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xi Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for democratic consolidation in South Africa 1999–2001.... HSRC Public Opinion Survey Prospects for consolidating democracy in South Af

Public Attitudes in Contemporary South Africa

© 2002 Human Sciences Research Council

Distributed by Blue Weaver

25 Katie Martin Way

Contributors ix

Preface xi

Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for democratic consolidation in South Africa 1999–2001 1

1 Politics, governance and civic knowledge 12

Satisfaction with the government 13

Race 16

Living standard measurements (LSMs) 19

Institutional trust 20

Race and living standard measurements 23

Civic knowledge 25

Conclusion 26

References 27

2 Political party preferences 28

Introduction 28

Intended votes 29

References 33

3 Provincial living preferences in South Africa 34

Provincial place preference: A general picture 36

Geographical preference and demographic characteristics 37

Race 37

Age 40

Language 40

Income 41

Educational qualification 41

Current employment and occupation status 41

Relationships between social well-being and preference for province 41

Migration tendencies 43

Conclusion 45

References 46

4 Identity and voting trends in South Africa 47

Identity, instrumentality and voting in ‘white’ South Africa 49

The racial census approach 53

Self-identity and voting preferences 55

Conclusion 59

References 60

5 Race relations 63

Analysis of the survey 64

Factors influencing racial discrimination and racism in South Africa 70

Conclusion 72

References 72

6 Addressing HIV/AIDS 73

Results 75

Sense of concern 75

Level of knowledge 75

Perceived risk 76

Reported sexual behaviour and condom use 76

‘Helpless, hopeless and meaningless’ outlook on life 79

‘Helpless, hopeless and meaningless’ stance towards HIV/AIDS protection 80

Discussion 81

Chi-Squared Test Results 81

Concern, knowledge and perceived risk are high 82

Sexual behaviour and condom use 83

Significant protection constraints: Lack of hope 84

The way forward 85

References 86

7 Spirituality in South Africa: Christian beliefs 87

Introduction 87

Attendance at religious meetings 87

Public opinion and church attendance 89

Views about Christian principles 90

1 Prayer 91

2 Extra-marital sex 91

3 Jesus as the solution 91

4 Life after death 92

5 Spiritual re-births 92

Christian belief 92

Conclusion 96

References 96

8 Perceptions about economic issues 97

Perceptions about economic conditions in South Africa 97

Effects of government policies on the general economic situation in the country 99

Conclusion 101

9 National priorities 102

Previous surveys on national priorities 102

In regard to job creation, the results by province appear in Figure 9.2 103

Comparison by population group 104

Comparison by income group 105

Comparison by area type 105

Comparison by highest education qualification 107

Comparison by employment status 107

Comparison by age category 107

Comparison of how government could best reduce crime by province 108

Comparison by area type 108

Comparison by population group 110

Comparison by personal monthly income 110

Comparisons by employment status, age and highest educational qualification 111

1O Environmental concerns 113

Major environmental issues at a national level 113

Major environmental issues at a local level 116

Socio-economic profile of people identifying environmental issues at a local level 118

Access to water 118

Clean air – prevention of air pollution 119

Access to land 120

Protection of indigenous plants/vegetation 120

References 123

11 Civil society participation 124

Membership to civil society organisations in the 2001 survey 125

Distribution of membership of civil society organisations 126

Conclusion 128

12 Information and communications technologies 129

Access to information and communications technologies 130

Access to communications technologies considering other factors 130

Radio station preferences and time spent 133

Conclusion 135

13 Families and social networks 136

Size of social networks 137

Immediate family members 137

Extended family members 138

Workplace friendships 139

Community friendships 140

Other friendships 141

Total number of friends 142

Frequency of contact 142

Frequency of contact with favourite sibling 142

Frequency of contact with child over the age of 18 years 143

Frequency of contact with parents 144

Frequency of contact with closest friend 145

Summary 146

Type of community 146

Gender 147

Race 147

Age 148

Composite social capital score 149

Conclusion 150

References 151

14 Human rights 152

Knowledge of human rights institutions 153

Gender 155

Race 155

Standard of living 156

Belief in human rights 159

Conclusion 163

References 164

Appendix 165

Introduction 165

The first SAARF Living Standards Measure (LSM) 165

1993 SAARF LSMs 166

Later developments of the LSM concept 167

1995 SAARF LSMs 167

2000 SAARF LSMs 168

The SAARF UNIVERSAL LSM 169

SAARF LSM 170

Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za

Abigail Baim-Lance is an intern at the Fogarty HIV/Aids Research Training Programme

at the Nelson Mandela School of Medicine

John Daniel is head of the Publications Department and a research director in the

Democracy and Governance programme of the Human Sciences Research Council

Christian De Vos is an intern with the Democracy and Governance programme at the

Human Sciences Research Council in Durban

Ronnie Donaldson is a senior lecturer in the Department of Geographical Science at

Vista University in Silverton

Arlene Grossberg is a senior researcher in the Democracy and Governance programme

of the Human Sciences Research Council

Adam Habib is a part-time research director at the Human Sciences Research Council,

Professor in the School of Development Studies and Director of the Centre for CivilSociety, University of Natal, Durban

Craig Higson-Smith is a senior research specialist in the Child, Youth and Family

Development research programme of the Human Sciences Research Council

Mbithi wa Kivilu is a chief research specialist in the Surveys, Analyses, Modelling and

Mapping research programme of the Human Sciences Research Council

Godswill Zakhele Langa is a researcher in the Surveys, Analyses, Modelling and Mapping

research programme of the Human Sciences Research Council

Maano Ramutsindela is a lecturer in the Department of Environmental and

Geographical Science at the University of Cape Town

Stephen Rule is director of research with the South African Ministry of Social

Development

Craig Schwabe is head of the Geographical Information Systems (GIS) Centre in the

Human Sciences Research Council

Jarè Struwig is a chief researcher in the Social Analyses, Modelling and Mapping research

programme of the Human Sciences Research Council

Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za

HSRC Public Opinion Survey

Prospects for consolidating democracy in South Africa, and attempts to addressthe country’s ailing economic fortunes, depend largely on three critical factors:the ability of government to make informed decisions and strategic interventionsbased on the principles of good governance and sound policy; the willingnessand determination of the stakeholder community, including civil societyorganisations and the private sector, to provide the necessary checks andbalances required to maintain and nurture a constitutionally-enshrineddemocratic dispensation; and the ability of the research community to produceresearch, either self-generated or commissioned, that provides penetrative andtextured accounts of the multi-faceted nature of our society

The compilation that follows is an illustration of the latter and, firmly rooted

in the HSRC’s determination to conduct ‘social science research that makes adifference’, as well as in the organisation’s desire to comprehensively align appliedsocial research to user needs, is an attempt to generate debate on matters crucial

to the public domain, inform and synergise often competing althoughcomplementary discourses on development, and make inroads in a policy arenathat is sometimes characterised by too much fluidity and a lack of strategicdirection As such, the account that follows – both as a public snap-shot and amore in-depth analysis of trends and opinions – makes a significant contribution

to the critical debate around the challenges to, and prospects for, consolidatingdemocracy in South Africa It also informs the debate on how to enhance theimpetus towards sustained economic growth, and the fundamentals thatunderpin this

The compilation also has important tangential implications and policyovertones for the southern African region, and the rest of the African sub-continent at large Indeed, comparative insight and perspective will begin togrow in importance as efforts to implement the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD) get off the ground, and it is recognised that a pivotal

basis for doing this will be through comprehensive and rigorous national publicaudits on attitudes and trends on key issues.

