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The Army Science Board ASB Summer Study attempted to balancethe picture by focusing on the future soldier.3 The purpose of thework reported here is to provide an initial quantitative exp

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Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

Force-on-Force Simulation of Candidate Technologies

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Examining the Army’s future warrior : force-on-force simulation of candidate

technologies / Randall Steeb [et al.].

p cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

“MG-140.”

ISBN 0-8330-3518-5 (Paperback)

1 Military research—United States 2 Combat—Simulation methods 3

Military doctrine—United States 4 United States Army—Reorganization I

Steeb, Randall, 1946– II Rand Corporation.

U393.E95 2004

355.5—dc22

2003023340 The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No DASW01-01-C-0003.

Preface

This report summarizes work performed during a quick-responseanalytic effort in support of the 2001 Army Science Board (ASB)Summer Study on Objective Force Soldier, along with subsequent ef-forts in related areas The work used high-resolution constructivesimulation to examine key aspects of “objective soldier,” with themodeling taking place in the 2015–2020 time frame In conductingthe study, the research team interacted with various members of theASB and, in particular, with key members of the Analysis, Fightabil-ity, and Concepts panels, drawing extensively on their forward-looking ideas and ultimately integrating many of these ideas into theresearch The primary scenario employed was a highly stressing mis-sion involving a dismounted attack on an enemy position in complexterrain

This work should be of interest to those involved in technologyassessment, force structure, and examination of new tactical concepts.This research was sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of theArmy (Analysis, Logistics and Technology) and was conducted in theForce Development and Technology Program of RAND ArroyoCenter The Arroyo Center is a federally funded research and devel-opment center sponsored by the United States Army

iv Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

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Contents

Preface iii

Figures and Table ix

Summary xi

Acknowledgments xvii

List of Acronyms xix

CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1

Background 1

Objective 2

Methodology 3

Scenarios Chosen 4

Simulation Tools Used for the Analysis 7

Organization of This Document 9

CHAPTER TWO How Might a Current-Generation Soldier Unit Perform in a Challenging Combat Operation? 11

How Does the Current-Generation Soldier Unit Fare? 11

Why Do We See the Results We Do? 12

CHAPTER THREE What Are Some Key, High-Leverage Technologies for the Objective Soldier? 17

What Technologies Are Examined? 17

viii Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

What Are Some Other Potential Excursions? 19

CHAPTER FOUR

What Is the Impact of Such Technologies in Combat, Using Resolution Simulation? 21 What Effect Do Future Technologies Have on the Performance of

High-Future Objective Soldier? 21 Excursions on Individual Technology Options 22 Excursions on Synergistic Effect of Multiple Options 29 What Effect Do “Far Future” Technologies Have on the Performance

of the Future Objective Soldier? 31

CHAPTER FIVE

What Are Some of the Alternatives (Non-Soldier-Based) for

Accomplishing the Same Mission? 39 What Can We Learn from Other Relevant Studies About Fighting in Complex Terrain as in Scenario 1? 39 What Can We Learn from Other Relevant Studies About Fighting in MOUT Situations as in Scenario 2? 45 What Improvements in Modeling and Simulation Are Needed for

