who served Grant's 84 artillery pieces to perform as best as they could

Overall, Grant's army included a variety of units who had only recently reached Pittsburg Landing The 15th 17

Iowa actually arrived for duty on Sunday m o r n i n g after t h e fighting h a d

b e g u n On the day of battle m a n y h a d n o t t h e time to establish cohesive

links with their fellow units a n d some 2,000 m e n h a d yet to be assigned

to any particular c o m m a n d

The Confederate forces

Confederate small u n i t infantry organisation differed little from Federal

organisation, t h e only difference b e i n g that infantry c o m p a n i e s n o m

-inally n u m b e r e d 64 to 100 m e n T h e Army of t h e Mississippi h a d b e e n

hastily f o r m e d from disparate units so t h e r e was hardly a typical brigade

organisation T h e infantry brigades n u m b e r e d four to eight r e g i m e n t s

or battalions, a n d all h a d o n e or two a t t a c h e d artillery batteries Unlike

their o p p o n e n t s , t h e Confederates employed a corps structure Polk's

First a n d Bragg's S e c o n d Corps h a d two divisions each, b u t n e i t h e r

H a r d e e ' s T h i r d , n o r Breckinridge's Reserve C o r p s h a d a division

structure Like t h e Yankees, t h e rebel cavalry h a d yet to form into a

brigade structure Instead, a u t o n o m o u s c o m p a n i e s , battalions, a n d

regi-m e n t s o p e r a t e d directly u n d e r corps c o regi-m regi-m a n d

Confederate artillery c o n t a i n e d 23 batteries, one-third possessing four

guns, a n d two-thirds with six guns, while Byrne's Mississippi Battery

proudly carried a piece c a p t u r e d in Kentucky a n d thus c o m p o s e d a

seven-gun battery Eighty-five per cent of the tubes were s m o o t h b o r e 6-pdrs a n d

12-pdr howitzers, inferior weapons at a disadvantage in long-range

artillery duels Most of the g u n n e r s h a d never seen action a n d some h a d

yet to fire their pieces T h e i r ranks did include some notable formations,

such as Girardey's Washington Artillery, a well-trained six-gun battery

from Augusta, Georgia; Ketchum's a n d Gage's Alabama batteries drawn

from the cream of Mobile society; a n d the r e n o w n e d Washington Artillery

from Louisiana Like the Federal artillery, the batteries were attached to

infantry brigades T h e three line corps h a d a nominal chief of artillery,

The 9th Mississippi at sacola The diversity of dress is already evident with the men at left and middle proudly dis- playing cart-ridge belts with buckles and shoulder straps The man kneeling over the fire, and the soldier at far right are possibly brothers since both are wearing the same pattern checked trousers The obviously wealthy man second from right has a splendid civilian frock coat, waistcoat, and top hat At Shiloh the 9th Mississippi served

Pen-in Chalmers' Brigade (Library of Congress)

OPPOSITE A Confederate infantryman in regulation issue uniform Shiloh was the first combat for many regiments, and the standard of dress was higher than the campaign- stained look that characterised western armies thereafter (National Archives)

1 8

but in fact the officers assigned this duty h a d no real authority T h u s the first stages of the battle would see o n e officer wasting his time gathering

up c a p t u r e d U n i o n e q u i p m e n t , while a n o t h e r relinquished his position to direct his own battery T h e battery to brigade assignments, as well as the lack of supervising artillery c o m m a n d e r s , impaired effective use of massed firepower

N e i t h e r side was well a r m e d at this stage of t h e war H a r d e e ' s Corps

h a d 6,789 infantry, most of w h o m carried s m o o t h b o r e muskets Some 1,060 m e n h a d Enfield rifles, b u t t h e r e were only 31,000 cartridges Since p r o l o n g e d fire fights easily c o n s u m e d 40 to 60 r o u n d s p e r m a n , this m e a n t that H a r d e e ' s rifle-armed soldiers e n t e r e d battle woefully

u n d e r - s u p p l i e d with a m m u n i t i o n Shiloh would be a terrifying, stand-up battle between two civilian armies Many soldiers would be c r u s h e d by t h e strain T h e y feigned sickness before e n t e r i n g combat, s h a m m e d w o u n d s , lay down in shelter

o n c e t h e bullets b e g a n whizzing a n d refused to b u d g e , or r a n at first

c o n t a c t However, m a n y m o r e w o u l d p e r f o r m a d m i r a b l y W h a t motivated t h e m to c o n f r o n t t h e h o r r o r s of battle? P e e r pressure was most i m p o r t a n t Aligned in close o r d e r formation, a m a n could hardly

d u c k his duty without b e i n g noticed Shirking was highly visible, a n d a coward was r o u n d l y criticised by his c o m r a d e s a n d r e p o r t e d to the

p e o p l e back h o m e For many, such a fate was worse t h a n risking life a n d limb in battle T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n n o t to let down o n e ' s c o m r a d e s provided t h e glue that c e m e n t e d t h e i n e x p e r i e n c e d soldier to his duty