Public opinion and attitudes often remain the yardstick against whichinterventions are made The collection which follows, in synthesising andanalysing the results and findings of some key policy areas that have beeninvestigated, will provide all stakeholders in South Africa with a set of factualinformation and derivative analytic insights Such a representation allows forinformed choices and decisions to be made, policy dimensions to be investigatedfurther, and research to be commissioned in areas where voids are conspicuous

UDESH PILLAY

Executive Director

Surveys, Analyses, Modelling

and Mapping (SAMM)

Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for

democratic consolidation in South Africa 1999–2001

Adam Habib

Democracy cannot be taken for granted Its consolidation is neither inevitable,nor need the process take the form of a linear progression Democracies aresusceptible to reversions to authoritarianism As Robert Dahl demonstrates in

his recent work, On democracy, authoritarian regimes have replaced democratic

ones some 52 times between 1900 and 1985 (Dahl, 1998) But southern Africans

do not need to be quoted statistics to be made aware of this fact Indeed, thepoint has been graphically brought home by developments in both Zambia andZimbabwe In the case of the former, a trade union leader who led resistanceagainst what had been the only president of post-independent Zambia, thensubverted that same democracy by first attempting to re-write the constitution

to enable him to seek a third term, and when that failed, manipulating elections

to ensure that his nominee was elected president In Zimbabwe, a first generationindependence leader succeeded in holding onto power through graft, patronage,electoral fraud, constitutional manipulation, and intimidation of opponents anddissidents In both cases, democracy and the promise of development dissipated

as a result of both structural conditions and leadership behaviour

South Africans can thus not be complacent about their democracy They need

to be constantly on guard against any threat of reversion In fact, this seems tohave been the intention of the architects of our constitutional system whoestablished a series of checks and balances in order to contain arbitrary andauthoritarian behaviour, and empower the citizenry To contribute to this effort,the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) has for several years beenconducting regular national surveys on public opinion Issues that have beeninvestigated include, among others, citizens’ satisfaction with service delivery,their perceived national priorities, their political preferences, and their attitudes

on the state of the economy Such knowledge about citizens’ perceptions is

crucial not only to inform government officials about what the citizenry thinks

of their performance and policies, but also because it enables researchers andscholars to make continuous assessments of citizens’ attitudes which constituteone of the structural conditions for democratic sustainability

The national survey on which the analysis in this volume is premised wasundertaken in July 2001 The survey instrument comprised a questionnairecontaining questions on a variety of themes It was divided into different topicsand the duration of interviews of respondents was between 60 and 90 minutes

A sample of 2 704 respondents was selected throughout South Africa in clusters

of eight households situated in 338 primary sampling units (PSUs)/enumeratorareas (EAs) as determined from the 1996 census In order to ensure adequaterepresentation in the sample from each province and from each of the fourdominant population groups, the sample was explicitly stratified by provinceand urban/rural locations This added up to 18 strata (see Table 1) Dispropor-tional samples were drawn from less populated provinces such as the NorthernCape, Free State, Mpumalanga and North West

Table 1 Number of primary sampling units/ EAs per province and strata

The realised sample was only slightly less than the intended 2 704 In terms ofprovince and population group, the spread was sufficiently wide to facilitatestatistical generalisations about opinions prevailing within each province andamong persons of each of the four main population groups Each case was thenweighted so that the resultant weighted dataset would approximate thedistribution of the population of South Africa in terms of population group,province, gender and educational qualification

This chapter summarises the results and findings of the chapters that followwith a view to understanding how they impact on, and what they reveal aboutthe challenges to, and the prospects for, the consolidation of democracy.Obviously, an exhaustive analysis of the results cannot be undertaken here.Readers interested in such an analysis within a particular issue area should refer

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

to the relevant chapters in this volume This chapter merely summarises andanalyses the overall findings across the various issue areas, as they pertain to thechallenge of democratic sustainability and consolidation in South Africa.

Identity in the post-1994 era

In 1970, in a path-breaking review of the post-World War II democratisationliterature, Rustow (1970:350–351) identified the emergence of a national identity

as the only precondition necessary for habituation, or what we now term theconsolidation of democracy (Rustow, 1970:350–351) This of course should be

an obvious condition to identify, especially in South Africa After all, apartheid’sovert attempt to categorise and then govern people along racial lines meant thatthe conflict in South Africa came to be principally defined as one of race; aconflict primarily among racial groups whose choices and political behaviourwere determined by their group identities For democratic consolidation to beeffected in South Africa then, such group identities have to be transcended, or atthe least, eclipsed in prominence by a new national identity

What then is the state of identity among South Africa’s citizenry seven yearsafter the dawn of the post-apartheid era? Mainstream political science stillmaintains that the citizenry primarily conceptualise and identify themselves inracial terms The most recent exposition of this thesis is detailed in HermannGiliomee’s and Charles Simkins’ comparative study on one-party states entitled

The awkward embrace: One-party domination and democracy This study

maintains that the establishment of a viable parliamentary opposition isimpossible because of the South African electorate’s propensity to vote alongracial lines The citizenry, they maintain, identify themselves in racial terms, andtheir electoral behaviour is so governed Electoral outcomes for Giliomee andSimkins (1999:346), then, are ‘likely to continue to resemble a racial census’.The EPOP survey contained a number of questions designed to get to citizens’attitudes in this regard, and as a result a number of chapters in this volume speak

on the issue Almost all would question Giliomee’s and Simkins’ ‘racial census’thesis, or at the very least, would tend to qualify it The most direct challenge tothis thesis comes from Maano Ramutsindela in his fascinating chapter onidentity and voting trends, based on the November 1999 survey This chaptercategorically demonstrates that the majority of people view themselves primarily

as South Africans This form of national identity prevailed among 61% of the

Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for democratic consolidation in SA

respondents Only 11% of respondents conceived of themselves in racial terms,and a further 15% through a linguistic lens This data then leads Ramutsindela

to conclude, ‘the racial census approach neither provides insights into questions

of voting behaviour in a new political environment nor illuminates continuitiesand changes in the choices of members of a particular group.’