Representing Dismounted Infantry Operations and Complex

Terrain? 49

CHAPTER SIX

Observations and Conclusions 55

Bibliography 58

Figures and Table

Figures

S.1 LER Improvements as Individual Changes and Then

Combinations of Changes Are Made to the Blue Force xiii

1.1 Modification of High-Resolution Fort Hunter Liggett Terrain to Represent Kosovo Engagement 5

1.2 Details of Scenario 1 6

1.3 Details of Scenario 2 7

1.4 Simulation Environment Used for This Analysis 8

2.1 Results of Baseline Case for Current-Generation Soldier Unit 12

2.2 Janus Screen Showing Good Lines of Sight for the Red Force 13

2.3 JCATS Screen Showing Composite Lines of Sight for the Red Force 13

2.4 Detections, Shots, and Kills for the Blue and Red Forces 14

2.5 The Effects of Poor Weather on Detections of Blue Forces 15

3.1 Various Technologies to Improve Soldier Operations 18

4.1 Different Conditions Examined in the Analyses 22

4.2 Effect of Reducing Signature 23

4.3 Performance of XM-29 by Target Characteristics 24

4.4 Effects of Smoke 25

4.5 Effect of Cannon Fire Without Good Knowledge of Enemy Positions 27

4.6 Effect of MLRS with DPICM Without Good Knowledge of Enemy Positions 28

4.7 Effect of Fires with Good Knowledge of Enemy Positions 29

x Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

4.8 Effect of Synergies of Indirect Fire, XM-29, and Body Armor 30

4.9 Effect of Synergies of Indirect Fire, XM-29, and Body Armor on LERs 31

4.10 Effects of Faster and Slower Sprint Speed Under Heavier Load 32

4.11 Effects of Adding Very-High-Quality Body Armor 33

4.12 Effects of Further Reducing Signature 34

4.13 Effects of Outfitting Only a Portion of Force with XM-29 34

4.14 Effects of XM-29 and M-16 on LER 35

5.1 Effects of C2 Delay on Indirect Fire Munitions 41

5.2 Effects of Different Types of Intelligence Gathering by the Light Force 42

5.3 Importance of Sensor Height on UGVs 43

5.4 Effect of Reducing UGV Size on Detections 44

5.5 Effect of Using Armed UGVs for Recon 45

5.6 Difficulty of Attacking an Urban Area 46

5.7 Modeling MOUT “Pointman” Function Using Janus 46

5.8 Effects of Using UGVs in Convoys in MOUT Scenario 48

5.9 Effect of Smoke on Convoy Survivability in MOUT Scenario 48

5.10 An Illustration of the Problem of Noncombatants (White) Using JCATS 50

5.11 Usefulness of Visualization Programs in MOUT Modeling Using OneSAF Testbed 50

5.12 Usefulness of OTB Maps in Showing Terrain 51

5.13 Movement in Three-Dimensional Terrain Represented by OTB 52

5.14 A MOUT Scenario Represented Using OTB 52

5.15 An Alternative MOUT Scenario Represented in JCATS 53

Table 4.1 Effects of Adding “Junkyard Dogs” to the Force 37

The Army Science Board (ASB) Summer Study attempted to balancethe picture by focusing on the future soldier.3 The purpose of thework reported here is to provide an initial quantitative exploratoryanalysis of objective soldier options, within the context of several _

1 Matsumura et al., Exploring Advanced Technologies for the Future Combat Systems Program,

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1332-A, 2002.

2 Department of the Army, Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Army Future Combat

Systems Unit of Action Systems Book, Version 3.0, May 13, 2003.

3 This study and many other examinations of future soldier systems are reported in the ASB

2001 Summer Study on the Objective Force Soldier/Soldier Team An electronic copy can

be found at https://webportal.saalt.army.mil/sard-asb/ASBDownloads/OFS-Vol-III-All.pdf.

xii Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

stressing scenarios The effort focuses on a series of research tions, starting with How might a current-generation dismountedforce perform in a challenging combat situation? and ending withWhat are the impacts of key, high-leverage technologies in combat?The report also references relevant research prior and subsequent tothe ASB summer study

ques-Approach

Our approach entails a constructive simulation effort that centers onusing Janus4 and a set of locally connected models to represent dis-mounted operations Two scenarios were examined, the first a dis-mounted Blue force attack on a Red force defending inside a treeline,and the second a convoy operation through an urban area A high-resolution terrain database describing Fort Hunter Liggett was modi-fied with additional foliage to represent the treeline scenario, whiledata from Sarajevo were used to represent the urban convoy opera-tion The primary focus of this work was on the treeline scenario.Before using Janus and associated models, we examined thebenefits possible by changing to more sophisticated models: JCATS(Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation) and OTB (OneSAF Test-bed) Each of these models offers advantages when representing urbanterrain, including the modeling of noncombatants and presenting theresults in the form of 3-D visualization

Findings

The bulk of our work focused on use of the treeline scenario Here, a40-soldier platoon of Blue dismounted soldiers attacked a 13-soldiersquad of Red infantry dug into a treeline The attack was made undercovering fire by machine guns, with the force advancing in alternat- _