T h e U n i o n soldiers of 1862 h a d v o l u n t e e r e d for service o u t of a sense of patriotism a n d spirit of a d v e n t u r e T h e link between t h e com-munity a n d the r e g i m e n t was strong T h e 16th Iowa, a typical regiment,

e n t e r e d t h e f i g h t with t h e m o t t o 'Keep u p the g o o d n a m e o f Iowa'

T h e same motives influenced t h e C o n f e d e r a t e soldiers However, for t h e m it was also a m a t t e r of d e f e n d i n g their h o m e l a n d from an invader A speech by a y o u n g w o m a n , given d u r i n g a c e r e m o n y pre-senting t h e flag to a Louisiana unit, was a l t o g e t h e r typical: 'Receive t h e n , from your m o t h e r s a n d sisters these colors woven by o u r feeble b u t reliant h a n d s ; a n d w h e n this bright flag shall float before you on t h e bat-tlefield, let it n o t only inspire you with t h e brave a n d patriotic ambition

of a soldier aspiring to his own a n d his country's h o n o r a n d glory, b u t also may it be a sign t h a t c h e r i s h e d o n e s a p p e a l to you to save t h e m from

a fanatical a n d heartless foe.'

ABOVE Alabama infantry at

Pen-sacola Soldiers from the Gulf

coast defences took the train to

join the Army of the Mississippi

at Corinth (Library of Congress)

1 9

2 0

2 1

2 2

OPPOSING PLANS

APPROACH MARCH, 3-5 APRIL 1 8 6 2

Overcoming poor roads and sloppy staff work, Johnston's army manages a 23-mile approach march and deploys for battle

Because of poor camp security, the Union army is taken by surprise

2 3

G rant's army encamped at Pittsburg Landing in a triangular area

bounded by water The army's rear rested on the Tennessee

River, with the left flank on Lick Creek and the right against

Snake Creek and Owl Creek The Tennessee provided a solid barrier

passable only by boat, and the creeks were passable only at the bridges

The open, or western, side of the position faced toward Corinth In

effect, the Union army was in a cul-de-sac, and their camps were

posi-tioned for convenience without tactical thought Except for the cleared

fields, trees and underbrush covered the land, making much of it

impassable for wheeled transport, artillery, and horsemen The ground

was without significant elevations It generally sloped down from the

most forward Yankee positions back toward the Tennessee River A steep

bluff ran along the west bank of the Tennessee River, and was bisected by

an improved path that climbed up from the landing Here stood the

Army of the Tennessee, perfecting its drill, adding to its organisation,

waiting for Buell's reinforcements to arrive before resuming active

cam-paigning

Twenty-three road miles separated the Confederate encampment at

Corinth from the Union tents around Pittsburg Landing As might be

expected given the inexperience of the Army of the Mississippi, the

Con-federate approach march was a miserable, start-stop-start affair Poor,

rain-soaked roads and inadequate staff work

con-tributed to the disorder Columns fouled one

another's line of march, overloaded baggage trains

bogged down in the mud, guides became lost

Polluted water at Corinth had weakened the bowels

of many rebels (the army left a staggering 7,645 sick

back at base) Individuals started the march with

rations for five days and in typical soldier style

lightened their load by eating them in three Thus

hunger and the failure of the supply wagons to keep

up, coupled with exposure to rain and wind,

weakened them further Before attempting to sleep,

one soldier wrote in his diary, 'More heavy rain!