Obviously, Ramutsindela is not arguing that race is not important All that he

is maintaining is that one cannot read political and electoral behaviour from thecolour of one’s skin This is not only because identities constantly evolve, but alsothe fact that the coincidence in South Africa of racial and other categories, inparticular class, makes it almost impossible to reach conclusions on the basis ofcorrelations between race categories and one or other form of politicalbehaviour There are a number of examples of this in this volume.Ramutsindela’s chapter, for instance, demonstrates a relationship between livingstandard measure and identity Although the majority of people across the classdivide conceive of themselves in national terms, the percentage margin in thelower income brackets was in almost all cases smaller More significantly, the factthat 27% of respondents in the lowest income brackets saw themselves in ethnicterms does suggest that class plays a significant role in influencing how peopleconceive of themselves

This is also borne out in Arlene Grossberg’s rich chapter on race relations.Grossberg not only demonstrates that a majority of respondents (42,1%) are ofthe opinion that race relations in South Africa have improved since 1994, but alsoindicates that this view is most prevalent among the Indian (58,9%) and black(42,9%) respondents When the data on the Indian population is weighted forliving standard measure, it becomes apparent that this view is as much areflection of class as it is of race variables Similarly, Zakes Langa’s chapter onaccess to information and communications technologies demonstrates thataccess is greater not only for the white and Indian populations (Table 12.3), butalso for those in the higher income brackets (Figure 12.1) Once again, thiscoincidence between race and class should make analysts wary of simply drawingconclusions on the basis of correlations to racial categories

These chapters, then, represent a significant challenge to the ‘racial census’thesis that is so commonly held in, and propagated by, mainstream politicalscience circles They suggest that identity formation and conception in SouthAfrica is far more complex than is normally assumed, and that identity andbroader political behaviour is as much influenced by class as it is by racial

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

variables Moreover, Ramutsindela’s chapter in particular suggests that theprevailing identity among the majority of South Africans is a national, and not aracial and ethnic one This result is heartening particularly for analysts andpolitical activists committed to the consolidation of democracy Indeed theseresults suggest that the citizenry is way ahead of the political leadership and theacademy in this regard The leadership of both the opposition and the rulingparty too often play the race card In fact, simplistic racial assumptions tend togovern much of their political campaigns, and the national surveys on publicopinion suggest that their campaigns are at odds with the prevailing identitiesamong the populace In a real sense, the citizenry is facilitative of, while thepolitical elites are becoming an obstacle to, the consolidation of democracy inSouth Africa.

Party structure and prospects for a parliamentary opposition

It has become an almost uncontested fact in the post-World War IIdemocratisation literature that a viable institutionalised opposition is anessential feature of consolidated democracies Robert Dahl’s comprehensivestudy on this subject, published in 1966, made the case for oppositions, and hasnot in any way been refuted In fact, its essential thesis has been supported andcorroborated by other studies in the course of the three decades that followed itspublication (See, for instance, Barker, 1971; Epstein, 1967; Moore, 1989;Huntington, 1991; Shapiro, 1994; Blondel, 1997; Jung & Shapiro, 1995.) Even inSouth Africa today, the fact that a viable institutionalised opposition is crucial todemocracy is almost undisputed All that seems to be the subject of debate is theform of that opposition, and whether its effect would be the same if it were to belocated within an alliance with the ruling party (For a review of these debates,see the various chapters in Southall, 2001.)

So what are the prospects for a viable parliamentary opposition? Again, thereseems to be an almost unanimous view among political analysts across thepolitical divide Almost all would argue that there is no viable parliamentaryopposition in South Africa, although they would differ as to what theimplications of that are for the consolidation of democracy This assessment isborne out by the national survey Stephen Rule’s chapter on political partypreferences categorically indicates that the ANC is way ahead of the pack Theparty’s support in July 2001 was approximately half of the electorate Its nearestrival was the Democratic Alliance (DA) with only 8,9% of support among voters

Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for democratic consolidation in SA

Indeed, these figures are substantively lower than the parties’ respective electionvotes, although this should not be surprising since electoral uncertainty is afeature of periods midway between elections In any case, even if the DA, theInkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the United Democratic Movement (UDM)came together, they would not constitute an electoral challenge to the ANC TheANC’s dominance is still absolute.

But this is not the whole story Rule’s further investigation into how close ordistant people feel towards various parties reveals that the ANC is not in anunchallengeable position There are three striking features evident in the data inthis chapter, only the first two of which are recognised by Rule himself First, thisdata suggests that substantial proportions of the population have multiple partypreferences This effectively means that a large part of the ANC’s support basemay simultaneously feel close to other parties Second, as Rule demonstrates, thepotential bases of support for parties are far larger than actual party votes tend

to suggest This means that a large proportion of opposition parties’ supportbases do not turn out to vote, and how to get them to the voting booth is thesubject of intense debate within these organisations Should, however,opposition parties succeed in this, then, the establishment of a viableparliamentary opposition would not constitute such an impossible task

Third, a feature not identified by Rule is that the data indicates that thefulcrum of opposition sentiment lies to the left of the ANC The South AfricanCommunist Party (SACP) on its own has as large a potential base of support(17%) as does the DA (17%) If you add the SACP’s potential support with that

of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO),and the UDM, you would have a potential base of support (53%) that rivals that

of the ANC Yet the entire initiative to construct a viable opposition is occurring

to the right of the ANC, initially with the Democratic Party (DP)/New NationalParty (NNP) experiment, and now with the DA/IFP initiative in KwaZulu-Natal

On the left, parties are either too divided or constrained from exploringinnovative solutions by existing strategic alliances and relationships

But the possibility of the opposition’s potential base of support translatinginto an actual one depends on whether the electorate is satisfied with the state ofgovernance under the ruling party How, then, does the electorate view life underthe Mbeki presidency? A series of questions in the national survey, and a number

of chapters in this volume, address precisely this issue

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

Citizens’ satisfaction with governance

The fundamental goal of a democratic system is citizen satisfaction A centralelement of the system is the empowerment of ordinary citizens so that they canreplace their leaders in the event of dissatisfaction with leaders’ performance It

is choice, this central tenet of democracy, which enables the system ‘to promotefreedom as no feasible alternative can’ (Dahl, 1989:88–89) This does not meanthat citizens always exercise their choice Democracies across the world have largeproportions of unhappy citizens who instead of replacing their leaders simplywithdraw from participation in the political system But the principle of choice

is inviolate Such citizens always have the right of choice enshrined in theirpolitical system, so that, should they have a majority, they are able to vote out theleadership they are unhappy with and replace it with one that satisfies theirinterests