4 Janus is a system-level force-on-force simulation originally developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Summary xiii

ing sprints We started with a current-generation force, with riflemenwith M-16s, M-240 machine gunners, and grenadiers, facing an en-emy squad with AK-74s and machine guns The current Blue forcewas basically unsuccessful, losing half of its number while the enemyalso lost half of its force

Improvements to the force were tested one at a time and then incombination, and the results (stated as a ratio of improvement to thebaseline) are shown in Figure S.1 Adding stealth and smoke to Bluedid not improve the outcome, instead simply reducing the typicalrange of detections, shots, and kills Adding body armor, the OICW

Figure S.1

LER Improvements as Individual Changes and Then

Combinations of Changes Are Made to the Blue Force

(Base given value of 1 in chart, actual base case LER = 0.38)

Base

NOTE: BA = Body Armor

IDF = Indirect fires.

+ IDF + IDF + XM-29 + IDF + XM-29 + BA

xiv Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

weapon (Objective Individual Combat Weapon—a rifle and sion explosive round combination—now designated the XM-29), andits forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor5 each helped, but noneachieved more than a moderate improvement to the outcome Link-ing the force to indirect fires (we used precision cannon fire and mis-sile-based area fires with dual-purpose improved conventional muni-tion—DPICM) attrited some 25 percent of the enemy force andsuppressed another portion of it for a short period

preci-The real differences in outcome came when combinations ofimprovements were made When indirect fire and the OICW weaponand FLIR were used, the loss-exchange ratio (LER, here the number

of enemy dismounts killed divided by the number of Blue dismountskilled) improved fivefold When body armor was then added to thismix (able to stop most small arms fire), the LER improvementreached seventeen times the original level This synergy appeared toresult from the indirect fire attriting the part of the enemy force (ma-chine gun teams) that was the main threat to body armor, thus ena-bling massed Blue fires to be more effective

Some additional excursions were also revealing Additional speed

of movement by Blue did not help, again just reducing the range ofengagement, but slower movement actually hurt A high level of bodyarmor protection (90 percent against the 7.62 machine gun) made asubstantial difference, but there is some question whether this level ofbody armor protection may be achievable Surprisingly, equippingonly one-sixth of the force with OICW resulted in roughly half thebenefits of equipping the entire force Alternatively, adding six armedunmanned ground vehicles (small UGVs about 1 meter tall) to theBlue force increased survivability of manned systems and improvedlethality against the enemy In fact, the combination of adding sixarmed UGVs and equipping six soldiers with OICW resulted in per-formance equivalent to equipping all the Blue force with OICW. _

5 In the study we assumed the basic room-temperature FLIR planned for the OICW (similar

to Javelin FLIR performance), but we also examined the use of a cooled second-generation FLIR.

Summary xv

The second, convoy scenario showed that smoke and UGVs canmake a difference, if Blue is not attacking a fixed position Use ofsmoke and addition of unmanned vehicles gave much greater surviv-ability in the urban passage, especially when the UGVs were armed

Conclusions

We found that even in a very stressing attack scenario, a Blue mounted force with a combination of technologies could defeat anentrenched Red force The key improvements in this scenario werethe OICW weapon and FLIR, links to indirect fires, and capablebody armor In other scenarios, use of obscurants and UGVs mayalso make significant contributions to survivability The importance

dis-of synergies between systems was especially evident in the studies wemade

Tradeoffs were evident in many runs Equipping only a portion

of the force resulted in a more than proportional improvement inoutcome, indicating decreasing marginal returns Reachback fireswere useful, but they required substantial firepower to achieve a lim-ited number of kills of dug-in forces

This quick-reaction study relied on Janus for most of the lytic findings Our parallel examinations of JCATS and OTB showedthat these simulation tools had great potential for modeling interiorfighting, representing noncombatant interactions and collateral dam-age, and visualizing event chains.6 At the same time, more needs to bedone using man-in-the-loop simulation (especially for command andcontrol issues) and field experiments The scale of the analysis alsoneeds to increase, with studies devoted to such questions as howclosely linked the dismounts should be to the FCS vehicles, the link-ages needed for controlling air and ground robotics, and development

ana-of new MOEs and MOPs (measures ana-of effectiveness and _

perform-6 While we did not directly compare Janus, JCATS, and OTB across the same scenarios, we found that Janus and JCATS had roughly similar outcomes in similar situations A full de- termination of consistency between these models needs to be made.