Hard going, had to abandon light baggage Again

marched more than 12 hrs'

In the belief that Beauregard better understood

local conditions, Johnston allowed his

second-in-command to draft battle plans Beauregard's

scheme called for the attack to commence on 4

April When that proved impossible, Johnston

delayed it by 24 hours After waiting on the edge of

the Union camps for an additional four hours past

the designated start time, and still not hearing the

sounds of battle, Sidney Johnston stormed, 'This is

perfectly puerile! This is not war!' Generals Bragg,

Polk, Beauregard and Johnston met to decide what

to do Convinced that surprise had been lost,

Beau-regard urged a retreat Displaying great soldierly

resolve, Johnston overrode him He desired battle,

and did not care about the details Referring to the

fact that the battle front would be constricted by Owl

A rakish Louisiana soldier with baggy trousers and gaiters While 12 regiments of Louisiana soldiers fought at Shiloh, New Orleans, the South's largest city, fell to a small naval landing team

18 days later (National Archives)

2 4

At 5:00 am Maj Powell led his

combat patrol into this field

where stood the 3rd Mississippi

Infantry Battalion The ensuing

fire fight began the battle of

Shiloh (Author's collection)

and Lick Creeks, Johnston confided to an aide, 'I would fight them if they were a million They can present no greater front between these two creeks than we can.'

According to Gen Beauregard's deployment scheme, the army would form three corps-sized lines stretching between Owl and Lick Creeks, with a central reserve of three brigades Hardee's Corps deployed into battle for- mation to compose the first line, with its artillery massed along the main road to the landing and its cavalry in support of the wings Since these were not enough men to cover the entire front, Gladden's Brigade from Bragg's Corps advanced to take up a position on Hardee's right Bragg's remaining five brigades deployed into battle line 500 yards behind Hardee Eight hundred yards behind Bragg stood Polk's Corps Unlike the more advanced corps, it remained in a line of brigade columns with the batteries stationed behind each of the four columns Breckinridge's three brigades also formed brigade column and brought up the rear Thus the rebel army had nine brigades deployed for immediate action, with seven more in column to support the front

The army's assistant adjutant-general would later boast how he modelled the deployment upon that used by Napoleon at Waterloo In open European terrain it might have served, but in Shiloh's tangled terrain it was badly inappropriate The army's initial position lay at the base of a funnel with a frontage of about three miles The front would double as the army advanced Thus, each of the leading three corps com- manders would have to attempt to control the action across an extensive and expanding front, where his line of sight would typically be restricted

by the woods to one or two hundred yards In the resultant command void, a Confederate staff officer, Col Thomas Jordan, would make critical tactical decisions Distributing manpower evenly across the entire front also meant that there was no concentration of force Moreover, lost amidst the linear dispersion was the essence of Johnston's plan: to turn Grant's left flank 'so as to cut off his line of retreat to the Tennessee River and throw him back on Owl Creek, where he will be obliged to sur- render' The Confederate disposition failed to provide the necessary extra strength on the army's right flank to accomplish this

Civil War generals tried to emulate Napoleon by issuing eve of battle proclamations Sidney Johnston told his army: I have put you in motion

to offer battle to the invaders of your country With the resolution and disciplined valour becoming men fighting you can but march to a decisive victory over the agrarian mercenaries sent to subjugate and despoil you The eyes and hopes of eight million people rest upon you.' 2 5

THE BATTLE

Outpost battle

N o sooner had the Union army set up camp at Pittsburg Landing,

than the rebel cavalry began probing its outpost line This produced frequent alarms, with the pickets firing against enemy targets both real and imagined Back at the tent line, officers and men alike had grown accustomed to such random firing and paid it little heed Unconcern pervaded the higher command as well During the period leading up to the battle, Sherman received several false reports of enemy presence Such reports, coupled with the pickets' frequent wild firing, convinced the general that his soldiers had 'as much idea of war

as children' Moreover, Sherman had been relieved of command the previous autumn because of his excessive fears that his post was about to

be attacked Given a second chance here at Shiloh, he was determined not to make the same mistake

On 4 April, the day Beauregard intended the Confederate attack to begin, a Federal detachment of the 5th Ohio Cavalry scouted some two miles toward Corinth to investigate the disappearance of a seven-man outpost The troopers surprised the 1st Alabama Cavalry and sent them flying Pursuing over the hill crest, the Yankees suddenly confronted a rebel battle line complete with deployed infantry and artillery Although the Ohio cavalry did not know it, the enemy belonged to Hardee's Corps and were the vanguard of the entire Army of the Mississippi

Returning to camp, a cavalry officer informed Sherman that a strong enemy force was present Sherman dismissed the report saying, 'Oh - tut; tut You militia officers get scared too easy'

The next day featured more of the same Some mounted men appeared on the fringes of a camp occupied by the 53rd Ohio, and the regiment's colonel, Jesse Appier, sent a patrol to investigate The patrol exchanged shots with 'what appeared to be a picket line of men in but- ternut clothes', and Appier reported this incident to Sherman Previous experience had given Sherman a low regard for the elderly, notably skittish colonel He testily responded, 'Col Appier Take your damned regiment to Ohio There is no enemy nearer than Corinth!'