This principle of citizen choice is of course also enshrined in South Africa’spost-1994 constitutional arrangements The citizenry is empowered to replacetheir political leadership should they feel dissatisfied with their performance Butthey have not as yet done so Instead, the ruling party has been returned to power

in 1999 and 2000 with margins of electoral majorities that exceeded even itsearlier victories in 1994 and 1996 This, then, would lead one to assume that thecitizenry is largely satisfied with the performance of the ruling party

The results of the opinion survey undertaken in 2001, however, suggest thatthis assumption would be incorrect John Daniel’s and Christian De Vos’ chapter

on politics, governance and democracy clearly indicates that there is a largedegree of unhappiness with the state of governance in South Africa The highestlevels of unhappiness were reserved for local government with about half of therespondents registering their disapproval with the state of governance in theirlocal areas Some 40,5% of respondents also registered their dissatisfaction withprovincial government But most shocking of all was the proportion ofrespondents unhappy with the state of governance at a national level A majority

of respondents, 42,5% to be precise, indicated that they were unhappy with theANC’s performance in governing the country nationally Only 37,8% weresatisfied with the way the country is being run What should also be of concern

to government is that civil society components, and in particular the church andmedia, are more trusted by the citizenry than is the government Daniel and DeVos, however, do make a distinction between satisfaction and trust, and conclude

Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for democratic consolidation in SA

‘that people, despite their dissatisfaction, still maintain a sense of faith in theinstitutions that represent them.’

This conclusion, while boding well for democratic consolidation, is notnecessarily good news for the ANC It is useful to note that unhappiness with theruling party’s performance is particularly centered on the economy JarèStruwig’s chapter on the electorate’s perception of the state of the economydemonstrates that a majority of South Africans (58%) see the economic situation

in South Africa as having worsened over the previous 12-month period Theseperceptions are consistent across the class divide Indeed, a significant majority

of both the rich (LSM 8 category – 76,2 %) and poor (LSM 1 category – 64,4%)felt economic conditions had worsened The ANC would thus do well not tobecome complacent After all, Adam Habib’s and Christian de Vos’ chapter onhuman rights clearly indicates that most South Africans have a substantiveconception of democracy, one that includes economic justice as a component ofthe definition Couple this with Mbithi wa Kivilu’s chapter which demonstratesthat the black population, what the ANC sees as the mainstay of its support base,

is the most active in political and civic activities, and you have an explosivecombination that suggests that the ruling party could pay the penalty forcomplacency at some future date at the polls

If this scenario is to be averted, government would have to review its economic strategy Some commentators believe this is already happening.Vishnu Padayachee and Imraan Valodia, for instance, suggest that the 2001budget reflected a shift in government priorities to a more Keynsian economicorientation This view, however, tends to be overly optimistic The government’seconomic programme in its fundamental tenets remains neo-liberal, and playing

macro-on the margins as the 2001 budget did, is not going to fundamentally change theeffects of this macro-economic strategy And so long as that does not happen,popular unhappiness with economic outcomes, and ultimately the state ofgovernance, is likely to continue

The performance of constitutional and societal institutions

The consolidation of democracy is not only dependent on the performance ofgovernmental institutions It is also dependent on the efficient functioning ofconstitutional and societal institutions that contribute to the development ofwhat Putnam (1993) celebrated as social capital in his pioneering work entitled

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy Social capital, the set of

organisations, networks, norms and values that build trust and facilitateinteractions within communities, is crucial since it constitutes the core element

of the social foundation that enables the sustenance and consolidation ofdemocracy An analysis of the performance of the constitutional and societalinstitutions that facilitate the development of this social capital is thus necessary

in any assessment of the progress to democratic consolidation in South Africa.Unfortunately, however, the prognosis is not very good Adam Habib’s andChristian De Vos’ chapter on human rights demonstrates that constitutionalinstitutions, those established at the dawn of South Africa’s democracy for thedefence of the citizenry, have not succeeded in rooting themselves among thecountry’s populace seven years after their birth Indeed, the chapter clearlyconcludes that the vast majority of the country’s residents are unaware of and donot know how to utilise the constitutional instruments that have beenestablished for the realisation of their rights Similarly, Stephen Rule’s chapter onChristian beliefs demonstrates that there is no correlation between churchattendance and norms and values about brotherhood and empathy that canmake a constructive contribution to the development of society Indeed, hischapter suggests that the churches, the largest and most widely supported socialinstitutions in the country, are not having the effect that they should be, namely

to foster the kinds of values that could contribute to the development of socialcapital in South Africa

These conclusions are also borne out by Craig Higson-Smith’s analysis onfamilies and social networks Higson-Smith’s chapter concludes by warningsocial activists not to take the value of communalism for granted in poor Africancommunities His analysis clearly demonstrates that class variables cruciallyinform the level of social capital available within communities and societies Hethus concludes, ‘it is precisely the targets of many developmental initiatives –people who are poor, people living in rural communities and women – that havethe least social capital If … social capital is fundamental to sustainabledevelopment work, then it is essential that social activists put energy intobuilding this important resource.’The overall conclusion that can be drawn fromthe data of the national survey, and articulated in the various chapters in thisvolume, is that the constitutional and societal institutions are not performingoptimally, and are therefore not facilitating the development of a socialfoundation that would enable the consolidation of democracy in South Africa

Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for democratic consolidation in SA

To sum up then: the analyses in this volume suggest that there are positive andnegative developments to report from the perspective of consolidatingdemocracy in South Africa On the positive side, citizens’ behaviour anddecisions are much less determined by racial identities than analysts have led us

to believe In fact, citizens are way ahead of political elites from both the rulingparty and opposition circles, who are far more preoccupied with and influenced

by a racial mindset Moreover, democratic consolidation can only be enhancedwith the existence of a vibrant institutionalised opposition Although the datashows that we are far away from such a state of affairs, it does indicate quiteclearly that potential bases of support are quite dispersed across the partyspectrum Why then hasn’t a viable parliamentary opposition emerged? Onceagain, the problem can be traced to the door of political elites The leadership ofthe official opposition is too influenced by racial variables and as such isincapable of developing a set of policy proposals that could serve to attract thesupport of the majority of the citizenry Left-leaning political elites, where thepotential for opposition is greatest, are reluctant to consider an oppositionaloption to the ANC Nevertheless, the potential for opposition exists and thatdoes bode well for the consolidation of democracy

On the negative side, two developments must be highlighted First, the datadoes indicate that the citizenry is really unhappy about the state of governance atall levels of government, and the state of the economy Second, the institutions ofsociety, either those established by the constitution or civil society agencies likethe churches, are not very effective at creating a set of norms and valuesconducive to democratic consolidation Indeed, the analyses suggest that thestate of social affairs in poor communities is not conducive to development anddemocracy Activists need seriously to consider establishing the conditions tofacilitate these goals If this is not done, we could become vulnerable toregressions from democracy South Africans must not become complacent abouttheir political system and constitutional democracy It is after all a pricelesstreasure that, if taken for granted, can so easily disappear We need only learnfrom the experiences of our brothers and sisters elsewhere on the continent

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

Barker, R (ed.) 1971 Studies in opposition London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Blondel, J 1997 Political opposition in the contemporary world Government and Opposition,

32(4).