xvi Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

ance) for operations in complex terrain All these aspects should beexplored in upcoming analytic efforts

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the numerous individuals who erously contributed their time to this research effort The authorsmust first acknowledge the key contributions provided by the variousmembers and affiliates of the ASB Outstanding guidance and, insome cases, support were provided by Dr Robert Douglas, GEN(R)David Maddox, LTG(R) Charles Otstott, GEN(R) Wayne Downing,

gen-Dr Anthony Tether, gen-Dr Stuart Starr, gen-Dr Michael Macedonia, Mr.Dan Rondeau, and Mr Ed Brady Additionally, we thank the fol-lowing individuals for their insights and comments during the springand summer period of the study: Dr Joseph Braddock, Ms KarenWilliams, and Dr Warren Morrison

Second, the authors wish to thank our sponsors from the Office

of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, andTechnology: Dr Michael Andrews, Dr Lawrence Stotts, and Dr.Pam Beatrice They gave valuable direction to the work

Others who helped with this work include Doug Parsons fromSTRICOM, who provided useful insights on OneSAF capabilities,architecture, and installation, Mike Uselak from LLNL, who helped

us in exploring JCATS, and COL Bruce Jette from Natick, who vided enlightening information on objective force soldier

pro-Finally, the authors thank their RAND Corporation colleagueswho shared their ideas and gave generously of their time: LTC Mi-chael Barbero, LTC Fred Gellert, Rob Cochran, Gail Halverson, Dr.Ken Horn, John Gordon, Dr Walt Perry, Dr Jon Grossman, LTCDavid Nadeau, and LTC Kent Fasana

List of Acronyms

Vehicle

xx Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

Com-bat Model

Munitions

for the FCS

Test-bed

to create a force that is more relevant to all kinds of potential conflict,including humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, stability andsupport operations (SASO), counterterrorism operations, and thewidening numbers and kinds of small-scale contingencies (SSCs) Tomeet these needs, the Army’s force, including its operational conceptsand its equipment, must change.

At the heart of this change lies the future combat systems (FCS)program The FCS program is a collaborative effort between the U.S.Army and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency(DARPA), and it represents a new and distinct major program of theArmy’s transformation plan In coordination with the lead system in-

2 Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

tegrator (LSI),1 the Army and DARPA are now assessing the shape ofthis future force, what it will look like, and how it will operate Thisforce is intended to be network-centric, relying on rapid processingand dissemination of information, and it will operate much less withbrute force and much more with surgical precision than currentforces This force is also designed to be much more deployable thancurrent Army mechanized forces To achieve this, the platformsthemselves will weigh less, have much less armor, and thus rely moreheavily on information, speed, and remote operation for protection.Much of the attention so far has focused on examining alterna-tive vehicle platforms and technologies for the FCS concept, and in-deed that was the focus of the effort by the Army Science Board(ASB) in its 2000 Summer Study.2 In its 2001 Summer Study, theASB sought to balance the picture by focusing on the future soldier,examining the integration of the FCS concepts with future dis-mounted operations that are a key part of the concept Subsequentdefinition of the FCS and umbrella Objective Force Concepts by theU.S Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), DARPA,and the LSI reinforce the role of dismounted operations.3

Objective

As part of the ASB’s Summer Study, RAND Arroyo Center was asked

to provide analytic support The purpose of this document is to vide and discuss the results of that analytic support—an initial quan-titative exploratory analysis of objective soldier options using force- _

pro-1 Team Boeing/SAIC is the lead system integrator for FCS; this group is responsible for the overall FCS development program.

2 See ASB’s website for electronic copy of the report, Technical and Tactical Opportunities for

Revolutionary Advances, Operations Panel,

https://webportal.saalt.army.mil/sard-asb/ASBDownloads/T2O-Ops.pdf.

3 See AMSAA (U.S Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity), Army Future Combat Systems

Unit of Action Systems Book, Version 3.0, 22 May 2003 (For government use only; not

avail-able to the public.)