So it was across the entire Union picket line There were enough incidents to commanders to order outposts to be strengthened and to order half-hearted reconnaissance, but little more was done Only one Federal officer seriously believed that the enemy was present Colonel Everett Peabody commanded a brigade in Prentiss's division He had seen action in Missouri where he displayed courage, short temper, and impetuosity During the day of 5 April, three of his officers gave con- vincing reports that the enemy was near When Peabody forwarded these reports to Prentiss, he, like Sherman, discounted them That night Peabody could not sleep so certain was he that an attack was imminent

2 8

Grant's men were at ease,

enjoying a Sunday morning

respite when the Confederate

attack struck (National Archives)

On his own initiative, without regard for the likely censure from his superiors, he ordered Maj James Powell to take three companies of the 25th Missouri on a 3 am reconnaissance in force

Powell was a regular army officer and efficiently gathered the unit's three best companies along with two more belonging to the 12th Michigan and set out down a wagon trail into the woods About 5 am they entered a 40- acre clearing known as Fraley Field where some 280 men belonging to the 3rd Mis- sissippi Infantry Battalion manned a picket line in front

of Hardee's Corps Unlike its foe, the Confederate outpost line showed alert antici- pation A cavalry vedette stood well in front of the battalion Behind the cavalry and 200 yards in front of the battalion was a seven-man infantry outpost Another eight- man outpost stood 100 yards further back, while pickets, deployed at 12-pace intervals, guarded both flanks When the rebel cavalry spied Powell's men, they fired three warning shots, received a volley in return, and retired At 90 yards range, the most advanced Confederate infantry outpost fired and fell back Powell's men entered the field where the second outpost fired and also retired Mid-way through Fraley Field the Federals spied a kneeling line of Mississippi soldiers apparently awaiting their approach At 200 yards distance, impossibly long range for their smoothbores, Powell's men nervously fired another volley The Missis- sippians returned the fire and one bullet struck a Missouri officer He was the first casualty in what would become one of the bloodiest battles

in American military history

Soon thereafter, a trickle of wounded men began appearing in Peabody's camp Peabody sent a reinforcing party of five companies belonging to the 21st Missouri to Powell's relief Across the lines, from the time of first contact to the forward movement of the entire Con- federate army, nearly 90 minutes passed In large measure this delay was due to the rebels' inexperience Even under ideal circumstances it took time for orders to filter down the chain of command, and the tangled thickets where the Army of the Mississippi had to deploy were far from ideal The fact that the attack order had failed to specify a start time, instead merely urging an assault 'at the earliest time practicable', did not help At 6:40 am, Albert Sidney Johnston mounted his charger, Fire-eater, turned to his staff, and exclaimed, 'Tonight we will water our horses in the Tennessee River.' Then he spurred Fire-eater to the front

2 9

Moving a battery limber and

caisson (note their size) through

the woods was often extremely

difficult, particularly when under

fire and trying to manage excited

horses (National Archives)

o r d e r e d t h e c o m b i n e d force forward T h e y e n c o u n t e r e d Shaver's Brigade at an old cotton field known as Seay's Rebel fire drove t h e m back, with o n e r o u n d badly w o u n d i n g M o o r e As the Yankees recoiled from t h e collision, M o o r e ' s s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d sent word to S h e r m a n ' s picket line t h a t t h e e n e m y was p r e s e n t in force

While Shaver's Brigade hesitantly worked its way forward - they were

as new to their trade as their foes, a n d their officers h a d difficulty

j u d g i n g t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e opposition - Col P e a b o d y was eating breakfast T h e muffled s o u n d s of fighting in t h e Seay field p r o m p t e d

h i m to o r d e r his own brigade into line, a l t h o u g h his actions b r o u g h t down u p o n h i m t h e wrath of his divisional c o m m a n d e r H e a r i n g the

d r u m ' s long roll urgently calling t h e m e n into line, Prentiss s p u r r e d to Peabody's c a m p a n d angrily d e m a n d e d if Peabody h a d provoked the enemy's attack by his u n a u t h o r i s e d mission 'Colonel Peabody,' s h o u t e d Prentiss, '1 will h o l d you personally responsible for bringing on this

e n g a g e m e n t ' H e r e was a m a n looking for a scapegoat!