Epstein, L 1967 Political parties in Western democracies New York: Praeger.

Dahl, R.A 1966 Political oppositions in Western democracies New Haven: Yale University Press Dahl, R.A 1998 On democracy New Haven: Yale University Press.

Giliomee, H & Simkins, C 1999 The awkward embrace: One-party domination and democracy.

Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Huntington, S 1991 The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century Norman

Oaklahoma and London: University of Oaklahoma Press.

Jung, C & Shapiro, I 1995 South Africa’s negotiated transition: Democracy, opposition and

the new constitutional order Politics and Society, 23(3).

Moore, B Jr 1989 Liberal prospects under Soviet Socialism: A comparative historical perspective.

New York: Averell Harriman Institute.

Putnam 1993 Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy Place: Publishers Rustow, D.A 1970 Transitions to democracy: Towards a dynamic model Comparative Politics,

2(3):350–351.

Shapiro, I 1994 Three ways to be a democrat Political Theory, 22, February.

Southall, R (ed.) 2001 Opposition and democracy in South Africa London and Portland:

1 ■ Politics, governance and civic knowledge

John Daniel and Christian M de Vos

This chapter focuses on the levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction of SouthAfricans with their post-apartheid governance, as well as on their degree of trust

in both the three tiers of government under which they now live and in some ofthe institutions spawned by the new democratic dispensation Finally, it alsolooks at the levels of civic knowledge of South Africans

These are interesting questions for a number of reasons Most adult SouthAfricans will have grown up in a period when the government of the day wasseen as ‘the enemy’, a brutally oppressive, unrepresentative and illegitimate entitywhich regarded the majority of its citizenry as less than equal, to put it charitably.Indeed, it is doubtful whether they even regarded them as fellow citizens.Testifying before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the apartheidgovernment’s war on both the southern African region and its own people in the1970s and 1980s, the former Security Branch officer, Craig Williamson, describedthe impact of the socialisation of white South Africans, particularly thosecharged with defending apartheid, as follows:

My security force colleagues and I did not see the liberation movementsand their members as fellow citizens of our society We regarded them as

an alien enemy, which threatened our society Our job was to eliminatethat threat (Transcript of Armed Forces hearing, 15.10.97:107.)

As a consequence of the regime’s illegitimacy in the eyes of the majority of SouthAfricans, a widespread culture of resistance to, and non-collaboration with, thegovernment and its institutions took root in the 1890s This was reflected, interalia, in a widespread refusal by blacks to pay for state services, a legacy of whichlingers to this day

The issues being probed in these questions were designed to assess the extent

to which South Africans have in the seven years (at the time of the survey) since

their liberation, embraced the new dispensation as theirs and whether they havedeveloped a degree of trust and pride in those democratic institutions createdessentially as the product of their years of struggle and sacrifice These are morethan just interesting questions; they are important to the issue of democraticconsolidation Though hard won, democracy cannot and should not be taken forgranted in South Africa today The authoritarian habits of the past (capitalpunishment, summary justice, ‘kangaroo courts’, muzzling of the media) retaintheir adherents and sometimes even appear as viable options in the face of crises.For democracy to thrive and grow, the citizenry needs to develop a genuine sense

of support for and faith in the new democratic regime and its institutions

Satisfaction with the government

Each respondent was asked how s/he felt about the political situation in SouthAfrica in July 2001, as well as with the way in which their local area, homeprovince, and the country as a whole was being governed A six-point scale wasused to measure satisfaction levels Table 1.1 summarises some of this data bycombining the ‘very satisfied/satisfied’ and ‘very dissatisfied/dissatisfiedrespondents’ into two principal categories

Table 1.1 Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by province

Most significant in these results is the fact that a larger percentage of SouthAfricans indicated that they were dissatisfied, rather than satisfied, withgovernance at every level Given South Africa’s past history with unrepresentativegovernments and the euphoria that greeted the installation of ‘a government ofthe people’ in 1994, this would seem to be a high level of dissatisfaction,

1 ■ Politics, governance and civic knowledge

governance

Dissatisfied 43,3 45,5 40,4 38,4 45,3 18,8 43,8 42,3 33,4 40,5 Satisfied 38,7 41,4 36,5 30,0 32,4 56,1 41,9 34,1 31,9 35,9 National

governance

Dissatisfied 37,0 38,4 47,1 47,3 40,8 19,6 36,2 34,6 52,9 42,6 Satisfied 40,7 48,0 37,8 29,3 40,6 57,8 45,7 42,1 24,8 37,8

particularly with the national government Clearly expectations, whetherreasonable or not, are not being met.

The highest levels of displeasure were directed at local governance; with nearlyhalf of all respondents (45,6%) indicating that they were either ‘dissatisfied’ or

‘very dissatisfied’ with the way their local or home area was being governed(Table 1.1) This is perhaps not so surprising The new system of municipalgovernment with its radically restructured boundaries had only been put in placelate in the year 2000 and it had had little time to make a positive impact onpeople’s lives Conversely, however, it had had plenty of time to make a negativeeffect with stories of huge salary hikes, generous perks and ‘jobs for pals’

At both the local and provincial level, the provinces of the Free State,Mpumalanga, and the Northern Province had the highest levels ofdissatisfaction Nationally, the Western Cape (52,9%) and KwaZulu-Natal(47,3%) registered the highest rate of disapproval, which is perhaps indicative oftheir status as opposition provinces

In connection with questions of government performance, dissatisfaction wasparticularly underscored by the question of crime in South Africa, with 75,3% ofrespondents answering that they felt ‘violent crime’ had increased since 1994 Asthe following figures demonstrate, this sentiment was strongest in provinces likeGauteng (83,9%), the Free State (87,7%) and the Western Cape (89,3%) This isprobably reflective of the high crime rates – and the high levels of publicityaccorded to crime – in the cities of Johannesburg and Cape Town, and the factthat the Free State has since the early 1990s experienced a high level of farmviolence in the form of the killings of numerous white farm owners and/orfamily members