Introduction 3

on-force simulation Additionally, we describe relevant findings fromprevious and subsequent studies on future dismounted operations.This work builds directly on previous studies of FCS platformsthat revealed issues with dismounted operations One such study cen-tered around a stressing Kosovo II scenario, in which a Blue force wasinserted through Albania, fought its way into Kosovo, and had toevict Serb forces from locations in treelines and cover AdditionalSerb battle groups were moving from the north to support the de-fense Many different excursions were run with different technologiesand tactics

The findings of that study showed that with a combination ofremote fires, new technologies for the brigade combat team (BCT),and aggressive maneuver, the Blue force could prevail against an en-trenched opponent Robotics, active protection system (APS), andspecial sensors were all essential to the force.4

Even with such capabilities, the BCT encountered strong tance from enemy forces in the treelines These forces were difficult

resis-to detect and could lie in ambush A special set of excursions ined the viability of using dismounts for engaging these forces Thispreliminary look showed a system-exchange ratio (SER) of one or lessfor the dismounts, an outcome that helped motivate the ASB study

exam-Methodology

An overview of the research plan for this effort entailed a multistepprocess involving close cooperation with the ASB, ASA(ALT),TRADOC, and other agencies It started by shifting from the Kosovo

II scenario used in the previous study to a pair of higher-resolutionscenarios that more accurately depict dismounted operations in com-plex terrain We then decided which future concepts and technologies

to assess in simulation The Army is considering many concepts andtechnologies for future rapid-reaction forces, ranging from advanced _

4 Matsumura et al., 2002.

4 Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

sensors, to new command and control (C2) systems, to manned androbotic weapons platforms We wanted to determine which of theseconcepts and technologies could be modeled explicitly and which had

to be represented by parametric effects modeling We then assessedforce-on-force effectiveness in simulation, which was intended to de-termine what advances the technologies were likely to yield Below,

we discuss in more detail the scenarios chosen and the simulation vironment used

en-Scenarios Chosen

In the work carried out for the earlier FCS study, we determinedthat level 2 terrain (30-meter horizontal resolution) was too coarse forrepresenting dismounted infantry operations The finding was sub-stantiated in a 1995 study of data from scout operations using terrain

at Twenty-Nine Palms.5 In that effort, Janus data sets were createdfrom the base’s Range 400 1-meter data set, with added dismountedforces and militarily sound routes Detection of a squad of soldiersshowed major discrepancies between 100- and 30-meter resolution,but little difference below 5- to 10-meter resolution levels

As a result, we changed from the Kosovo data set to a more tailed Fort Hunter Liggett terrain, as shown in Figure 1.1 This ter-rain was generated by adding foliage to the database and sampling the1-meter resolution original terrain data to achieve an approximately9-meter resolution.6

de-From that, we created two scenarios The first, shown in Figure1.2, employs the high-resolution digital terrain from Fort HunterLiggett, overlaid with vegetation and trees to represent a rolling, for-ested area such as Kosovo

Three squads of Blue dismounted soldiers attack a squad of Redsoldiers hidden in a treeline The Blue force includes two teams withM-240 machine guns, infantry with M-16s, and grenadiers The Red _

5 Personal communication with Dr Al Zobrist, consultant to the RAND Corporation, and JPL.

6 We could not retain the original 1-meter data for this work due to the huge data files for this size scenario The 9-meter sampled data were estimated to be sufficient for the study.

Introduction 5

Figure 1.1

Modification of High-Resolution Fort Hunter Liggett Terrain

to Represent Kosovo Engagement

force includes two teams of the Red force in defilade with AK-74s(5.45mm) and three teams with PKM machine guns (7.62mm) Redholds the treeline, and Blue has initial intelligence on their general lo-cation and strength Blue probes the area, runs into resistance, andquickly returns fire Movement is by echelon, with machine gun firefor cover Blue must cross 300 meters of relatively open terrain anddoes so in sprints with the covering fire Depending on equipment,tactics, weather, enemy fires, and attrition on both sides, the outcomevaries widely

In this scenario, there are many bunkers and defilade positions

in the woods A typical bunker might be something in front of a treeand behind low-lying foliage, where the enemy sets up sandbags andlogs He has somewhat constricted fields of fire, but at the same time