U n d a u n t e d , Peabody led two r e g i m e n t s n u m b e r i n g a b o u t 1,100 m e n

to t h e t o p of a nearby ravine a n d awaited the enemy He e n c o u n t e r e d Powell a n d his m e n w h o joined his battle line Suddenly the Confed-erates a p p e a r e d a m e r e 75 yards away T h e i r ranks m a d e an imposing spectacle T h e colonel of t h e 12th Michigan wrote, 'They were visible in line, a n d every hill-top in t h e rear was covered with t h e m ' T h e U n i o n line discharged a crashing volley

O n e of their targets was 19-year-old H e n r y Stanley, the m a n whose post-war search into the wilds of Africa for D o c t o r Livingstone would

e a r n h i m u n d e s e r v e d fame To Stanley it was as if a ' m o u n t a i n h a d b e e n

u p h e a v e d , with h u g e rocks t u m b l i n g down a slope' He h e a r d a shout, ' T h e r e they a r e ! ' a n d t h e C o n f e d e r a t e line fired back Momentarily

s t u n n e d , the rebels failed to press their attack, a n d instead e n g a g e d in a close-range fire fight across t h e ravine

T h e p r o b l e m s of tactical co-ordination in w o o d e d terrain now

b e c a m e a p p a r e n t By c h a n c e , Shaver's Brigade o v e r l a p p e d t h e U n i o n

3 2

left flank, b u t Peabody's right, in t u r n , o v e r l a p p e d t h e Confederate left

N o n e of this could be clearly seen by the officers on the g r o u n d , however, with t h e result t h a t Shaver's overlapping regiments were

r e l u c t a n t to advance until those on t h e brigade's left advanced with

t h e m But t h e left flank r e g i m e n t s e x p e r i e n c e d great difficulty in advancing into the fierce Yankee fire

Wood's Brigade, advancing on Shaver's left, h a d tried to maintain its

a l i g n m e n t with Shaver, b u t f o u n d an ever-increasing gap separating

t h e m Four of Wood's r e g i m e n t s v e e r e d off toward Shaver, while the

r e m a i n i n g t h r e e c o n t i n u e d straight a h e a d toward S h e r m a n ' s camp Additionally, because of t h e r u g g e d terrain, H a r d e e ' s artillery, which h a d

f o r m e d up in battery c o l u m n b e h i n d the infantry brigades, h a d trouble

k e e p i n g up with t h e infantry R e c e n t heavy rains caused wheels to bog down in the ravine b o t t o m s , while t h e thick u n d e r b r u s h forced g u n n e r s

to hack p a t h s in o r d e r to advance At first contact H a r d e e ' s Corps lost

m u c h of its artillery s u p p o r t as well as brigade a n d sometimes even

regi-m e n t a l integrity, with soregi-me units attacking Prentiss's position a n d others assaulting S h e r m a n

A l t h o u g h S h e r m a n would claim in b o t h his after action r e p o r t a n d

3 3

The scene of Shiloh Church well

depicts the combination of dense

thickets and open fields that

characterised the battle's terrain

(Library of Congress)

SITUATION APPROXIMATELY 9 A M , 6 APRIL 1 8 6 2

3 4

LEFT A Union recon force

encounters Confederates in

Fraley Field at about 5 am An

hour later the Confederate battle

line struggles forward, catching

Sherman and Prentiss barely

deployed at their tent lines By

7.30 am, Beauregard sends Polk

to the left and Breckinridge to

the right With the reserve

com-mitted, the attack degenerates

into poorly coordinated frontal

assaults McClernand moves

forward to stabilize the front at

8 am Still by 9 am, Sherman,

McClernand and Prentiss are in

retreat

Surprised at their tent line, many

Union regiments experienced

considerable confusion Here, a

hastily forming battle line faces

to the right to engage the

Con-federates who are concealed by

the voluminous smoke (National

o u t of t h e brush only 50 yards away A U n i o n officer s h o u t e d to him to look to his right T u r n i n g , S h e r m a n saw a line of riflemen with weapons

a i m e d directly at him He said, 'My God, we are attacked!' T h e rebels fired, hitting S h e r m a n in t h e h a n d a n d killing his cavalry orderly Before galloping off to organise a defence, S h e r m a n s h o u t e d to the m a n he h a d almost dismissed the previous day: 'Appier, h o l d your position; I will

s u p p o r t you.' Twice t h e rebels c a m e to within 50 yards of Appier's position, only to recoil from t h e Federal fire W h e n t h e attackers c a m e on a third time,