Table 1.2 Violence statistics in SA by province

Violent crime has increased since 1994 – province cross-tabulation

Political violence has decreased since 1994 – province cross-tabulation

Taken together, a little over half of all respondents still do not think of SouthAfrica as a more peaceful society post-1994, although they do believe thatpolitical violence has declined in the wake of the country’s political transition.However, this latter fact has done little for South Africans’ sense of security, as

1 ■ Politics, governance and civic knowledge

Province

Total

South Africa has become

more peaceful than it

was before 1994

Yes 44,3 50,0 38,6 62,2 47,8 58,5 51,3 59,6 15,4 46,6

No 55,7 50,0 61,4 37,8 52,2 41,5 48,7 40,4 84,6 53,4 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

Table 1.3 demonstrates that 69,8% of respondents answered that South Africawas ‘not safer than it was before 1994’ This is a huge percentage of thepopulation and, for any government, an alarming figure As noted earlier, thisvery high sense of public insecurity is certainly fuelled by the phenomenon ofviolent crime.

Table 1.3 Citizen safety in SA by province

South Africa has become more peaceful than it was before 1994 – race cross-tabulation

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

Province

Total

South Africa is now safer

than it was before 1994

Yes 31,6 35,7 23,4 32,0 31,8 37,5 46,6 36,7 14,4 30,5

No 68,4 64,3 76,6 68,0 68,2 62,5 53,4 63,3 85,6 69,5 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

Race

Total

South Africa has become more

peaceful than it was before 1994

Yes 52,5 30,2 50,4 18,2 46,6

No 47,5 69,8 49,6 81,8 53,4 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

But even more significantly, a sizeable majority in each racial category felt thesame way The apparent contradiction in the fact that a majority, albeit small, ofAfricans felt the country was more peaceful now but a majority felt less safe canonly be understood by reference to the degree of political violence unleashed onAfricans in South Africa by the security forces in the 1980s It seems thereforethat peace in the perceptions of Africans in South Africa is associated with theabsence of political violence while violent crime affects their perceptions ofsafety.

Table 1.4 Peace, safety, and crime in SA by race

Violent crime has increased since 1994 – race cross-tabulation

on average, at least 10% higher than Africans and Indians

Given these disparities, it is not surprising that more whites were alsodissatisfied with government performance Interestingly however, people’sevaluations of local governance were relatively the same when weighted for race

1 ■ Politics, governance and civic knowledge

Race

Total

Violent crime has increased

since 1994

Yes 72,9 83,9 72,7 86,8 75,4

No 27,1 16,1 27,3 13,2 24,6 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

Race

Total

South Africa is now safer

than it was before 1994

Yes 35,2 22,5 17,9 9,4 30,7

No 64,8 77,5 82,1 90,6 69,3 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

As Table 1.5 shows, only at the provincial and national level did African levels ofsatisfaction increase and the levels of satisfaction of whites decrease.

Table 1.5 Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by race

Locally, 32,9% of whites was ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with the way their localarea was being governed, while 34,3% of Africans said the same (These levelswere also consistent with coloureds and Indians, whose levels of satisfactionswere 38,1% and 41,4%, respectively.) Yet, when asked their level of satisfactionprovincially, 37,3% of Africans responded positively compared to 27,3% ofwhites Finally, on a national level, African rates of satisfaction increased to43,0% while that of whites decreased appreciably, to only 13% Correspondingly,only 38,0% of Africans were ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘very dissatisfied’ with nationalgovernance, compared to 68,3% of whites (Table 1.5)

These results present an interesting relationship Across race lines,approximately 45% of people were dissatisfied with the way their local area isbeing governed but, while the dissatisfaction of whites increases sharply on anational scale, that of Africans decreases As such, while Africans may take a moredismal view of how their local area is being governed, their satisfaction nationallysuggests a greater sense of confidence in the government’s performancecountrywide Conversely, many whites apparently do not hold the nationalgovernment’s performance in high esteem and take a similarly dim view of itsresponse to the problems of crime and security Again, given South Africa’srecent history and the regime change in 1994 that broke the white monopoly onpolitical power, these findings should come as little surprise

But perhaps most significant of all, and what should be most worrying for theANC as the dominant party in the country, is that there is no majority of satisfiedcitizens in any single category

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

Living standard measurements (LSMs)

Standard of living differences demonstrated a general trend in which satisfactionwith governance was highest for lower-income groups and declined steadily asincome increased Table 1.6 breaks down these levels of satisfaction

Table 1.6 Level of satisfaction with governance by living standard measurements

(LSM s)*

* For information on how living standard measurements (LSM) were divided, refer to the Appendix Essentially, LSM levels 1–2 are defined as ‘the less privileged’ (approximately 32% of population), LSMs 3–5 are ‘the emergent market’ (38% of population), and LSMs 6–8 are ‘the established

achievers’ (30% of population) who are predominantly ‘white adults, 35+ years old, who live in

houses, town houses or flats which they own’.

Significantly, respondents who had a higher living standard also felt that SouthAfrica was not more peaceful post-1994 and, on average, only 22% of those living

in LSMs 6–8 thought that the country was safer Again, the distinction in people’sminds noted earlier between peace and safety is discernible

Table 1.7 Peace and safety in SA by LSM

South Africa has become more peaceful than it was before 1994 – LSM cross-tabulation

LSM 2

LSM 3

LSM 4

LSM 5

LSM 6

LSM 7

governance

Dissatisfied 34,9 42,8 46,5 36,0 36,1 37,4 39,1 46,5 40,2 Satisfied 35,7 34,3 37,1 35,1 43,2 38,6 33,3 27,7 35,9 National

governance

Dissatisfied 34,8 36,8 37,7 36,7 36,1 42,7 47,4 65,2 42,4 Satisfied 33,5 35,7 44,5 42,1 46,8 40,9 31,8 15,8 37,8

LSM

Total LSM 1 LSM 2 LSM 3 LSM 4 LSM 5 LSM 6 LSM 7 LSM 8

South Africa has become

more peaceful than it

was before 1994

Yes 50,8 53,3 52,0 52,0 53,3 47,7 38,6 23,4 46,7

No 49,2 46,7 48,0 48,0 46,7 52,3 61,4 76,6 53,3 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

Table 1.7 Peace and safety in SA by LSM (continued)