6 Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

Figure 1.2

Details of Scenario 1

he can be hit by direct fire from only a limited number of directions.Blue must use an integrated fireplan to suppress and attack the dug-inpositions The resulting bunkers are similar in many ways to an urbanfighting position in a building Again there is the use of sandbags andcamouflage, and the enemy has a constrained firing area Althoughthe complex terrain is located in a treeline, the analysis of the scenarioshould produce insights relevant to urban combat.7

The second scenario is located in a portion of Sarajevo and volves a movement by a mounted convoy through an urban area with _

in-7 However, in many urban scenarios the Red force would have better protection and head cover than in this treeline vignette, and the Blue force would be more constrained by the terrain.

over-Introduction 7

multistory buildings defended by Red snipers with AK-47s androcket-propelled grenades (RPGs) It is shown in Figure 1.3 Thescenario is a dangerous movement through an urban area, pastbuildings with armed enemy dismounts The enemy soldiers are lo-cated in many different buildings, firing from different elevations.The Blue force is exposed to fire from both sides, from front andback, and from above Red holds fire until the ambush is initiated

Simulation Tools Used for the Analysis

We used two simulation tools for examining the force options inthe two scenarios: Janus (a two-sided, force-on-force ground combatmodel) and the Joint Combat and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) Fig-ure 1.4 shows the constituent models of the Janus-based simulationenvironment The models are linked together using the Seamless

Figure 1.3

Details of Scenario 2

8 Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

Figure 1.4

Simulation Environment Used for This Analysis

Model Interface (SEMINT), a form of locally distributed network.The individual models center on the force-on-force Janus wargamingsimulation and comprise a wide range of capabilities Janus itself hasbeen modified for analysis from its original form by increasing thesize and scope of engagements, adding automated operations, and al-lowing special digital terrain representations

The other models surrounding Janus are primarily for modelingadvanced systems The RAND Jamming and Radar Model (RJARS)dynamically simulates infrared (IR) and radio frequency (RF) air de-fense engagements against helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs), and fixed-wing aircraft The Model to Assess Damage toArmor with Munitions (MADAM) models the flyout, encounter, de-tection, and endgame with smart and brilliant munitions TheRAND Target Acquisition Model (RTAM) represents low-observability vehicles, the Acoustic Sensor Program (ASP) modelsacoustic sensor phenomenology, and the APS program simulates the

Introduction 9

effectiveness of vehicle protection systems against a variety of ing weapons The set of models are linked and coordinated in a local-area network using our Cartographic Analysis and Geographic Sys-tem (CAGIS) Other models noted in the figure were not called inthis analysis

incom-The system is normally first used interactively by Red and Bluegamers, setting up movements, firing missions, coordinating lines,etc Once the dynamics are set, the model is run autonomously formany iterations to arrive at a statistically converging ensemble of runsfor each excursion

Organization of This Document

The remainder of this document is organized around answering a set

of four research questions Chapter Two sets a baseline for the ses that follow by answering the question, “How might a current-generation soldier unit perform in a challenging combat operation?”Chapter Three further sets the stage for the analyses by answering thequestion, “What are some key, high-leverage technologies for the ob-jective soldier?” Chapter Four is the core of the document, providingthe results of the analyses by answering the question, “What is theimpact of such technologies (separately and in concert) in combat,using high-resolution simulation?” Finally, we mine previous work toanswer the question, “What are some alternatives (non-soldier-based)for accomplishing the same mission?” Chapter Five offers some ob-servations and conclusions based on the analyses

When we examine how a current-generation soldierunit—which is made up primarily of dismounted soldiers with M-16s and M-240 machine guns—might perform in a challengingcombat operation (in this case, the treeline attack scenario), we find

that because of the strong defensive advantage afforded Red in this

situa-tion, the Blue force takes substantial losses during an intense direct-fire fight In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss this finding in more

detail

How Does the Current-Generation Soldier Unit Fare?

As Figure 2.1 shows, the current-generation force was unable to complish its objective in the mission The figure, which shows thenumber of Blue and Red losses by force components, shows that all

ac-12 Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

SAW gunner Infantry

20

Kills Losses

Why Do We See the Results We Do?

Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the primary reasons for the results describedabove The former, a Janus screen, shows that one of the features fa-voring the Red force is its good lines of sight Thus, the Red force isable to spot moving Blue forces out to several hundred meters Thesecond figure, a JCATS screen, shows the overlapping lines of sight,making it apparent that the Red force has very good visibility and thetactical advantage

How Might a Current-Generation Soldier Unit Perform? 13

14 Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

Figure 2.4 shows another interesting insight from the analysis Itlooks at individual detections, shots, and kills for the Red and Blueforces What is clear from the figure is that even though the Blueforce had better surveillance than the Red force (more than 90 detec-tions versus more than 20, apparently due to detections of muzzleflashes by many Blue systems), the Red force shot more times thanthe Blue force (more than 20 versus fewer than 20) and had moresuppressions and kills (around 20 versus fewer than 10) This would

be expected against an opponent moving in relatively open terrain.Finally, we analyzed what effect weather would have on the out-come of the battle, speculating that poorer visibility might help theattacking Blue force given its edge in surveillance and open terrain.Figure 2.5 shows the results of a run in which the weather in the re-gion is that of the worst 10 percent of time, compared to medianweather (here historical levels are worse 50 percent of the time)

Detections of Shots at Kills of

How Might a Current-Generation Soldier Unit Perform? 15

100–149m 50–99m

However, the figure, which shows detections of the Blue force

by the Red force by 50-meter range intervals, reveals that poorweather and the resulting decreased visibility actually hurt the Blueattack slightly The attacker closes, increasing the probability of hitand kill in the ambush, and Blue is unable to effectively return fire.The forward-looking infrared sensors (FLIRs) of the Blue force donot provide sufficient advantage to overcome the problems of defi-laded, tree-covered, and stationary targets As a result, but not shown

on the figure, kills of Red are roughly constant, but losses of Blue crease from around 23 to around 25

in-It may appear that this baseline scenario is unrealistic and toodemanding A platoon leader or force commander would not riskthese losses However, this mission, attacking an uncertain, high-value target concealed in cover, is an important one for our forces Itmight occur in treelines in Kosovo, urban areas in Iraq, or the rockyslopes of Afghanistan In the next two chapters we will explore possi-

16 Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

ble technologies and tactics to reduce risks and improve chances ofmission success

What Are Some Key, High-Leverage

Technologies for the Objective Soldier?

The baseline analysis described above highlights some areas where thecurrent-generation force needs help if it is to accomplish its mission

in a stressing scenario like the one being used here When we answerthe question of what are the key technologies to address those needs,

we find that new sensor, weapon, protection, and information systems are

envisioned for the future soldier We discuss this finding in more detail

below

What Technologies Are Examined?

The technologies that directly equip the dismounted soldier can beroughly grouped into weapons (both personal and remote), sensors,information (i.e., links to other systems), and protection, as shown inFigure 3.1 Some of these technologies have been specified in detail,while others are still preliminary or conceptual in nature We will bemodeling the effects of all of these Some of the excursions were ofspecific systems, while others, such as stealth level, were parametric.The degree of situational awareness (for indirect fire) was varied byassuming different levels of knowledge of enemy positions

Weapon systems include the Objective Individual CombatWeapon (OICW; now called the XM-29) and the future 5mm agile

18 Examining the Army’s Future Warrior

Figure 3.1

Various Technologies to Improve Soldier Operations

SOURCE: Courtesy of Natick Labs, Objective Force Soldier program.

missile with seeker We have received preliminary data on the XM-29indicating that the 20mm round is expected to have a probability ofkill (Pk) of 0.35 out to 300 meters Other sources state that a 0.5 Pk

is anticipated to this range, with effects out to 1,000 meters

Information systems (or extent of situational awareness) areplayed parametrically We assume that enemy status and position areknown accurately (10-meter target location accuracy), or that an en-emy force is located in a treeline several hundred meters long

For the sensor systems, the FLIR being modeled here is a temperature 480×640-pixel sensor said to have at least 90 percent ofthe sensitivity of the current Javelin FLIR We are using the Javelincharacteristics as a surrogate