A p p i e r disobeyed S h e r m a n ' s o r d e r a n d s h o u t e d out, 'Fall back a n d save yourselves!' T h e e n s u i n g s t a m p e d e partially c o l l a p s e d S h e r m a n ' s position War c o r r e s p o n d e n t Whitelaw Reid described the surprise rebel attack: ' S o m e , particularly a m o n g o u r officers, were n o t yet o u t of bed

O t h e r s were dressing, o t h e r s washing, o t h e r s cooking, a few eating their breakfasts Many g u n s were u n l o a d e d , a c c o u t r e m e n t s lying pell-mell,

a m m u n i t i o n was ill-supplied - in short, t h e camps were virtually prised.'

sur-A surviving soldier confirms Reid's account: 'Shells were hurtling

t h r o u g h t h e tent before t h e r e was time for t h o u g h t or p r e p a r a t i o n ,

3 5

3 6

there came rushing through the woods the line of battle sweeping the

front of the division camps' At the forefront of the rebel attack were

gallant officers determined to prove themselves under fire None

sur-passed Maj J.T Harris of the 15th Arkansas He rode in front of his

brigade's skirmish line to within pistol range of the foe, fired his revolver,

and shouted to his men to come on Then enemy musketry killed him

Confronted with such implacable opponents, the Union position

rapidly became desperate Senior officers' official reports are seldom

models of candour Yet Sherman's after-action report does give some

indication of the panic that overcame many of his units Sherman wrote

that about an hour after the Confederate assault began, Appier's

regiment broke in disorder, soon followed by fugitives from Mungen's

regiment' Then, when the colonel of the 43rd Illinois received a severe

wound and fell from his horse, 'his regiment and the others manifested

disorder, and the enemy got possession of three guns' Sherman rode to

Behr's Battery to send it into action but Behr 'was almost immediately

shot from his horse the drivers and gunners fled in disorder, carrying

off the caissons and abandoning five out of six guns without firing a

shot' Although much would be made of how many men ran, on balance

the raw division acquitted itself well It entered battle with 8,213 men

and suffered 325 killed and 1,277 wounded, a loss rate of 19.5 per cent

Only by the narrowest margins did elements of Sherman's division

manage to hold until reinforced by McClernand

The shock of first contact took a toll on the rebel side as well Hungry

soldiers who passed through the captured Union camps fell out in

search of food Others began looting Early in the battle, a Mississippi

Union gun teams whip their horses as they retire from an onrushing Confederate assault wave An officer in the 21st Alabama describes his unit's introduction to combat: 'soon we came in range of the artillery which was thundering like mad

in front, the enemy fired too high and the shot crashed among the trees overhead - on! on! we marched - now we could catch glimpse of the [enemy's] white tents through the trees - now the enemy commenced a scattering fire of musketry on us — then the regiment on our right dropped down on their faces and poured a stream of fire upon the enemy - we then got the word and opened on the battery and camp: here fell Herpin and King Dixon came down a minute later - then we charged into the camp and carried it and the battery; the horses lay dead in their harness all piled up by their own struggles' (National Archives)

Johnson commanded a brigade

of Mississippi and Tennessee

infantry with characteristic

aggression and received a wound

during the battle (US Army

Military History Institute)

RIGHT A soldier described the

Union retreat to Pittsburg

Landing: 'Cavalrymen were riding

in all directions with drawn

sabres and revolvers threatening

to shoot and "Cut men's head

off" if they did not stop and rally

Officers were coaxing, praying

and exhorting men for "God's

sake" to stop and all make a

stand together But in most

cases their orders and appeals

were not heeded by these

demoralised men who kept going

like a flock of sheep All the

terrors of hell would not have

stopped them until they got to

the river.' (Library of Congress)

officer f o u n d a b o u t 300 stragglers loafing b e h i n d his r e g i m e n t They told h i m that they h a d b e e n badly ' s m a s h e d ' , a l t h o u g h in fact they h a d lost only t h r e e or four killed a n d two d o z e n w o u n d e d T h e officer later

c o m p l a i n e d , ' T h e s e are t h e k i n d of t r o o p s of which you read gallant

d e e d s a n d reckless c o n d u c t , they lose half a d o z e n , retire in time to save their haversacks a n d are puffed accordingly.'

Back on Prentiss's front, because of Everett Peabody's soldierly

c o n d u c t , t h e r e was time to partially brace t h e division before t h e howling line of rebels struck A d e f e n d e r relates his i n t r o d u c t i o n to combat: ' t h e r e was a m a n j u s t on my right b e h i n d a tree a n d I somewhat envied 37