South Africa is now safer than it was before 1994 – LSM cross-tabulation

% within LSM

To some extent this data seems counter-intuitive, since those with a higher dard of living would be expected to have greater access to means of protection(i.e burglar alarms, gated communities, more efficient police response) andtherefore less likely to be victims of violent crime Furthermore, if the majority ofpeople living in LSMs 6–8 are ‘married white adults’, it is likely that this group islargely made up of those whites who seem to hold low levels of satisfaction withthe way South Africa is being governed Similarly, if it is primarily Africans whomake up LSMs 1–4, a paradoxical relationship between race and class emerges.Although Africans of lower socio-economic status are more apt to suffer fromviolence and the failures of government policy in areas like service delivery, theyare still more politically satisfied than well-off whites who have greater socio-eco-nomic security and are presumably less dependent on public services

stan-Thus, this data, when tabulated for race and class, suggests that people’s levels

of satisfaction lie as much in their perception of governance as it does in reality.While white South Africans may be less dependent on government socialprogrammes, and less directly affected by the high crime rates, their dissatis-faction seems contingent on the perception that the whole country isnevertheless, unsafe and poorly governed Conversely, those Africans whosepersonal welfare may be more threatened by crime and local instability, have amore positive attitude towards their new rulers

South Africa is now safer

than it was before 1994

Yes 45,9 38,6 36,7 31,1 35,5 30,5 23,8 12,2 30,6

No 54,1 61,4 63,3 68,9 64,5 69,5 76,2 87,8 69,4 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

degrees of trust in a variety of civil institutions, including the nationalgovernment and the court system Again, a six-point scale of trust was used Aswith the satisfaction index, Table 1.8 summarises some of this data by combiningthe ‘strongly trust/trust’ and ‘strongly distrust/distrust’ respondents into twoprincipal categories.

Table 1.8 Level of institutional trust in SA by province

1 ■ Politics, governance and civic knowledge

Governance Trust level EC FS GT KZN M P NC NP NW WC RSA

National

government

Trust 52,9 55,6 48,9 46,9 48,5 58,0 65,1 65,9 35,6 51,5 Distrust 27,0 26,7 32,0 24,7 28,6 16,2 21,6 15,4 45,4 27,8

Local

government

Trust 39,9 36,8 35,9 29,4 31,3 49,8 50,5 43,2 36,2 37,5 Distrust 27,8 41,8 41,3 31,1 41,3 20,5 26,9 31,0 36,1 34,1

Courts

Trust 44,6 41,8 44,7 46,8 48,9 52,5 47,9 52,1 31,8 45,0 Distrust 36,7 35,7 36,8 25,6 28,8 16,6 36,9 23,8 37,5 32,5

Labour

unions

Trust 38,3 25,1 37,8 28,7 32,7 35,3 24,9 21,0 27,7 31,0 Distrust 22,1 24,2 28,3 21,0 33,1 19,5 32,9 29,0 37,8 27,3 Independent

Electoral

Commission

Trust 74,1 56,8 65,2 62,0 67,4 64,3 63,8 64,9 47,4 63,3 Distrust 1 7,1 24,3 15,7 12,5 10,3 12,4 10,9 1 9,2 24,5 13,9

Media

Trust 52,8 55,8 57,8 44,2 64,1 53,8 62,8 48,6 42,3 52,9 Distrust 12,4 16,6 17,3 14,3 10,3 9,3 12,7 14,4 23,7 15,3

Police

Trust 36,9 41,5 37,7 37,3 46,8 50,4 37,2 50,4 40,3 40,0 Distrust 34,9 41,6 39,0 43,3 30,7 18,7 50,0 31,6 38,1 38,9

Local police

station

Trust 36,8 43,3 37,4 34,6 35,2 53,2 39,2 41,8 44,7 38,7 Distrust 30,4 39,2 41,0 44,3 41,9 19,6 51,8 34,5 32,5 39,4

Political

parties

Trust 28,5 31,8 27,6 16,9 27,9 37,2 30,8 40,7 18,0 26,7 Distrust 36,6 47,2 47,3 43,1 41,7 24,1 36,0 30,5 47,4 41,5

On average, one in two South Africans (51,5%) responded that they either had

‘strong trust’ or ‘trust’ in the national government, compared to one in four whofelt ‘distrust’or ‘strong distrust’(28,0%) These figures would seem to us again to

be on the low side given the seminal nature of the change in South Africa infavour of democratic majoritarian rule only a few years earlier They, however,become even worse in regard to local government level As in the case of the

‘satisfaction’questions, fewer people (37,5%) expressed trust in local governance,

an only slightly higher figure than those who did not (34,1%) Also in line withthe statistics on dissatisfaction, respondents living in the Western Cape (45,4%),Gauteng (32,0%), and Mpumalanga (28,6%) again had the lowest levels of trust

in national government (Table 1.8)

As poorly as the government does in trust terms, the picture in regard topolitical parties is particularly bad, with only 26,7% of respondents expressingtrust in political parties This would seem a startlingly low figure, considering thewidespread legitimacy of the ANC, its history of struggle, its overwhelmingdominance of the political scene, and the so-called ‘Mandela legacy’.Interestingly, and somewhat paradoxically, more people expressed trust in thecourts (45,0%), which given their history in regard to administering injusticeand decades of repressive laws is surprising Likewise, given their role in the

‘struggle’ in the 1980s, why did so few express trust (31,0%) in labour unions?Even the police and military scored higher Given their histories as instruments

of oppression, this is a perplexing phenomenon

When asked about their trust in non-governmental institutions, SouthAfricans were, on average, more positive By far the greatest amount of trust wasplaced on the church, where only 7% indicated a lack of trust The public’s trust in

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

Governance Trust level EC FS GT KZN M P NC NP NW WC RSA

Business

Trust 49,8 35,1 48,2 32,1 50,5 49,5 54,5 30,8 44,3 43,4 Distrust 20,7 25,4 21,9 21,4 21,9 13,7 18,9 29,0 24,1 22,2

Churches

Trust 79,3 83,7 80,0 77,5 85,3 89,6 82,0 89,7 78,2 81,1 Distrust 1 5,9 1 6,7 10,1 1 4,8 1 4,1 1 2,2 10,2 1 5,0 1 6,3 1 7,0 South African

Defence Force

Trust 55,6 46,4 54,3 44,6 62,0 58,2 36,8 61,4 34,2 49,4 Distrust 13,1 22,3 16,1 19,5 10,0 1 9,0 28,6 1 6,7 33,3 18,5

the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was impressively high with 63,3%expressing faith in the organisation’s ability This was probably influenced by thefact that, seemingly against the odds, the IEC had administered the 1999 nationaland recent 2000 local government elections efficiently and fairly and in contrast

to the chaos which had attended the 1994 poll where it needs to be recalled that ittook ten days to produce (or manufacture in the case of KwaZulu-Natal) a result.Overall, business, the media, and non-governmental organisations such as thechurch were more trusted by the public than government institutions, althoughwhite South Africans displayed a much greater degree of trust in business thanblacks did

Race and living standard measurements

As with the breakdown over satisfaction, the responses on institutional trustagain indicate that Africans have greater trust in the government and civilinstitutions than whites do Tables 1.9a and 1.9b divide select institutional trustlevels by population group and living standard measurement

Table 1.9a Trust levels by race of select institutions in SA, EPOP 2001

1 ■ Politics, governance and civic knowledge

Governance Trust level Africans Coloureds Indians Whites

Table 1.9b Trust levels by living standard measurement (LSM ) of select institutions

in SA, EPOP 2001

Within this data, two patterns again emerge First, while the trust of Africansappears lowest with regard to those civil institutions closest to them (i.e localpolice), their levels of trust were higher when viewed from a countrywideperspective For example, their trust in the national government stood at 59,0%,even when only 40,1% reported having trust in their local government Second,the tendency of declining trust with increasing levels of incomes again applies,though not in regard to the media, churches, or business Extrapolating fromTable 1.9b, an average of 39% of LSMs 6–8 respondents indicated distrust in thenational government, while only 22% in LSMs 1–3 indicated the same degree ofdistrust While a respondent’s level of education almost certainly contributes tothis phenomenon, it is interesting to note that those respondents of fewest meansseem to have the most faith in the government’s ability to provide for them, whilethose of greater socio-economic wealth are the least trusting and also the mostdissatisfied

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

Governance Trust

level

LSM 1

LSM 2

LSM 3

LSM 4

LSM 5

LSM 6

LSM 7

LSM 8

Two other points warrant discussion First, when compared to similarstatistics compiled by the HSRC in 2000, many of the same patterns nowidentified were evident then Specifically, a similar racial dimension exists in thatwhites and Indians, ‘expressed considerably higher levels of dissatisfaction thandid coloureds and especially blacks … for whom dissatisfaction was lower thanfor any of the other groups’ (Houston, 2000:5) Furthermore, the provinces ofthe Western Cape, Mpumalanga, Gauteng, and the Free State were again thoseareas where dissatisfaction was highest However, it is interesting to note thatthese four provinces are also the wealthiest in light of their per capita income.According to the most recent data compiled in 1996, Gauteng is the wealthiestprovince in South Africa, followed by the Western Cape, Mpumalanga, and theFree State While Gauteng and the Western Cape are also home to two of SouthAfrica’s largest urban centres, it bears mentioning that this data is consistent withthe patterns discussed in terms of race and living standard measurements, inwhich dissatisfaction and distrust in government institutions is lowest amongstAfricans in poorer provinces, yet highest for wealthier whites in provinces withmore economic capital.

Second, although many of these patterns are consistent with those of previousopinion surveys, this year’s data does represent one significant reverse trend inthat fewer people expressed overall satisfaction Last year, Gregory Houstonnoted that dissatisfaction with national governance dropped from 55% in 1998

to 32% in 2000, while satisfaction rose from 37% to 53% in the same period oftime This year’s data, however, represents a steep decline in satisfaction, from53% to 37,8% Likewise, dissatisfaction has also gone up, from 32% to 42,6%.Thus, while institutional trust remains relatively strong in light of this decline, it

is clear that the government’s performance in 2001 has not been well regarded

Civic knowledge

Concurrent with the survey’s focus on people’s opinions about governmentperformance, questions were included to test respondents’ levels ofunderstanding about South Africa’s political and geographic make-up Eachrespondent was asked to answer a series of specific knowledge-based questions.The questions, and several of the relevant figures, are listed on the next page:

1 ■ Politics, governance and civic knowledge

(1) Who is the Minister of Finance in South Africa?

Finance M inister – province cross-tabulation

% within province

(2) What is the kilometre distance between Johannesburg and Durban?(3) How many million people live in South Africa?

(4) Which is the administrative capital of South Africa?

(5) In which year was South Africa’s first democratic election?

The authors have their doubts as to whether these questions constitute the bestmeans of gauging levels of civic knowledge (they did not draft them for inclusion

in the study) and feel that not too much weight should be given to the results.Nonetheless, it is impressive to note (in a table not reproduced here) that 91,4%

of respondents correctly answered that South Africa’s first democratic electionstook place in 1994 It is perhaps also impressive that nationally 44,4% of thosepolled correctly answered that Trevor Manual is the country’s Finance Minister.What would have been interesting and perhaps significant is if they had also beenasked who the nation’s President was

By contrast, only a very low figure of 4,2% of the population correctlyanswered that South Africa’s population presently numbers between 38–43million people and, again, living standard measurement was a significant factor

in the breakdown of correct responses Clearly, the greater education and accessafforded by higher socio-economic status was reflected in the answers to thesequestions

South African’s confidence in the democratic process As we have suggested atvarious points in this discussion, there would seem to be little cause forcomplacency around these questions in this society at present In our view, thedemocratisation process remains fragile, with high levels of dissatisfaction overissues like crime and violence (and probably other factors had other questionsbeen asked) and too little faith in the judicial process and rule of law The alarmbells may not be ringing, but the warning signs are certainly flashing.

2 ■ Political party preferences

Stephen Rule

Introduction

Seven months after the December 2000 local government elections, and with nonational elections scheduled until 2004, South Africans were asked to speculateabout their intended voting behaviour at those elections three years hence Thecontext was therefore not a highly politicised one and almost certainly a sense ofapathy and disillusionment existed in relation to party politics, given theextremely low turn-out (one-third of potential voters) in the local governmentelections Observations during those elections showed that many young peoplestayed away on election day, the queues at polling booths being dominated by theelderly The specific question posed in the July 2001 survey was ‘for which party

do you plan to vote in the next election?’

A change in the political landscape occurred subsequent to the 2001 surveywhen the New National Party (NNP) withdrew from the Democratic Alliance(DA) and decided rather to co-operate with the African National Congress(ANC) An immediate consequence of this was the DA’s loss of power in theprovincial government of the Western Cape This change was not anticipated inthe survey and responses thus constitute sentiment at a stage when the DApartners were all still members of the Alliance

It is pertinent to note here that support for individual liberal democraticfreedoms is relatively low amongst South African adults (O’Donovan, 2000).Some differences exist between voters that indicated support for the ruling ANC

in the December 2000 local government elections and those who said they wouldsupport other parties Amongst the latter, there was generally less support for thegovernment being able to subjugate freedoms such as the expression of

‘unpopular’ opinions and group association, or reducing public access toinformation The analysis that follows examines mid-2001 voter sentiment about